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T.be  present volume  is part of a  series of sectoral studies on  the 
evolution of concentration in the member  states of the European 
Community. 
Those  reports were  compiled by  the different national Institutes and 
experts,  engaged  b,y  the Commission  to effect the study programme  in 
question. 
Re~ing  the specific and  general interest of these reports and  the 
responsibility taken by  the Commission  with regard to the European 
Parliament,  they are published wholly  in the original version. 
The  Commission  refrains from  commenting,  only stating that the 
responsibility for the data and  opinions appearing in the reports, 
rests solely with the Institute or the expert  who  is the author. 
Other reports  on  the sectoral programme  will be  published by  the 
Commission  as  soon as  they are received. 
The  Commission  will also publish a  series of documents  and  tables of 
syntheses,  allowing for international comparisons  on  the  evolution of 
concentration in the different member  states of  the Comruunity. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
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181 Chapter  I  INTRODUCTION 
This  study of  the United Kingdom  cement  industry was  sponsored by  the 
Commission  of  the European  Communities  as  part of  a  wider  series of  such 
industrial studies  throughout  the E.E.C.  A central objective of  this series 
is  to  provide  a  detailed statistical analysis of  changes  in the concentration 
of  industries  selected for  investigation,  applying  a  standard methodological 
framework  specified by  the Commission.  In addition,  each  study addresses 
itself to questions  concerning  the extent  to which  firms  are  connected by 
interlocking shareholdings  and  interlocking directorates,  the  concentration 
of  share  ownership  and  the significance of  company  directors'  interests  in 
the capital of  their own  firms.  Furthermore,  each study investigates  such 
practices or agreements  as  are likely  to prove  detrimental  to  competition 
within the industry under  investigation. 
For  the  most  part,  the  studies  are based  upon statistical information 
extracted  from  company  reports  and,  as  such,  are  exposed  to all the 
inconsistencies  and  limitations  that  such reports  contain.  In our  case, 
however,  statistical information available  to  the  'independent  costs  committee 
of  the Cement  Makers'  Federation for purposes  of  fixing  common  prices was  made 
available  to  us  on  a  strictly confidential basis.  In consequence,  the 
concentration analysis  throughout  Chapter  5  is based  on cement-specific 
information provided  on  an entirely consistent basis.  For  this reason,  our 
results are exceptionally accurate  and  our general  conclusions  are  drawn with 
an unusual  degree of confidence. 
As  a  consequence  of  our  investigation,  we  concluded  that significant 
connections  existed between certain of  the six cement  producers  in the United 
Kingdom  in the form  both of  interlocking shareholdings  and  of interlocking 
directorates.  For  this reason  the measures  of  concentration were  calculated 
on  three  separate bases,  each reflecting a  different view of  the structure of 
1 the U.K.  cement  industry.  We  concluded  that  the weight  of  evidence 
supported  the view  that  there was  a  small  trend decline  in concentration 
over  the period  1968-1977,  although  this was  more  marked  in the case of 
concentration measures  which  gave  strong weighting  to market  share 
increases  by  relatively small  producers.  In no  case was  a  trend increase 
in concentration apparent,  although  there was  a  marked  pro-cyclical  tendency 
for  concentration to  increase in the boom  and  to  decline in the recession. 
The  situation is obscured  somewhat  by  the existence of  a  common  price 
agreement within  the industry operated by  the Cement  Makers'  Federation. 
This  price agreement  has  been endorsed  twice  by  the Restrictive Practices 
Court  and  does  not provide high profits  to its members.  In our view  the 
structure and  the conduct  of  the  UK  cement  industry does  not distort  the 
movement  of  cement  between  the United Kingdom  and  other E.E.C.  countries. 
The  low  level of  international  trade  in cement  products  is explained in 
terms  of high  transport costs  and high  dock  charges  in the U.K. 
2 Chapter  2  THE  NATURE  AND  EXTENT  OF  PRODUCTION 
I.  The  Composition of Portland Cement 
Although mineral  cements  of  one kind  and  another  have  been manufactured 
for utilisation  ~n the building processes  since early historical  times, 
Portland  cement  is a  relatively modern material.  The  first reference  to 
'Portland cement'  occurs  in the patent granted  to Joseph Aspdin,  a  builder 
of Leeds,  in  1824  for  a  cement  produced  by firing a  mixture  of  limestone  and 
clay.  Aspdin's  product was  not  the Portland  cement  currently manufactured, 
but rather  an  improved hydraulic  lime  cement,  not unlike  that described by 
the Roman  writer,  Vitruvius.  Indeed,  it was  not until  1845  that  the first 
true Portland  cement  in the modern  sense was  produced  in Kent  by firing a 
mixture  of  chalk and  clay to  a  temperature  sufficiently high as  to  complete 
the  chemical  and  physical reactions which  occur  in the manufacture  of modern 
cement. 
Hydraulic  cements,  of  which Portland cement  is by far  the most  important, 
are  so-named  because of  their ability to  set and  develop  strength under water. 
They  are mineral  substances which,  in fine  powder  form,  react with water, 
evolving  heat  and  forming  a  strong,  dense mass  of  very  low  solubility.  The 
principal hydraulic  compounds  present in Portland cement  are  tricalcium 
silicate  (50-70 per cent),  dicalcium silicate  (20-30  per cent),  tricalcium 
aluminate  (5-12  per cent)  and  calcium aluminoferrite  (5-12  per cent).  As 
indicated,  the proportion of  each of  these  compounds  present in the finished 
cement  depends  both on  the  raw materials utilised and  on  the production proces! 
employed.  Variations  in proportion affect  the properties of  the cement  and 
controlled variations are exploited  to  produce different  types  of Portland 
cement. 
These  hydraulic  compounds  of  calcium are formed,  in the process of 
Portland  cement manufacture,  by  the reactions  between oxides  of  calcium, 
3 silicon,  aluminium and  iron present  1n  the raw mix  as  they are brought  to 
increasingly higher  temperatures  in the  cement  kiln.  Table  I  outlines  the 
common  raw materials  used  in Britain and  the  typical  raw material mix  used 
in manufacture: 
Table  I  Analyses  of  Typical  Raw  Materials 
Chalk  Clay  Limestone  Shale  Marl  Typical  raw  mix 
Silica  I.  14  60.48  2. 16  55.67  16.86  14.50 
Alumina  0.28  17.79  1.09  21 .50  3.38  3.03 
Iron Oxide  o. 14  6. 77  0.54  9.00  I.  11  I.  31 
Calcium Oxide  54.68  1.61  52.72  0.89  42.58  44.38 
Magnesium  Oxide  0.48  3. I 0  0.68  2.81  0.62  0.59 
Sulphur  0.01  nil  0.03  0.30  nil  nil 
Sulphur  Trioxide  0.07  0.21  0.02  nil  0.08  0.07 
Loss  on  Ignition  43.04  6.65  42.39  4.65  34.66  35.86 
Potassium Oxide  0.04  2.61  0.26  4.56  0.66  0.52 
Sodium  Oxide  0.09  0.74  0. 11  0.82  0.12  0.13 
99.97  99.96  100.0  100.20  100.07  99.99 
(Source:  'Portland Cement  in the Making'  published by  Cement  and  Concrete 
Association,  1978) 
In  the majority of cases,  the required proportions of oxides  in the raw 
mix are obtained by blending  calcareous materials  such as  chalk or  limestone 
with argillaceous materials  such as  clay or shale.  In some  cases,  however,  the 
essential  oxides  occur  approximately in the desired proportions and  require 
only  a  minimum  of blending. 
4 2.  Types  of Portland Cement 
The  main  types  of Portland cement manufactured  in the United  Kingdom 
are  (a)  ordinary,  (b)  rapid-hardening,  (c)  sulphate-resisting,  (d)  white, 
(e)  masonry  and  (f)  blast furnace. 
(a)  Ordinary Portland cement  is  the most  widely  used of all cements, 
and accounts  approximately for  85  per cent of  total United Kingdom  cement 
production.  It has  a  medium  rate of heat evolution and  strength development. 
(b)  Rapid-hardening Portland Cement  is similar in chemical  composition 
to ordinary Portland cement  but differs physically in being more  finely  ground 
during manufacture.  Although it is not  'quick-setting'  the greater  specific 
surface provided by  the finer particle size increases  the rate of  early 
hydration,  giving higher early strengths which  are  important  in concrete work 
which  calls for  the early removal  of  formwork  or rapid  turn around  of  precast 
concrete units  in a  mould. 
(c)  Sulphate-resisting Portland cement  is manufactured especially for  use 
in concretes which  may  be  subject  to  the effects of  sulphates  in solution.  Such 
sulphates attack the hydration product of  tricalcium aluminate which is therefore 
restricted in this process  to  not more  than 3.5  per cent.  This  limitation is 
imposed  by  decreasing  the  alumina in the feed material  and  by  adding extra 
iron oxide  to  the  raw mix. 
(d)  White Portland cement  is used  for visual effect in white or coloured 
concretes which are  to be left exposed,  and also in white or coloured mortars 
for masonry and  rendering.  It has  the  same  properties as  ordinary Portland 
cement  but is manufactured  from  special  raw materials which  substantially are 
free  from  colour-forming compounds  such as  the iron oxides which give other 
cements  their characteristic grey or grey-brown colour.  The  materials used 
in Britain are pure chalk and white  china clay. 
5 (e)  Masonry  cement  is produced  from ordinary Portland  cement  clinker 
with additives  incorporated during grinding.  These  additives  increase 
the cohesiveness  of  the mixed mortar,  increase water  retention and  limit 
the development of strength in the mix.  Masonry  cement  is not suitable 
for making concrete. 
(f)  Portland-blastfurnace  cement  is manufactured only in small 
quantities in Britain.  However,  it represents  a  significant part of  the 
outputs of  the  cement  industries of  some  countries.  It 1s made  by  inter-
grinding ordinary Portland cement  clinker with selected granulated blast-
furnace  slag.  The  slag  shows  little hydraulic activity of its own,  but 
reacts with the alkaline products  of  the hydration of  the Portland cement. 
3.  Cement  Manufacturing Processes 
Although variations of detail,  which may  be  considerable,  exist  from 
plant  to plant,  all methods  of  cement  manufacture are designed  to  produce 
the  same  end product  and  all involve  the  same  fundamental  stages. 
Firstly,  the  raw materials are  reduced  to  fine particle size  so  that 
they  can be mixed.  Secondly,  the  raw materials  are  blended  and  mixed  to 
produce  a  raw feed mix  of uniform chemical  composition.  Depending on  the 
process used,  the blending  and mixing may  take place partly during  the 
milling stage,  or may  be  a  completely  separate operation.  Thirdly,  the 
blended  raw mix  is heated  to  the point where all moisture  is driven off 
as  steam or water vapour.  Fourthly,  the dried mix is heated  to  decarbon-
ation or  calci-ning  temperature of approximately  800°C.  At  this  temperature, 
the calcium carbonate in the mix  is dissociated into calcium oxide  (free 
lime),  which  remains  in the mix,  and  carbon dioxide which  is driven off  as 
gas.  Fifthly,  the mix  is further heated  and  as  the  temperature  rises  the 
oxides of  calcium,  silicon,  aluminium and  iron react  to  form  the calcium 
silicates,  aluminate and  aluminoferrite which are  the principal active 
compounds  of Portland cement.  This  process is completed at a  temperature 
6 of  around  1400°C.  The  resulting product is Portland  cement  clinker. 
Sixthly,  the clinker is cooled  to  a  temperature at which it can be 
handled  conveniently,  60  - 150°C.  Clinker may  be  despatched directly 
to  the finish grinding mills;  but usually it is stockpiled.  Since 
clinker may  be  stored for relatively long periods without deterioration 
it is possible to  supply cement  to  locations far-distant  from  the works 
by  shipping clinker rather  than finished  cement.  Seventhly,  clinker is 
ground  to  the specified fineness  with the addition of  a  small  proportion 
of  gypsum  to control  the setting time  of  the finished  cement.  Additives 
for  the special  cements  are incorporated during  the grinding  stage. 
Finally,  the finished  cement  is stored in silos for  a  relatively short 
time  before being despatched  to  the  customer  in bags  or  in bulk.  Bulk 
delivery,  using specially designed  dry-bulk carriers,  accounts  for  some 
75  per cent of all cement  sold in the United Kingdom. 
Manufacturing methods  can be  divided  into  two  broad categories,  the 
wet  and  dry processes,  which differ in the way  materials are dealt  with 
until stage 4,  the calcining stage.  In  the wet  process,  the  raw materials 
are  reduced  to  the requisite fineness  in water and  are blended,  stored 
and  fed  to  the kiln as  fluid  slurry.  Water  in the slurry - approximately 
30-40  per  cent by weight  - is eliminated in the initial stage of kiln 
processing.  In the dry process,  moisture  in the  raw materials  is eliminated 
in part by  heating  in the initial processing  stage,  usually in the case of 
hard materials,  during  the grinding  stage itself.  This relatively dry 
'meal'  is blended and  usually is passed  through a  preheater  system which 
completes  the drying  and  (in  the case of  complete  preheater  installations) 
raises  the meal  to  a  temperature at which it is partially calcined. 
The  two  maJor variants of  the wet  and  dry processes  are  the  semi-wet 
and  semi-dry methods.  In both,  the  raw  feed,  prepared either by  the wet 
or by  the dry methods,  according  to  the nature of  the  raw  materials,  ~s 
7 formed  into pellets or nodules with a  medium moisture  content.  The  pellets 
or nodules  are fed  into  the kiln by  means  of  a  grate preheater,  in which 
the moving  bed  of  nodulised material is dried and brought  up  to  calcining 
temperature by heat  from  the kiln. 
The  choice of process  is dependent  upon  a  combination of  factors, 
including the nature of  the  raw materials,  the  thermal  efficiency of  the 
different processes  and  energy prices.  Following  the quadrupling  of oil 
prices  in  1973-74,  the relatively fuel-intensive wet  process,  once widely 
used,  where  the raw materials were  chalk and  clay,  is largely being 
superceded by  the dry or  semi-dry processes wherever  the  raw materials 
are  suitable  (ideally  limestone and  shale).  Energy prices are also 
generating more  active consideration of  the semi-wet process,  which  is 
still only in limited use throughout  the world.  In  1977,  the wet process 
accounted for  67  per cent of kiln capacity in the U.K.,  the dry process 
for  18  per cent and  the  semi-dry for  15  per cent. 
In all processes,  kilns are operated continuously,  24  hours  a  day, 
7  days  a  week,  apart from  shutdowns  for relining with heat-resisting 
refractory bricks or other necessary repairs.  Grinding mills are 
operated  to meet  current orders. 
4.  Transport  and Distribution 
The  distribution of  cement  to  customers  is a  major  operation, 
involving the  large-scale utilisation both of  labour  and  of capital.  In 
1945,  all but  a  small  percentage of  the industry's output was  sold in 
bags,  with much  of it delivered by  rail to rail-served builders'  merchants 
yards,  whence  it was  finally distributed  to  the  user  for  site mixing.  At 
the present  time,  however,  some  87  per  cent  of  UK  production,  although still 
invoiced  through merchants,  goes  direct  from  the manufacturer  to  the  customer, 
with only  13  per  cent  passing  through merchants'  yards.  Bagged  cement 
8 accounts  for  only  just over  25  per  cent of  the  total, whilst  the  remainder 
is delivered  in bulk  to  the  customers'  own  silos. 
Another  significant change has  been  the relative decline  in site 
mixing  in the more  densely populated areas.  Only  about  one-third of all 
cement  now  reaches  the construction site as  cement  itself;  the  large 
majority arrives  in  the  form  of  ready-mixed  concrete or manufactured 
concrete products.  The  ready-mixed  concrete  industry is  the  cement 
industry's  largest single market,  taking over  40  per cent of  production, 
whilst manufacturers  of precast concrete  and  asbestos  cement  products  take 
a  further  25  per cent.  Both  industries receive virtually all their cement 
in bulk.  In  1976,  40.7  per cent  of all U.K.  cement was  delivered  to  ready-
mixed  concrete manufacturers,  22.1  per  cent  to  precast  concrete manufacturers, 
2.1  per cent  to  asbestos  cement manufacturers,  13.6 per  cent  to merchants' 
yards  and  21.5  per cent  to sites,  etc. 
Cement  may  be  delivered direct from  the works  to  the  customer;  but  a 
considerable proportion is routed  through manufacturers'  regional distribution 
depots  from which  local deliveries are made.  Deliveries  to  customers  almost 
invariably are  by  road,  but despatches  from works  to  depots  may  be  by  road 
or by rail.  In  1977,  approximately 84  per cent were  by rail.  Water  transport 
(by barge or coastwise  shipping  in bulk and  in bags)  accounts  for  6  per  cent 
of all works-to-depot despatches.  Virtually all bulk cement  is now  delivered 
in purpose-made pressurised  tank vehicles  using air discharge.  Bagged  cement 
is delivered by  standard platform lorries.  In general,  the cement manufact-
urers maintain a  sufficient fleet of bulk vehicles  to meet  peak demands, 
whereas  fleets  of  lorries for  bagged  cement  are normally only large  enough 
to  accommodate  average  demand,  with lorries and drivers hired additionally 
from  independent hauliers  to meet  peak demand. 
9 5.  Cement  and  Energy 
The  manufacture  of  cement  is necessarily energy-intensive,  in that 
the chemical  and  physical reactions  involved in  the production of  cement 
clinker  take place at high  temperatures.  The  greatest use of primary  energy 
occurs  Ln  the manufacture  of clinker in the  cement kiln and  major  efforts 
have  been made  (even prior  to  1973/74)  to  economise  in this  input.  Between 
1965  and  1975,  the  average  energy  consumption  from  fuel  in British kilns 
fell by  23  per  cent  from  7.2  to  5.5 giga Joules  (GJ)  per  tonne  of clinker. 
The  process  used has  an  important bearing  on  the amount  of  energy 
required.  In particular,  the wet  process  is much  the most  fuel-intensive, 
since even  Ln  the most  modern wet-process kilns,  water  evaporation accounts 
for  40  per  cent or more  of  the  total heat  consumption.  Thus,  in  1975,  the 
average  energy consumption from  fuel  in British wet-process kilns was 
6.60 GJ/t,  compared  with 3.66 GJ/t for  dry process kilns,  and  3.42 GJ/t 
for  the  semi-dry process. 
Inevitably,  there is a  world-wide  shift  towards  the use  of  dry or 
semi-dry processes wherever  raw materials allow,  and  to  the semi-wet  process 
elsewhere.  In addition,  there  have  been continuing  improvements  in kiln 
design and  in associated equipment which also  have  increased  the energy 
efficiency of kiln systems.  Notable  among  these have  been  improvements  Ln 
the design of  the chain system in the drying  zone  of wet-process kilns,  the 
adoption of  suspension preheaters for  dry-process kilns,  improvements  in 
clinker cooler design,  and  the use of waste heat  from  the cooler for 
recycling purposes. 
Approximately  84  per  cent of existing kiln capacity is coal-fired, 
approximately  11  per cent is gas-fired from  the national grid and  approx-
imately 5  per  cent is oil-fired.  Since  1973/74,  a  number  of kilns previously 
fired by oil have been  converted  to  gas  firing.  Considerable  attention has 
10 been devoted in recent years  to  the use of  low-grade  fuels  in cement 
manufacture  and,  following preliminary trials,  pulverized domestic  refuse 
is now  used  to  supplement pulverized coal  fuel  in certain cement works. 
The  firing of  raw materials  into clinker in the kilns  accounts  for 
just under  90  per cent  of  the net  energy used  in cement manufacture.  In 
addition,  the industry consumes  substantial  amounts  of  secondary energy 
in the form  of electricity,  especially in the milling of  raw materials  and 
of  cement  clinker.  To  economise  in electricity costs,  grinding mills, 
wherever  feasibl~ are  used  during periods of off-peak electricity demand. 
6.  Cement  Production in the United Kingdom 
There  are seven manufacturers  of Portland cement  in the United Kingdom: 
The  Associated Portland Cement  Manufacturers  Ltd  (APCM) 
The  Rugby  Portland Cement  Company  Ltd  (Rugby) 
Tunnel  Holdings  Ltd  (Tunnel) 
Ribblesdale  Cement  Ltd  (Ribblesdale) 
Aberthaw and  Bristol Channel  Portland Cement  Company  Ltd  (Aberthaw) 
The  Ketton Portland Cement  Company  Ltd  (Ketton) 
Imperial  Chemical  Industries Ltd  (ICI) 
APCM  own  26  per cent of Aberthaw.  Ribblesdale 1s  owned  50 per  cent by 
Tunnel  and  50 per cent by  Ketton.  Thos.  H.  Ward  Ltd.  owns  29.9  per cent of 
Tunnel  and  100  per cent of Ketton.  Thus,  it also has  a  majority interest 1n 
Ribblesdale.  The  first six companies  listed above  manufacture  and  market 
Portland  cement  and  are  members  of  the Cement  Makers'  Federation  (CMF). 
ICI  markets  its cement  through APCM  and  is not  a  member  of  the  CMF.  Currently, 
it is the smallest manufacturer  and  produces  cement  in order  to  render 
profitable its use of  limestone  slurry which is a  residue  from  that used  1n 
some  of  its other production processes. 
11 The  number  of cement  producing works  in the U.K.  has fallen from  51 
1n  1968  to  31  in 1978.  APCM  reduced its number  of  cement works  over  this 
period from 33  to  16,  Tunnel  from  5  to  3,  and  ICI  from  2  to  1.  One  of 
Tunnel's works  does  not manufacture clinker,  but only grinds  clinker into 
cement.  The  other manufacturers  each have  the  same  number  of  cement works 
at present as  they had  10  years  ago.  Rugby  has  7,  Aberthaw  2,  and 
Ribblesdale and  Ketton one  each. 
The  annual  production capacity of  the  UK  industry currently is 
estimated at  some  20  million tonnes  of  cement  clinker.  Table  2  outlines 
the rated production capacity of  each manufacturer. 
Table  2  The  Productive Capacity 
of  UK  Cement  Manufacturers  Jan.  1978 
Manufacturer  Million Tonnes  Per  cent 
APCM  12.5  62 
Rugby  3. 1  15.5 
Tunnel  1.5  7.5 
Ribblesdale  1.1  5.5 
Aberthaw  1.0  5 
Ketton  0.7  3.5 
ICI  0.2  I 
--
20.1  100 
(Source:  Price Commission  'The Associated Portland  Cement  Manufacturers Ltd. 
- Increases  in Cement  Prices'  HMSO  495  12th June  1978) 
The  rate of capacity utilisation varies quite markedly  through  the 
cycle of  the construction industry.  For  example,  in  1973  - the peak year 
for  cement  demand  in the  UK  - the  throughput  actually exceeded  rated 
capacity.  Since  then,  capacity utilisation declined  to  a  low  of  75  per cent 
12 in  1976  and  rose  to  80  per  cent in  1977  only as  a  consequence  of works 
closures.  Table  3  outlines  UK  manufacturers'  deliveries of all cement 
to  the U.K.  market  over  the  decade  1968-1977: 
Table  3  UK  Manufacturers'  Deliveries  of  Cement 
to  UK  Market  1968-77 
Year  Millions  of  Tonnes  Annual  Change 
1968  17.6  +2 
1969  17.4  -I 
1970  17. I  -2 
1971  17.8  +4 
1972  18.0  +I 
1973  19.9  +II 
1974  17.5  -12 
1975  16.8  -4 
1976  15.5  -8 
1977  14.3  -8 
(Source:  Price Commission op.cit.) 
% 
Table  4  analyses  U.K.  deliveries of  cement  for  the  three years  1975 
to  1977  by  market  segment: 
Table  4  UK  Deliveries of  Cement  by  Market  Segment  1975-77 
--
1975  1976  1977 
Harket  Millions  of  Tonnes  -
Readymix  concrete  7. I  6.3  6.1 
Concrete  products  3.3  3.4  3.1 
Building sites  3.9  3.4  2.6 
Merchants'  yards  and  2.2  2.1  2.2  stockists 
Asbestos  cement  products  0.3  0.3  0.3 
-- -- --
16.8  15 .. 5  14.3 
(Source:  Price Commission  op.cit) 
13 There  is very little trade  between  the  UK  and  other countries  1n 
cement,  largely as  a  consequence  of relatively high  transport costs.  UK 
exports  of  cement  and  clinker were  static between  1974  and  1976  at  some 
one million  tonnes  each year.  In  1977  they rose  to  1.75 million tonnes. 
APCM  accounted  for  over  90  per  cent of  UK  exports  of  cement  and  clinker 
during  1976  and  1977.  In  1975,  its share was  70  per  cent.  In  1977,  APCM 
gained The  Queen's Award  for Export Achievement.  Throughout  the last five 
years,  there have  been no  imports  of  clinker  into  the UK.  Cement  imports, 
all into Northern Ireland from  the Irish Republic,  declined  from  100,000 
tonnes  in  1973  to  10,000  tonnes  in  1977. 
The  Location of Plants 
In  1977,  Portland cement was  produced  by  31  works  in  the U.K.,  30  of 
which were  fully  integrated plants  producing  finished  cement  from  locally 
obtained raw materials.  The  one  remaining works  (as  outlined above)  was 
restricted  to  clinker grinding only.  The  majority of  these works  are 
located in England.  There  are  two  works  in South Wales,  one works  in 
North Wales,  one  integrated works  and  one  clinker grinding works  in 
Scotland and  two  works  in Northern Ireland.  Figure  1 outlines  the  location 
of  cement  works  in the United Kingdom  1977,  and  separates out  the works  of 
the largest cement manufacturer,  APCM. 
Because of  the very high capital costs  involved in the construction or 
expansion of  a  cement works,  and  the high costs of  transporting  raw materials, 
it is important  that  the works  should have  raw material resources  which will 
be economically workable  over  long periods of  time.  This  is a  major  factor 
both in establishing new  works  and  in planning  the  future  development  of 
existing works.  Throughout  the history of  cement manufacture,  plants have 
been closed down  because of  the exhaustion,  or  limited future,  of  their  raw 
material  resources. 
14 In consequence,  the market  penetration of  the largest cement 
manufacturer,  APCM,  varies markedly across  the country.  In  1977,  it 
served  100  per cent of  the market  in the North of  Scotland  and  Northern 
Ireland and  over  90  per  cent in the West  Country.  Yet,  in parts of  South 
Wales  and  Northamptonshire,  it controlled  less  than one-fifth of  the 
market.  Figure  I  indicates  the  importance of plant  location as  a  basis 
of APCM's  varying market penetration. 
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17 Chapter  3  COST  AND  OUTPUT 
It is important  to  distinguish clearly between cost of production 
in the short-run,  when  cement  makers  are unable  to vary  the input of 
certain factors  such as capital and,  increasingly in the United Kingdom, 
labour,  and  cost of production in the  long  run when  all factor  inputs may 
be varied  ~n response  to  changing market  pressures.  Both concepts  are 
important  to an understanding of  the  UK  cement  industry and its arrangements. 
I.  Short-run costs 
In this  study,  we  have made  no  attempt  to  estimate short-run cost-
output functions,  either by means  of  statistical cost analysis or  by  means 
of engineering  simulations.  Rather,  we  have  attempted  to  isolate  the 
changing composition of average  total costs  of  cement  in the United Kingdom 
over  the period  1966  to  1977,  using available  information,  provided  by  the 
independent  costs  committee  of  the Cement  Makers'  Federation,  in response 
to  the  requests  of various  government  price control  agencies. 
In  1966,  the average manufacturing cost per  ton of  UK  cement  was 
75/9d,  with the following  composition as  outlined in Table  5: 
-----------------· -----
Table  5  Average  UK  Cement  Manufacturing Costs 
per Ton  1966 
r 
Input  % of Av.Manufg.Cost 
Kiln Fuel  27 
Electric Power  12 
Wages  and  Salaries  17 
Maintenance Materials  13 
Works  Overheads  9 
Depreciation  8 
Other  Costs  14  --
100  --
per 
(Source:  National  Board  for Prices  and  Incomes  Report No.38: 
Portland  Cement  Prices Aug.  1967  at p.7) 
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l 
ton It is evident  from Table  5  that fuel  and  power  costs  accounted at 
that  time  for  almost  40  per cent of  total manufacturing costs.  Table 6 
outlines  the  composition of  average  total costs  per  ton of  cement which 
in  1966  amounted  to  110/IOd  per  ton. 
Table  6  Average  Total  Costs  per  ton of 
UK  cement  1966 
Input 
Manufacturing 
Delivery  expenses 
Sales  expenses  and 
containers 
Merchants'  margins 
and  discounts 
(Source:  Ibid at p.7) 
% of  average  total cost per  ton 
68 
18 
7 
7 
100 
A subsequent  report of  the National  Board  for Prices  and  Incomes, 
published in November  1969,  provided  a  more  detailed analysis of  average 
short-run cement  costs  and  offered a  comparison between the composition of 
such costs  in  1966  and in  1969.  Table  7  outlines  the  situation thus 
depicted. 
Perhaps  the most  significant change  between  1966  and  1969,  as 
outlined in Table  7  is the fall  in the preparation of kiln fuel  costs 
to  total costs of  cement  production from  18.3  to  16.7 per cent.  This 
was  achieved,  despite rises in fuel  prices over  the period,  by  cement 
makers  changing  the quality and  type  of  fuel utilised,  notably a  shift 
from oil  to  coal,  and by significant reductions  in fuel  consumption per 
ton of  cement  produced. 
20 Table  7  Average  Cost  of  UK  Cement  per  Ton  1966-69 
-~==~~==========~~==-====--~ 
Component 
Raw  materials  (including  clinker 
purchased) 
Wages 
Maintenance materials 
Kiln Fuel 
Electric power 
Works  overheads 
General  administration 
Depreciation 
Others 
Manufacturing cost 
Delivery expenses 
Sales  expenses  and  containers 
Merchants'  margins  and  discounts 
TOTAL  COST 
Year  to  31-12-66 
% 
5.2 
11.7 
8.6 
18.3 
7.9 
6. 1 
3.8 
5.4 
1.4 
68.4 
18.3 
7.2 
6. 1 
100 
----------··-~-
··--·--~, 
Six months  to  30-6-69 
% 
5.6 
12.0 
8.9 
16.7 
8.2 
6.6 
4. 1 
5.8 
1.3 
69.2 
18. 1 
6.8 
5.9 
100 
(Source:  These  properties were  calculated from National  Board  for Prices 
and  Incomes:  Report  No.133  'Portland Cement  Prices'  Nov  1969 
at Table  D and  p.9) 
In  1978,  the Price Commission  provided detailed  information on  the 
short-run costs of  the largest  cement  maker  in the United  Kingdom,  APCM, 
with indications of  changes  in the  company's  cost profile which had 
occurred between  1973  and  1977.  Table  8  outlines  in detail  the  changes 
in the composition of costs for  that period.  The  distinction between 
variable and  fixed  costs adopted  by  the Commission  is retained for  exposition 
21 purposes  but we  would  stress  that the division,  especially with regard 
to manpower  and  to repair stores,  is arbitrary. 
Table  8  Total Unit  Costs of  APCM  (1973  and  1978) 
Unit  Costs 
Production Variable: 
Kiln fuel 
Electric power 
Other 
Fixed: 
Manpower 
Repair  stores  (maintenance 
parts) 
Process  stores 
Overheads 
Total Production Costs 
Distribution 
Total Unit Costs 
1973 
% 
19 
9 
4 
14 
1  1 
4 
16 
32 
45 
77 
23 
100 
1977 
% 
26 
10 
4 
10 
10 
3 
14 
--------------·( 
Per  cent  Increase 
in Unit Costs  1977:1973 , 
232 
193 
129 
40  208 
68 
127 
112 
1  12 
37  102 
77  146 
23  145 
100  146 
_________  .. _  --- -~---.. --·-----.. ·--·--·----.. ---------------------------' 
(Source:  The  Price  Commission  supra at p.28) 
As  is  evident  from Table 8  both production and  distribution costs 
rose  to  the same  extent over  the period  1973  to  1977.  However,  unit variable 
production costs  (as  defined by  the  Commission)  were  three  times  greater, 
whilst unit  fixed  costs  (similarly defined)  had  only  doubled.  This 
differential almost  wholly was  explained by  the proportionately higher 
escalation in kiln fuel  and electric power  costs over  this period.  Indeed, 
22 in  1977,  energy in terms  of kiln fuel  and electricity was  the largest 
cost item in cement  production,  accounting for nearly 50  per  cent of 
total production costs,  with labour  and  maintenance  costs of  less 
significance  than had  been  the case in  1973. 
As  we  indicated in Chapter  2,  energy utilisation now  is central  to 
the economics  of  cement  making,  and  indeed  is especially sensitive to 
the process utilised.  Table  9  which outlines  information provided by 
APCM  to  The  Price Commission,  indicates  the advantages  in terms  of cost 
per  ton of cement  of using  the dry or  the  semi-dry process rather  than 
the wet  process  in cement  production. 
Table  9  Cost per  ton in Cement  Production by  Process  (Wet  Process  100) 
Dry  Process  Semi-Dry  Wet  Process 
Process 
Kiln fuel  22 
Electric Power  15 
- - -
Sub  total fuel  37  38  52 
- - -
Manpower  12  12  8 
Repair  stores  (maintenance  12  12  16  parts) 
Overheads  16  19  14 
Other costs  3  7  10 
- -- -
TOTAL  80  88  100 
(Source:  APCM  The  Price Commission  supra p.29) 
In  1977,  an average wet  process works  required  22  tonnes  of  standard 
coal  for  each  100  tonnes  of clinker produced,  whereas  the average  dry 
process works  required only  12  tonnes.  Clearly,  rising energy costs have 
23 widened  the  total production cost differential between dry  and  semi-dry 
process  works  and wet  process works,  from  15  per  cent in  1973  to  22  per 
cent in  1977. 
In such circumstances,  UK  cement  makers  have  intensified  their 
efforts to  achieve  fuel  economies,  available without major  capital 
expanditure.  For  example,  APCM  during  the past  few  years  has  carried 
out  a  programme  involving  the reduction of  slurry water  content,  the 
reduction of kiln back-end  temperatures,  the operation of kilns as 
close  to  capacity as possible,  the  improvement  of wet kiln chain systems, 
the  improvement  of heat  transfer  from  the clinker coolers,  and  the 
reduction of  grinding energy  requirements  and  grinding media costs. 
Between  1969  and  1977,  APCM  reduced its energy  requirements  per  tonne 
of  cement  by  17  per cent  from  69  therms  to  57  therms  per  tonne,  whilst 
other UK  cement  makers  reduced  their energy requirements  from  70  to  64 
therms  per  ton.  Since  1972,  APCM  has  used  approximately  15  per cent less 
energy per  tonne  than  the other  UK  cement makers.  Nevertheless,  as  Table  8 
indicates,  kiln fuel  costs have still risen relative  to  other  costs between 
1  9 7  3  and  1  9  77 . 
As  is evident  from Table 8,  since  1973  distribution costs per  tonne 
have  increased at the  same  rate as  production costs.  In part,  this  increase 
is explained by  the decline in the  level of deliveries  to  the  UK  market.  In 
part,  it is a  consequence  of  cement  makers,  individually anxious  to maintain 
market  share,  incurring distributional costs  by  satisfying customers' 
demands  for delivery from specific plants or at particular  times  of day  for 
no  additional charge.  The  Price  Commission  incorrectly referred  to  such 
activities as  "distribution inefficiencies".  In reality,  of  course,  they 
are  an inevitable outcome  of  competition. 
Company-owned  and  hired vehicles represent  the major distribution 
cost  item,  accounting  in the case of APCM,  for  example,  for  some  58  per 
cent of  total distribution costs  in  1977.  Almost all of APCM's  deliveries 
24 ~n the  UK  are made  by its own  vehicle fleet,  which  comprises  some  1,000 
specialised bulk delivery vehicles  and  500  flat platform vehicles  for 
bagged deliveries.  Hired  transport occasionally supplements  the  company's 
own  fleet for  deliveries of bagged  cement,  but not  for  bulk deliveries. 
Delivery vehicles operated  from  the  16  works  - each of which  acts  as  a 
depot  - and  from  35  independent  depots. 
Long  distance  transport represents  some  28  per  cent  of APCM's  total 
distribution costs.  It consists of linear trains which  supply  on  a  regular 
timetable  34  of  the  35  depots,  and coastal  shipping which deliver  cement  to 
the offshore  islands  and  to Northern  Ireland.  APCM  would  like  to make 
greater use of water  transport,  utilising its experience of shipping  up  the 
Thames  from Northfleet.  Presently,  high  labour costs render  this alternative 
uneconomic. 
Operational  research  techniques  on  a  computerized  system  ~s  vsed  by 
APCM  to minimise  total deliveried costs,  though  the constraint of  satisfying 
special  customer  requirements  presently is binding in the actual  solutions 
achieved. 
2.  Long-run costs 
The  information available on  the  relationship between  long-run cement 
production costs  and  capacity of works  (i.e.  returns  to  scale)  is patchy 
and  somewhat  dated.  In particular,  all estimates predate  the  1973  energy 
crisis.  Nevertheless,  the results are presented here with notice of  their 
limitations. 
Table 10  outlines  the principal relationships between costs  and  scale 
for cement manufacture  in Germany  and  in the USA,  as  outlined in a  United 
Nations  study published in  1963. 
The  results outlined in Table 10  were  reviewed  in greater detail for 
two  hypothetical  US  cement  works.  These  latter results are outlined in 
Table 11. 
25 TablelO  Returns  to  Scale  in Cement  Manufacture  (1963) 
-·--
Capacity of Works  ('000 metric  tons p.a.)  --
33  66  100  200  400  500  1,000 
Fixed  investment Eer  ton 
of  capacit~: 
w.  Germany  (index)  200  146  121  100  79  - -
USA  (index)  120  100  83  80  56 
Labour  requirements: 
USA  No.  per  '000  tons  156  100  67  63  31 
(index) 
Unit  costs Eer  ton of 
caEacity: 
W Germany  (index)  150  121  114  100  86 
USA  (index)  116  100  89  84  63 
--L--------' 
(Source:  Studies  1n the Economics  of  Industry  1.  United Nations,  New  York  1963) 
Table  11  A Breakdown of  Unit Costs  for  Two  HyEothetical  US  works 
120,000  1,000,000  % of  total 
tons p.a.  tons  p.a.  saving 
Cost  $  per  ton  --
Direct  labour  3.70  0.90  32 
Direct material  and water  0.67  0.67  -
Power  2.10  2.10  -
Fuel  2.37  2.37  -
Indirect  labour  and  overheads  3.37  I.  61  20 
Depreciation on  fixed  capital  4.93  2.53  27 
Interest on  fixed  capital  3.89  2.00  21 
-- -- -
21  .03  12.18  100 
i 
(Source:  Studies  in Economics  of  Industry  !.United Nations  New  York  1963) 
26 As  is evident from Table 10  substantial  economies  of scale existed  1.n 
1963  for  labour,  fixed capital and  overhead  costs,  but  no  economies  of 
scale for materials  and  fuel. 
In  1968,  Pratten published estimates,  based on  engineering simulations, 
of  the relationship between scale and  costs  for  new  UK  cement  works.  The 
importance  of  the  assumptions  about  the number  of  kilns  and mills  installed 
in works  was  emphasised.  In addition,  it was  assumed  that  the  2 million 
ton works  was  sited on  the coast,  as it was  considered uneconomic  to 
transport  I  million ton units  to  an  inland site. 
Table 12  Estimated Costs  for  New  UK  Cement  Works  1968 
Capacity  (000  ton)  100  200  500  1,000  2,000 
Number  of kilns  and mills  1  1  2  2 
Indices  of costs 
Fuel  and  power  100  98  97  96 
Wages  and  salaries  100  70  55  40 
Depreciation and  return on capital  100  80  70  58 
Overheads  100  90  82  75 
Average  total costs  100  85  77  69 
Value  added  100  80  69  58 
Marginal  cost  100  70  72  61 
(Source:  Pratten,  C.F.  'Economies  of  Scale  in Hanufacturing  Industry' 
C.U.P.  1968  at p.92) 
2 
95 
35 
47 
70 
62 
49 
55 
Although  technical  scale economies  exist for  individual kilns  in cement 
production,  process  industries prefer,  where  possibl~ to  have  at least  two 
units  to  provide flexibility for  contingencies  such as  breakdowns  and  relining. 
In  1968,  breakdowns  represented  5  per  cent of capacity per  annum  in the  UK 
cement  industry. 
27 In conclusion,  althoughscaleeconomies exist in cement  production, 
it is worth emphasising  that  these may  be offset by managerial  and 
distributive diseconomies  if very large units were  to  be established. 
The  fact  that  the average  UK  cement  plant is smaller  than  that for 
continental Europe  does  not  imply necessarily therefore  that  the  UK 
cement  makers  are sacrificing available cost  savings  in cement  manufacture 
and  distribution as  a  whole. 
28 Chapter  4  OWNERSHIP  AND  CONTROL 
This  chapter is concerned with answering  four  questions: 
(a)  To  what  extent are  the firms  in the  UK  cement  industry connected by 
interlocking shareholdings? 
(b)  How  extensive are  interlocking directorates  between  companies? 
(c)  How  concentrated is  the ownership  of  the  independent  companies  1n  the 
industry? 
(d)  Do  company  directors  have  significant  interests  in the capital of 
their own  firms? 
These questions will  be  considered  for  each  of  the  six companies  in the 
Cement  Makers'  Federation  (Associated Portland  Cement  Manufacturers Ltd., 
Rugby  Portland Cement  Company  Ltd.,  Tunnel  Cement  Ltd.,  Aberthaw  and  Bristol 
Channel  Portland Cement  Company  Ltd.,  Ribblesdale  Cement  Ltd.,  Ketton Portland 
Cement  Manufacturers Ltd),  the main results being  summarised  in figures  1 
and  2  and  table  17.  In all cases  the  information has  been obtained  from  the 
relevant  company  reports  and  accounts  for  1976. 
Associated Portland 
The  largest of  the  cement  manufacturers,  Associated Portland  is an 
independent  company  with relatively dispersed  ownership.  In  1976  no  single 
shareholder owned  10%  or more  of  the  issued ordinary  stock of  the  company. 
The  size distribution of  shareholdings  in that year was  as  shown  overleaf. 
Associated Portland held  26%  of  the  issued ordinary share capital of 
Aberthaw Cement  and  appointed  one  representative  to  the  six-member  board of 
directors  of  the latter.  The  representative  concerned was  also  a  director of 
Associated Portland.  Finally,  the  combined  shareholdings of APCM's  board of 
directors,  including  family  interests,  accounted  for  only  0.04%  of  the  issued 
ordinary stock of  the  company. 
29 Size  of holding 
Number  of  Total  Percentage  of  Percentage  of 
of  ordinary  £1 
holders  holdings  total  accounts  ordinary capital 
stock 
I  - 250  13,274  1,913,497  30.3  2.4 
251  - 500  II  ,843  4,388,652  27.0  5.4 
501  - I,  000  10,264  7,601,412  23.4  9.4 
I,  001  - 5,000  7,534  14,149,034  17.2  17.5 
5,001  - 10,000  385  2,652,809  0.9  3.3 
10,001  - 20,000  163  2,458, 711  0.4  3.0 
20,001  - 50,000  160  5,355,747  0.4  6.6 
50,001  - 100,000  75  5,599,875  0.2  6.9 
100,001  - 200,000  59  8,669,867  0. I  10.7 
200,001  and  above  56  28,194,675  0. I  34.8 
Totals  43,813  80,984,279  100.0  100.0 
Rugby  Portland 
Rugby  Portland is the only firm in the  UK  industry which is not  connected 
with another member  of  the Cement  Makers'  Federation through interlocking 
shareholdings  and directorships.  The  ownership  of  the  company  is relatively 
dispersed,  the distribution of  shareholdings  in  1976  is as  shown  overleaf. 
No  single holding accounted  for  10%  or more  of  the  issued  share capital 
of  the  company  and  the directors'  interests totalled 0.25%  of  the ordinary 
and  1.63%  of  the participating shares. 
30 Table  14 
Ordinary Shares  (nominal  value  25p) 
Size of  Number  of  Total  Percentage of  Percentage of 
holding  holders  holding  total accounts  ordinary shares 
I  - 100  I ,422  81,952  5.5  0.1 
101  - 250  3,878  677,618  15.0  1.0 
251  - 500  4,862  I,808,428  18.8  2.6 
50 I  - I, 000  6,193  4,479,584  24.0  6.4 
1,001  - 5,000  8,30I  16,784,589  32.2  23.8 
5,001  - 10,000  707  4,858,716  2.7  6.9 
10,001  - 50,000  326  6,301,598  1.3  9.0 
50,001  and  above  II7  35,407,515  0.5  50.3 
I 
I  Totals  25,806  70,400,000  100.0  100.0  I 
i 
Participating Shares  (non-voting,  nominal  value  5p) 
·-
Percentage  of 
! 
Size of  Percentage  of 
I  Number  of  Total  part icipat  in,q: 
' 
holding  holders  holding  total accounts  shctres 
I - 100  40  2,603  1.6  o.o 
I01  - 250  96  16,496  3.9  0.1 
251  - 500  246  90,240  9.9  0.3 
501  - 1  '000  486  358,433  19.5  I.  I 
I ,001  - 5,000  I, 245  2,787,539  49.9  8.6 
5,001  - 10,000  21  I  I , 45 I , I 56  8.5  4.5 
10,001  - 50,000  I 
101  2,067,759  4. I  6.4 
50,001  and  above  I  68  25,625,774  2.7  79. I  I 
Totals  2,493  32,400,000  100.0  100.0 
I  ' 
31 Tunnel  Cement 
Tunnel  Cement  1s part of  the  group  now  known  as  Tunnel  Holdings  Ltd. 
4.3%  of  the  'B'  and  100%  of  the  'C'  ordinary  shares  of  the parent company 
are owned  by  Thos.  W.  Ward  Ltd.,  a  firm with major  interests  in steel, 
engineering and  vehicles  as well  as  cement.  These  shares entitle Thos.  W. 
Ward  Ltd  to  29.9  % of  the votes  attached  to  the ordinary capital of  Tunnel 
Holdings  Ltd.  Prior  to  1973  a  substantial financial  interest in Tunnel 
Cement  Ltd  had  been held  (since  1911)  by  the Danish group  F.L.  Smidth  & Co. 
A/S,  whose  principal business  is the manufacture  of  cement  making machinery 
together with the provision of advice  and  support in the design and building 
of  cement  works  across  the world.  However,  the  Smidth group  eventually 
decided  that a  large stake in one  of  the major  UK  cement manufacturers 
conflicted  to  some  extent with their main activities and  in  1973  Thos.  W. 
Ward  Ltd.  acquired  their holding- which at that  time  accounted  for  2,742,910 
'A'  shares  (carrying one vote per share),  382,181  'B'  stock units  (carrying 
one vote per  two  units of  stock)  and  40%  of  the  total votes.  The  Panel  on 
Take-Overs  and  Mergers  would  only  consent  to  the  transfer of  such a  large 
block of shares if Thos.  W.  Ward  agreed  to  a  certain reduction 1n  the voting 
powers  of  the equity  they  had  purchased.  Subsequently all  'A'  shares acquired 
by  the Ward  group were  converted  into  a  new  class of  'C'  shares with voting 
rights  governed by  a  formula  which  reduced  the entitlement  from  40%  to  29.99% 
of  the votes.  Upon  completion of  the  transaction,  two  directors of  the Ward 
group  joined  the Tunnel  board  in place of  the resigning Danish directors 
nominated  by F.L.  Smidth  and Co.,  and  since that  time  Thos.  W.  Ward  Ltd., 
have  contined  to provide  two  directors for  the  company.  In  1976  the Tunnel 
board had  nine members. 
Apart  from  the Ward  shares,  no  other holding  accounts  for  10%  or more 
of  the  issued  share capital of Tunnel  However,  Tunnel  Holdings Ltd.  itself 
has  a  50%  interest in Ribblesdale  Cement  Ltd.,  the  other  50%  being owned  by 
32 Ketton Cement  Ltd.  - a  wholly  owned  subsidiary of  Thos.  W.  Ward  Ltd. 
Three  directors of  Tunnel  are members  of  the  seven-member  Ribblesdale  board. 
In March  1977  the directors of Tunnel  and  their  families  owned  0.77% 
of  the  'B'  ordinary  shares  of  the company. 
Aberthaw Cement 
In  1977,  approximately  26%  of  the ordinary share  capital of Aberthaw 
was  held  by Associated Portland.  Apart  from  this block,  no  other holding 
accounted  for  10%  or more  of  the ordinary  shares,  which were  distributed as 
follows: 
Table  16  -
Size of  Number  of  Total  Percentage of  Percentage of 
holding  holders  holding  accounts  ordinary  shares 
I  - 500  590  155,693  53.8  4.0 
501  - I,  000  200  164,490  18.2  4.2 
I,  001  - 5,000  235  531,874  21.4  13.7 
5,001  - 10,000  28  201 '242  2.6  5.2 
10,001  - 20,000  24  358.652  2.2  9.2 
20,001  - 50,000  5  189,572  0.5  4.9 
50,001  - 100,000  II  849,276  1.0  21.9 
100,001  and  above  4  1,434,958  0.4  36.9 
(including APCM, 
I  million) 
Totals  I,  097  3,885,757  100.0  100.0 
Associated Portland are  represented by  one  of  their directors  on  the 
Aberthaw board  (made  up  of  six members  in  1976). 
The  beneficial and  non-beneficial  shareholdings of  the Aberthaw directors 
accounted for  6.4%  and  4.5%  respectively of  the  company's  ordinary shares  on 
31st December  1976. 
33 Ribblesdale  Cement  Ltd 
Ribblesdale  is owned  jointly by Tunnel  Holdings  Ltd  and  Ketton Cement 
Ltd.,  each of  the  latter companies  having  a  50%  stake.  Since Ketton is a 
wholly owned  subsidiary of  Thos.  W.  Ward  Ltd.,  who  also have  a  substantial 
holding  in Tunnel,  this  implies  that,  indirectly,  the Ward  group  have  a 
majority interest in Ribblesdale. 
The  seven-member  board  of directors consists of  three representatives 
each  from Tunnel  and Ketton  together with an  independent  managing  director. 
The  chairmanship  of  the board rotates bi-annually between appointees  of  the 
two  companies. 
Ketton Cement  Ltd 
Ketton Cement  Ltd.  is now  part of  the Thos.  W.  Ward  group  of  companies, 
who  therefore appoint its directors.  Thos.  W.  Ward  obtained  complete  control 
in  the  summer  of  1973  (at which  time  they were  also  acquiring  their interest 
in Tunnel),  having previously held  73.6%  of  the ordinary shares.  Ward  had 
also  acted as  the sole selling agents  for Ketton's  products  before  1973. 
Ketton has  a  50%  interest in Ribblesdale  Cement  Ltd  and  appoints  thre-
representatives  to  the latter's seven-member  board of directors. 
SUMMARY 
There  are significant connections  between  the  companies  ~n the  UK  cement 
industry in the  form  of  interlocking  shareholdings  and  interlocking director-
ships.  Two  firms,  Ketton and  Ribblesdale,  are wholly  owned  by other  firms 
involved  in  the  industry,  while  substantial proportions of  the  ordinary capital 
of Tunnel  and  Aberthaw are also held  by  other  companies.  These  ownership  links 
are paralleled by  a  similar set of  interlocking directorships. 
The  two  independent  companies,  Associated Portland  and  Rugby  Portland, 
have  relatively diffuse ovmership.  With  the  exception of Aberthaw,  the prop-
ortion of  each  company's  stock held  by  its board of directors  is trivially small. 
34 Figur~  1:  Interlocking Shareholdings  1976  (Ordinary  Shares  only) 
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RIBBLESDALE Table  17  Ownership  of  Ordinary Shares  1976 * 
I  ! 
I Large holdings:  i 
Nominal  Number  beneficial owner  Directors'  Directors'  holdings 
Company  Type  of share  Value  Issued  and  percentage of  holdings  as  a  percentage of 
(thousands)  shares  held  (thousands)  shares  issued 
! 
Associated  Ordinary  stock  £1  81000  - 31.196  0.04  Portland 
Rugby  Portland  Ordinary  shares  2Sp  70400  173. 196  0.2S  I  - I 
I 
I 
Participating  (non- Sp  32400  S28.1SO  1.63  I  - I  voting)  shares  I 
Tunnel  'A'  Ordinary  shares  SOp  137.09  - - -
'B'  Ordinary  shares  SOp  8860. 190  - 67.9IS  o. 77 
'C'  Ordinary  shares  SOp  2742.910  Thos.  Ward  (I  00%)  - - I 
Aberthaw  Ordinary  shares  2Sp  388S.7S7  I Associated Portland  423.SS9  I 
10.9 
l  I 
(26%) 
I  L  I 
*  Ketton and  Ribblesdale are not  included,  both being completely owned  by  other companies. Chapter  5  RECENT  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  THE  CONCENTRATION  OF  THE  CEMENT  INDUSTRY 
1.  General  Remarks 
This  chapter is concerned with recent movements  ~n various  indices  of 
concentration for  the cement  industry.  The  statistical measures  used  are 
as  follows: 
Absolute measures  of concentration 
Concentration ratios 
Herfindahl  index 
Entropy  index 
Hall-Tideman  index 
Linda  index for all firms  ~n the  industry 
Relative measures  of concentration 
Coefficient of variation 
Redundancy  index 
Gini  coefficient 
Linda  indices  for  subsamples  of  firms  in the  industry 
Variance  of  logarithms 
The  relative measures  are designed  to  assess  the inequalities within 
a  given sample  of observations,  whereas  the absolute measures  are  intended 
to provide  comparisons  between  the observed distributions and  some  notion of 
a  "perfectly competitive"  industry.  For  example,  the Gini  coefficient and 
the variance of  logarithms  both take  the  same  value  (zero)  for  an  industry 
composed  of  two  firms  of  equal  size as  for  an  industry containing  three 
identical firms.  In contrast,  the Herfindahl  and  Hall-Tideman  indices 
would  indicate  that  the latter structure was  less concentrated. 
For  the purposes of  the present analysis  this distinction between  the 
types  of  index is of little importance  however,  since  the number  of  firms 
39 ~n the  cement  industry has  not  changed  during  the period of  interest.  In 
such circumstances it can be  3hown  that  there exist positive monotonic 
relationships  between various  absolute  and  relative indices  (see Appendix  B). 
The  measures  linked by  these relationships  are: 
the Herfindahl  index and  the coefficient of variation, 
the Entropy  index  and  the  redundancy  index, 
the Hall-Tideman  index  and  the Gini  coefficient. 
Since  the  above  pairs  contain the  same  statistical information for  the  UK 
cement  industry,  graphs  of  the movements  of  the  indices have  only been 
presented for  the absolute measures,  although  tabulations of both sets of 
indices have  been provided. 
The  analysis which follows  is divided  into  two  major  sections dealing 
with  the  concentration of output  and  of  other variables  (employment,  capital, 
sales,  etc.)  respectively.  This has  been done  because  extremely  good  data 
on market  shares  for Portland Cement,  based on output figures,  is publicly 
available  through  the  1978  Price  Commission  study of  the Associated Portland 
Cement  Manufacturers.  The  output data has  therefore been  subjected  to  a 
fairly  comprehensive  analysis,  while  the less  complete  information on  the 
other variables  of  interest is presented  ~n a  more  summarised  form. 
2.  Concentration Movements  in the  Supply of Portland Cement 
The  basic data  for  shares  of  the Portland Cement  market  is  shown  in 
table  18.  Portland Cements  account for over  90%  of  total  cement  sales in 
the  UK  and  movements  in relative shares  for  this market  provide accurate 
indicators of  developments  in the  industry as  a  whole.  For  example,  it 
can be  seen from  the  table  that APCM's  share of  the Portland Cement  market 
fell  from  61%  in  1975  to  60%  in  1976  and  then  to  59%  in  1977.  Over  the 
same  period the company's  share  of  the total  cement market moved  in a 
similar fashion  from  62%  in  1975  to  61%  in  1976  and  60%  in  1977. 
40 The  Period  1968-77 
Table 18  indicates  that  the share of  the principal producer,  APCM, 
has  fluctuated  around  a  slightly downward  trend  (continued  from earlier 
years)  since  1968,  tending  to move  upwards  when  demand  is increasing and 
downwards  when  demand  is decreasing  (for  1968-77,  demand  has  "highs"  in 
1968  and  1973,  and  "lows"  in 1970  and  1977).  Of  the  two  intermediate 
sized produceers,  Rugby  has  steadily increased its market  share while 
Tunnel  has  fallen back,  particularly since  1972.  These  relative movements 
are in line with what might  be  expected  from  the profit margins  of  the  two 
companies,  Rugby  having  a  significantly higher ratio of profit  to  turnover 
than Tunnel.  Finally,  the market  shares  of  the  three  smaller  companies 
have  steadily increased over  the  ten-year period. 
Future Prospects 
In  1977  APCM  operated at a  little over  80%  of estimated production 
capacity;  Rugby,  Ribblesdale  and  Aberthaw at around  75%;  Tunnel  at 95%  and 
Ketton at  10%,  the latter raising its capacity by  14%  in 1978.  The  gradual 
recovery of  demand  expected by  the  industry over  the years  1978-80  is 
therefore  likely  to  be  of  most  benefit  to  the market  shares  of  the first 
four  companies. 
Ownership  Considerations 
In interpreting  the movements  1n  the market  shares of  the six 
companies,  it is important  to  take  into account  the  common  ownership 
arrangements  explained  in Chapter  4.  With  these factors  in mind  two 
further  sets of market  share  data have  been calculated  and  are  shown  in 
tables  19  and  20.  In table  19  the market  share of Ribblesdale  has  been 
allocated equally between Tunnel  and  Ketton  since  these  latter  two  companies 
each have  a  50%  stake in Ribblesdale  and  dominate  its board  of directors.  In 
41 table  20, Aberthaw's market  share has  been  added  to  that of APCM,  while 
Tunnel,  Ketton  and Ribblesdale have  been  consolidated  into  a  single group 
representing  the holdings  of Thos.  Ward.  The  latter aggregation is 
appropriate when  the interest lies in the concentration of  ultimate control 
in the market,  on  the assumption  that  the  26%  stake of  APCM  in Aberthaw  and 
the  30%  stake of Thos.  Ward  in Tunnel  represent controlling blocks  of  shares. 
The  trends  shown  by  table 19  are very  similar  to  those in the 
unadjusted data.  The  addition of  50%  of Ribblesdale's  (rising)  market 
share  to Tunnel's  does  not prevent  the downward  movement  of  the combined 
figure.  However,  table  20 presents  a  rather more  static picture.  The 
smaller market  shares have  disappeared and  Rugby  becomes  the smallest of 
the three groupings.  APCM's  market  share  shows  the  same  pro-cyclical 
variations as  before but  there is now  little indication  of  a  downward  trend. 
The  Ward  group  has  lost a  fraction of its share over  the period,  but Tunnel's 
contraction has  almost  been counterbalanced  by  the progress  of Ketton and 
Ribblesdale. 
Concentration Ratios 
Tables  21,  22  and  23  and  figures  3,  4  and  5  show  the behaviour  of 
the various  concentration ratios over  the period,  calculated  from  tables 18, 
19  and  20  respectively.  The  most  significant changes  since  1968  are  the 
relatively steady falls  in the  three-firm concentration ratios c;  and  C~ 
resulting from  the  increasing market  shares  of  the smaller  companies.  The 
fall  is greatest for  the unadjusted data,  which  implies  a  decline  from  88.5% 
in  1968  to  84.5%  in  1977.  The  two-firm concentration ratio for  the unadjusted 
data  shows  a  slight upward  trend,  reflecting the  increasing market  share of 
Rugby  since around  1970;  but  this  ceases  to  be  the  case when  c2  is calculated 
from  tables  19  and  20.  Overall,  the movement  of  the  concentration ratios 
suggests  some  movement  towards  a  more  "competitive"  industrial structure 
between  1968  and  1977, 
42 Herfindahl  Indices 
The  movement  of  the Herfindahl  index is strongly  influenced by  the 
fluctuations in APCM's  share of  the market,  since  the  APCM  term in the 
formula  for  the index accounts  for  about  90%  of  the latter's value.  It 
can  be  seen from  tables  24  and  25, together with  the corresponding graphs, 
that Ha  and  Hb  (calculated from  tables  18  and  19  respectively)  show  a  clear 
downward  trend  together with a  strong cyclical movement  which  correlates 
with demand  fluctuations.  The  cyclical variation is due  chiefly to  the 
pattern in APCM's  market  share outlined earlier.  However,  the  trend  in 
the index disappears  when  table  is used  as  the basis of  the calculations. 
In this  case  the  trend  level ofconcentrationin the  industry appears  to  be 
fairly static over  the period. 
In  summary,  then,  the Herfindahl  indices  indicate: 
(a)  a  trend  towards  reduced  concentration among  the operating units  (firms) 
in the  industry; 
(b)  little longer-run movement  1.n  the concentration of ultimate "control"; 
(c)  a  strong pro-cyclical movement  of concentration,  irrespective of 
which  data  l.S  used  to  calculate  the  index. 
Coefficient of Variation 
The  values  of  the coefficient of variation for  each of  the  three sets 
of data are  shown  in table 25.  The  coefficient of variation is related  to 
the Herfindahl  index by  the formula  (see  appendix A). 
cv  I  N.H  - 1 
where  N is the number  of firms  in the  industry.  Since  N is constant between 
1968 and  1977  there is a  positive,  monotonic  relationship between  the  two 
statistics.  Hence,  graphs  of  the coefficient of variation through  time  follow 
a  similar pattern to  those  1.n  figure  6,  and  the CVs  yield  the  same  conclusions 
as  the Herfindahl  indices. 
43 Entropy  Indices 
The  entropy  indices for  the data  ~n tables  18,  19  and  20  are  shown 
in tables  26  and  figure  7.  Bearing in mind  that an increase  in the entropy 
measure  represents  a  decrease  in concentration,  the statistics  show  the  same 
pattern as  the Herfindahl  indices  although,  because  E  attaches  a  little 
more  weight  to  the smaller  firms,  the  trend movements  are more  pronounced 
and  the cyclical variations  less  severe. 
Redundancy  Indices 
The  redundancy measure  (R)  is related  to  the entropy  index by  the 
formula: 
R  =  log2  N - E 
Since N is constant over  the period under  examination,  R contains  the  same 
information as  E.  The  values of R are  shown  in table 
Hall-Tideman  Indices 
The  Hall-Tideman is another  index which attaches more  weight  to  the 
smaller firms  than  the Herfindahl.  Its values  are  shown  in table 
figure 8.  Again  the pattern is one  of a  pro-cyclical movement  in concen-
tration superimposed  on  a  definite downward  trend when  the index is calculated 
from  tables  18  and  19.  However,  this  index also  suggests,  ~n contrast  to  the 
earlier results,  a  downward  trend in the concentration of "control"  (i.e.  Tc 
also  shows  a  downward  movement  over  the  ten years).  The  difference can be 
explained by  the extra weight given by  the Hall-Tideman  to  the smaller firms. 
Thus,  ~n case c,  the index is rather more  influenced by  the increasing market 
share of  the smallest grouping  (Rugby)  than  the previous measures. 
The  Gini-Coefficient 
Values  of  the Gini  coefficient,  derived  from  tables  18,  19  and  20  are 
given in table  29.  The  Gini  coefficient  (G)  is related  to  the Hall-Tideman 
44 index by  the  formula 
G  =  1  - N.T 
With N fixed it ~s  therefore directly linked  to T  and  provides  the  same 
information. 
Variance  of Logarithms 
The  variance of  logarithms  is most  useful as  a  measure  of concentration 
when  the underlying  size distribution of  firms  is lognormal  or approximately 
lognormal.  This  is not  the case in the  UK  cement  industry,  but values of 
the  index - shown  in table 30  and  figure  9  - are  included for  completeness. 
Inspection of  the data reveals  that,  for  this  Index,  the cyclical movements 
in concentration are highly attenuated and  the  downward  trend  is very 
pronounced  in cases  a  and  b.  The  trend,  though  smaller,  can also be 
discerned  in case c.  Once  more  this behaviour of  the statistic is due  to 
the relatively high weight it gives  to  the  smaller firms,  which  have  been 
increasing their market  shares  over  the last ten years. 
Linda  Indices 
The  final  set of statistics used  to  examine  the development  in 
concentration in the present  study are  the Linda  indices.  Linda  indices 
can be  calculated either for  the  complete  industry or for  the  largest 
n  (<  N)  firms  in the industry,  where  n  ~s an  arbitrary integer greater  than 
or equal  to  two.  Since  there are only six firms  ~n the  UK  cement  industry 
the full  set of Linda  indices for each of  tables  18,  ~9  and  20  are  e~ven in 
tables  31,  32  and  33,  and  are graphed  in figures  10,  11  and  12. 
The  three  indices  relating  to  the  complete  industry are,  for 
comparative purposes,  graphed  together  in figure  13.  All  three  show  an 
unmistakeable  cyclical pattern and  downward  trend.  It should be noted 
that in case c,  while  the decline  in the  index  is not as  great  as  in the 
45 other  two  cases,  the general  downward  movement  through  time  is clearly 
visible.  Comparing  the value of  the  indices  in "high"  concentration years 
1968  and  1974,  and  in the "low"  concentration years  1971/2  and  1977  yields 
the following percentage falls: 
% fall in  between 
La 
6  1968  &  1974  =  6.1% 
La 
6 
1971  &  1977  =  4.7% 
Lb 
5  1968  &  1974  8.6% 
Lb 
5  1972  &  1977  5.7% 
Lc 
3  1968  &  1974  =  5.6% 
Lc 
3  1971  &  1977  2.2% 
The  remaining Linda  indices  show  how  concentration has  changed within 
subsamples  of  the largest n  (<  N)  firms.  Thus,  for  example,  L; has  declined 
1n recent years  because of  the  growth  1n  the market  share of  Rugby  relative 
to  that of APCM.  Again,  the cause  of  the rise in L; is  the decline of 
Tunnel,  which  has  increased  the  degree  of  inequality between  the  three 
largest firms.  Movements  in the other indices  can be  explained in a 
similar fashion. 
Conclusions 
All  the  indices calculated above  for  the unadjusted data of  table 
show  (a)  a  trend decline  in concentration over  the period  1968-77,  and 
(b)  a  pro-cyclical movement  in concentration around  this  trend.  These 
findings  also  hold when  the market  share of Ribblesdale is divided between 
Ketton and  Tunnel  to yield  the  data  in table  19.  However,  the  further 
aggregation of market  shares  undertaken  in table  20  leads  to  less clear-
cut results.  A trend decline  is  just visible in  the  Hall-Tideman  index, 
more  pronounced  for  the variance  of  logarithms  and  the Linda  indices,  but 
46 apparently non-existent for  the Herfindahl  and  Entropy measures.  The 
difference appears  to  be  linked  to  the weighting given by  the  indices 
to  the  smaller firms  in the market,  s~nce it  ~s  the latter which have 
made  the highest proportionate gains  in market  share.  Thus,  those  indices 
which give more  weight  to  the smaller units,  such as  the variance of 
logarithms  and  the Linda indices,  show  the greatest relative decline over 
the  ten year period.  Whatever  interpretation is placed  upon  the statistics 
in case  c,  it can  safely be  concluded  that  there  has  been  no  tendency  for 
concentration,  however measured,  to  increase in the last ten years. 
47 Table  18 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Table  19 
t 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Percentage  Shares  of  the  UK  Market  for Portland 
Cements  (in  tonnage  terms) 
Rugby  Tunnel  Ribblesdale  Aberthaw  Ketton 
-----+--------
62.0  13.0  13.5  4.0  4.0 
61.5  13.0  13.5  4.5  4.0 
60.5  13.0  13.5  4.5  4.5 
59.0  14.5  13.5  4.5  4.5 
60.0  14.0  13.0  4.0  5.0 
61.0  14.5  II . 5  4.5  5.0 
61.5  14.5  11.0  4.5  4.5 
61.0  14.5  10.5  5.0  5.0 
60.0  15.0  10.5  5.0  5.0 
59.0  15.5  10.0  5.5 
Percentage  Shares  of the UK  M<~rket for Portland 
Cements  (in tonnagg_J~ 
-~.  -
Tunnel  &  Ketton  & 
APCM  Rugby  ~  Ribblesdale  !  Ribblesdale 
62.0  13.0  15.5  5.5 
61.5  13.0  15.75  5.75 
60.5  13.0  15.75  6.25 
59.0  14.5  15.75  6.25 
60.0  14.0  15.0  6.0 
61.0  14.5  13.75  5.75 
61.5  14.5  13.25  6.25 
61.0  14.5  13.0  6.5 
60.0  15.0  13.0  7.0 
59.0  15.5  12.75  7.75 
- ~-----------1------~--------- --~-- ~------- ------------------------ ----
48 
3.5 
3.5 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
3.5 
4.0 
4.0 
4.5 
Abertha  w 
4.0 
4.0 
4.5 
4.5 
5.0 
5.0 
4.5 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 Table  20 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Percentage  Shares  of the UK  Market  for Portland 
Cements  (in tonnage  terms) 
APCM  and  Thos.  Ward  Rugby 
associates  and  associates 
66.0  21.0  13.0 
65.5  21.5  13.0 
65.0  22.0  13.0 
63.5  22.0  14.5 
65.0  21.0  14.0 
66.0  19.5  14.5 
66.0  19.5  14.5 
66.0  19.5  14.5 
65.0  20.0  15.0 
64.0  20.5  15.5  '  ' 
I 
49 Table  21  Concentration Ratios  for Output  of Portland Cement 
--
Year  C1a  C2a  C3a  C4a  C5a  C6a 
1968  62.0  75.5  88.5  92.5  96.5  100.0 
1969  61.5  75.0  88.0  92.5  96.5  100.0 
1970  60.5  74.0  87.0  91.5  96.0  100.0 
1971  59.0  73.5  87.0  91.5  96.0  100.0 
1972  60.0  74.0  87.0  92.0  96.0  100.0 
1973  61.0  75.5  87.0  92.0  96.5  100.0 
1974  61.5  76.0  87.0  91.5  96.0  100.0 
1975  61.0  75.5  86.0  91.0  96.0  100.0 
1976  60.0  75.0  85.5  90.5  95.5  100.0 
1977  59.0  74.5  84.5  90.0  95.0  100.0 
-------·-----__________  .. __________  ----------·----------- ·-·- ····-··-···-·····--···-·- . 
Table  22  Concentr;:ction Ratios  for Output  of Portland Cement 
1-Year-t 
Clb  C2b  C3b  C4b  c5b 
11968  I  62.0  77.5  90.5  96.0  100.0 
61.5  77.25  90.25  96.0  100.0  i  1969 
i 
1970  60.5  76.25  89.25  100.0  !  95.5 
i 
I  1971  59.0  74.75  89.25  95.5  100.0 
1972  60.0  75.,0  89.0  95.0  100.0 
1973  61.0  75.5  89.25  95.0  100.0 
I 
1974  61  .. 5  76.0  89.25  95.5  100.0 
I 
I 
1975  61.0  75.5  88.5  95.0  100.0  I 
i 
I 
1976  60.0  I  75.0  88 .. 0  95.0  100.0  i 
i 
i  1977  59,0  I  74.5  87.25  95.0  100.0 l  L_  I  I 
-------~----~-------------- -------------·-- ---------------- -- ----- --
50 Table  23  Concentration Hation  for Output  of Portland Cement 
Year  C1c  C2c  C3c 
--·-· 
1968  66.0  87.0  100,0 
1969  65.5  87.0  100.0 
1970  65.0  87.0  100,0 
1971  63.5  85.5  100.0 
1972  65.0  86.0  100.0 
1973  66.0  85.5  100.0 
1974  66.0  85.5  100.0 
1975  66.0  85.5  100.0 
1976  65.0  85.0  100.0 
1977  64.0  84.5  100.0 
-~ 
51 Table  24  Herfindahl  Indices  for  Output  of Portland Cements 
Year  [  Ha  Hb  He 
- c- --• _J  --· 
'  1968  '  0,424  0.430  0.497 
1969  0.418  0.425  0.492 
1970  0.407  0.414  0.488 
1971  0.393  0.400  0.473 
1972  0.402  0.408  0.486 
1973  0.412  0.418  0.495 
1974  0.417  0.423  0.495 
1975  0. 411  0.417  0.495 
1976  0.401  0.407  0.485 
1977  0.390  0.397  0.476 
.  -
Table  25  Coefficients of Variation for  Output  of Portland Cement 
---- ----~·-··--
Year  eva  cvb  eve 
---·--------- ·-- -- ----~-- ------- -
1968  1. 243  1. 072  0.701 
1969  I. 228  1.06I  0.690 
1970  I • 201  I.  034  0.681 
1971  I • 165  I. 000  0.647 
I972  1.188  1. 020  0.677 
1973  I.  213  I. 044  0.696 
1974  I. 226  I .056  0.696 
1975  1 • 21 1  1 .042  0.696 
1976  1 • I86  1 .017  0.675 
1977  1.158  0.992  0.654 
52 Table  26  Entropy  Indices for  Output of Portland Cements 
Year  Ea  Eb  Ec 
I968  I.  741  I.  643  1.25I 
1969  I. 760  I.  663  I. 259 
1970  I. 800  1. 692  1.268 
I97I  1  • 83I  I. 724  1.301 
1972  I. 8I 0  I.7IO  I. 274 
I973  I.784  I. 686  I.  259 
I974  I.  788  I. 666  I. 259 
I975  I. 798  I. 694  I.  259 
1976  I .828  I. 720  I.279 
I977  I.  860 
I 
I. 746  I. 298 
Table  21  Redundancy  Index for Output of Portland Cements 
~~··- -
I  Ra  Rb  Rc 
Year  I 
I968  0.844  0.679  0.334 
1969  0.825  0.659  0.326 
I970  0.785  0.630  0.317 
1971  0.754  0.598  0.284 
I972  0. 775  0.612  0. 3II 
1973  0.801  0.636  0.326 
i 
1974  0.797  0.656  0.326 
1975  0. 787  0.628  0.326 
1976  0.757  0.602  0.306 
! 
1977  0. 725  0.576 
I  0.287  I  I 
53 Table  28  Hall-Tideman Indices  for  Output of  Portlan~ Cements 
Year  Ta  Tb  Tc 
------------------- ------- ---· 
1968  0.370  0.403  0.515 
1969  0.366  0.400  0.513 
1970  0.355  0.389  0.510 
1971  0.350  0.380  0.495 
1972  0.355  0.382  0.505 
1973  0.362  0.387  0.508 
1974  0.362  0.391  0.508 
1975  0.356  0.385  0.508 
1976  0.349  0.379  0.500 
1977  0.340  0.372  0.493 
Table  29  Gini Coefficients for Output  of Portland Cements 
- ------------~·  ....  ---··-·-····--------------
Year  Ga  Gb  Gc 
-·------- --------1---------f------------
1968  0.550  0.504  0.353 
1969  0.545  0.500  0.350 
1970  0.531  0.486  0.346 
1971  0.524  0.474  0.327 
1972  0.531  0.476  0.340 
1973  0.540  0.483  0.344 
1974  0.540  0.488  0.344 
1975  0.532  0.481  0.344 
I 
1976  0.522  0.472  0.333 
I 
j  1977  0.510  0.462  0.324 
--
54 Table  30  Variance  of Logarithms  for Output  of Portland Cement 
- ;-- ------------------,..--
Year  I 
I 
va  vb  vc 
-r- .......  -..  - ~  - -------
I 
I968  i  I. 038  0.9I6  0.465 
I 
I969  I  I. 002  0.899  0.457  I 
I970  I  0.9I9  0.8I3  0.449 
I97I 
I 
0.916  0.800  0.386 
I972  0.925  0. 775  0.422 
1973  0.940  0.797  0.430 
I974  0.926  0.818  0.430 
I975  0.869  0.759  0.430 
1976  0.829  0.731  0.402 
I977  0. 776  0.699  0.376 
55 Table  31  Linda Inclicef;  for Output  of  Portland Cement 
r--
j 
i 
I 
I 
Year 
1968 
I969 
I970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
I975 
1976 
1977 
---· 
Table  32 
Year 
[ 
! 
--~~------
1968 
1969 
I970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
La  La  I  La  I 
2  3  4  I 
2.296  I .264  I.  493  I. 287  1 • 15 7 
2.278  I.  254  I .396  1. 247  1.132 
2.24I  I. 235  I. 377  1. 201  1. 043 
2.034  I • 156  1 . 33I  1. I72  I .020 
2.I43  1. 2I5  1. 295  I . 195  I .045 
2. 103  1. 329  1. 357  I .206  1. 08I 
2. I21  1. 380  I .450  I .250  1. 086 
2. I 03  I. 413  I.392  I.196  1 .046 
2.000  I.  380  1. 370  1.180  1.  0 I2 
I .903  I.392  I.  346  1. 150  0.972 
------
LindA  Indices for Output  of Portland Cement  _, 
Lb 
2 
Lb 
3 
Lb 
4 
Lb 
5 
---------- ~ ·- ·-··- -·-- ----·-··- --·· ·- ··------·-·  ------
2.000  1. 222  1. 262  1. 202 
1. 952  1 .208  1. 225  1.183 
I • 921  I • 190  1 • 159  1. 089 
I. 873  1.080  1 . 1  01  1 .052 
2.000  1.136  1.153  1 .032 
2. 103  1 • 1  77  1. 202  1. 058 
2. I21  1.217  1. 174  1. 099 
2. 103  1. 223  1 • 149  1 .038 
2.000  1 • 195  1. 090  1.  007 
1. 903  1.183  1 .025  0.973 
-· 
56 
J 
I 
I Table  33  Linda Indices  for Output  of Portland Cement 
Year  Lc 
2 
Lc 
3 
1968  3. 142  1. 205 
1969  3.047  1 • 191 
1970  2.955  1 • 1  77 
1971  2.886  1. 071 
1972  3.095  1  • 131 
1973  3.385  1 • 138 
1974  3.385  1 • 138 
1975  3.385  1.138 
1976  3.250  1. 091 
1977  3.122  1.047 
57 Appendix  A:  Definitions of  S~bols 
Subscript  i  denotes  ith largest firm in industry. 
s.  share of relevant variable accounted  for by  the ith largest firm. 
1 
x.  = magnitude  of relevant variable for  ith largest firm. 
1 
Bars  over  symbols  denote  means. 
n  denotes  nth largest firm. 
N  = total number  of  firms  in the  industry. 
CV  = Coefficient of variation. 
H  = Herfindahl  index. 
E  = Entropy  index. 
R  = Redundancy  index. 
T  = Hall-Tideman  index. 
G  = Gini  coefficient. 
V  Variance  of  logarithms. 
L  Linda  index  for  n  largest firms.  n 
58 Appendix  B:  Definitions of Concentration Measures 
I.  Then-firm concentration ratio 
Cn 
2.  The  Herfindahl  index 
H 
n 
1oo  I 
i=l 
N 
I 
i=l 
3.  The  coefficient of variation 
cv  = 
I  I  N 
s. 
1. 
/  N  L 
X  i=l 
A relationship between  CV  and  H can be derived in the  following manner: 
cv 
4.  Entropy  index 
E 
=  _!_  /  _!_  I  x~ - x
2 
X  N i=l  1. 
=I ~-2 I 
N X  i=l 
X~ - I 
1. 
= 
= 
= 
IN  I  t~ ) 
2 
/  i=l  NX 
N 
I 
i=l 
s.
2
- 1 
1. 
./  N.H  - I 
N 
L  si log2  si 
i=l 
59 
- I 5.  Redundancy  Index 
R  =  log~ N - E 
L 
6.  Hall-Tideman  Index 
T  = 
7.  Gini  coefficient 
G 
N 
2  I 
i=1 
iS.  - 1 
1 
N 
N  +  1  - 2  I 
i=l 
N 
But  from  the expression for  T: 
N 
2  I 
i=l 
G 
iS. 
1 
= 
8.  Variance  of  logarithms 
N 
I  v  = 
N 
i=l 
9.  Linda  indices 
+  T 
T 
N.T 
(log  s.  e  1 
n-1 
- log  e 
iS. 
1 
s. 
c. 
1 
1 
L 
n  n(n-1) 
i=l 
n-i 
i  c -c. 
n  1 
60 
)  2 FIGURE  3  CONCENTRATION  RATIOS,  1968-1977 
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7l 3.  Concentration  }bvements  ~n Other Variables 
It is possible  to  examine  the development  of  concentration since 
1968  using  the data published  ~n company  accounts.  However,  in our  view, 
such  a  procedure  ~s likely  to  produce misleading results  for  the  following 
reasons: 
ca)  some  of  the firms,  particularly  the  larger ones,  have  diversified 
their operations  into other  industries  and  overseas  production,  but  the 
accounts  do  not generally provide  breakdowns  of  the relevant variables  in 
a  form  which allows  accurate measurement  of  (UK)  cement-specific activities; 
(b)  accounts  for  two  of  the firms  in the  industry,  Ribblesdale  and 
(since  1973)  Ketton,  are not available since  these  firms  are wholly  owned 
by other companies;  and 
(c)  accounting conventions differ between  companies. 
It is our  judgement  that  the estimates  and  approximations made  necessary  by 
the use of  the published accounting data would  introduce measurement  errors 
which were  large in relation to  the magnitudes  of  the  changes  in concentration 
over  the period  indicated by  the output statistics,  and  that consequently  the 
results  could not  be  regarded as  reliable. 
The  Cement  Makers  Federation have,  however,  made  available  to  us 
confidential  information which  they collect in connection with  the  Common. 
Price Agreement.  This  information is cement-specific in that  the variables 
concerned relate  to  the production of  the  common-price  cements  (which  account 
for  over  90%  of deliveries  to  the  UK  market).  Further,  it is collected on  a 
standardised basis for all the firms  in the  industry and  data is available 
for Ribblesdale  and  Ketton.  The  only major  disadvantage  in using this  source 
is  that,  because of  the confidential nature of  the  information provided, it 
is not possible  to publish  the  raw data  and,  to  prevent reconstruction of  the 
raw data from  the  summary  statistics,  only a  restricted number  of  concentration 
indices  can be  calculated. 
72 Despite  this last drawback  we  have  chosen  to  work  with  the  CMF  data 
Ln  the present  chapter since we  believe  that it yields  a  very accurate 
picture of concentration trends  Ln  the  industry.  However,  an appendix  to 
the report contains  tables  showing  the magnitudes  of  the variables  under 
discussion derived  from  the  company  accounts,  to  enable  anyone  who  so 
wishes  to  calculate  the concentration indices  on  this alternative,  less 
reliable basis. 
The  variables  to be  considered are as  follows: 
Turnover 
Capital  employed 
Numbers  employed 
Wages  and  salaries 
Net profit before interest and  tax. 
In  the  CMF  statistics capital  employed  is measured  on a  depreciated replacement 
basis. 
Values  of  the Herfindahl  and  Hall-Tideman  indices  between  1968  and  1976, 
calculated from  the  CMF  data,  are  shown  in tables 35-44  and  are plotted in 
the accompanying  graphs.  As  in  the previous  section,  a  superscript  (a)  denotes 
indices  calculated from unadjusted data  on  the six firms  operating in the 
industry,  while  a  superscript  (c)  indicates  a  statistic derived  from data 
based  on  a  consolidation of  the variables for  APCM  and  Aberthaw,  and  for 
Tunnel,  Ketton and Ribblesdale.  The  main features  of  the results are 
summarised  below. 
Turnover 
Not  surprisingly,  the  turnover  figures  yield values of  the concentration 
indices which,  on average,  are very similar  to  those obtained for output. 
However,  the cyclical pattern of  the results  is much  less pronounced  and  the 
downward  trend in concentration shown  in the output figures  disappears  for 
73 turnover.  In fact,  the  trend  level of  concentration appears  to  be 
stationary for  three of  the indices,  while  the exception  (He)  actually 
shows  a  tendency  to  increase.  The  inference  suggested by  these movements 
is that,  over  the period,  the average price per  tonne  of  cement  has  tended 
to  increase slightly more  quickly for  the  larger companies. 
Capital Employed 
At  the beginning of  the period,  in  1968,  capital  employed  was 
significantly less concentrated  than output or  turnover,  indicating  that 
APCM's  operations were,  on average,  less capital intensive  than  those  of 
the smaller  companies.  Between  1968  and  1971  there was,  however,  a  sharp 
increase in concentration,  with Ha  rising  from  0.352  to 0.439  (a  25% 
increase)  and  Ta  from  0.334  to  0.392  (a  17%  increase).  This movement  is 
probably  explained by major  new  investments at APCM's  Northfleet site. 
From  1971  the unconsolidated  data  shows  a  steady fall  in the concentration 
indices,  whereas  He  and Tc  remain relatively steady until  1975  and  then 
show  a  marked  fall  in  1976.  The  downward  movement  in concentration since 
a  a  1971,  measured by  H  and  T  ,  is almost  certainly chiefly  the result of 
faster  expans~on of  capacity by  the  smaller  firms.  By  1976  the  degree  of 
concentration of  capital  employed  was  approximately  the  same  as  that of 
turnover  and  output. 
Numbers  employed 
In  1968  the concentration of  employment  among  the six firms  was  greater 
than  the concentration of  turnover or capital employed.  However,  all four 
indices  show  significant falls over  the period  so  that by  1976  employment  was 
less  concentrated  than  the other variables.  The  percentage falls  in  the 
indices  between  1968  and  1977  are as  follows: 
74 a 
H  11.4% 
Ta  9.0% 
He  5.9% 
Tc  6.0% 
Substitution of  capital for  labour has  thus  been proceeding  less quickly 
among  the smaller firms. 
Wages  and  salaries 
Ha  and  Ta  show  that wages  and  salaries have,  on average,  had 
approximately  the same  degree  of concentration over  the period as  numbers 
employed.  The values  of  He  and  Tc  are,  however,  slightly higher  than  the 
corresponding magnitudes  for  employment.  All  four  concentration indices 
show  a  strong downward  movement  from  1968  to  1978,  the percentage falls 
being as  follows: 
Ha  15. 1% 
Ta  12.4% 
He  9.1% 
Tc  7.2% 
Net profit 
A major  problem occurs  in usLng  net profit figures  to  calculate 
concentration indices  whenever  a  firm makes  losses.  To  overcome  this 
difficulty the arbitrary convention of  treating a  loss  as  zero profit has 
been adopted. 
It can be  seen  from  the  table and  graph  that  the  concentration indices 
for  net profit move  extremely erratically,  although  their average  values 
tend  to  be  higher  than  those  for  the other variables.  That  is,  profit 
appears  to  be  more  concentrated  than output,  turnover,  capital  employed, 
75 numbers  employed  and  wages  and  salaries.  Because  of  the fluctuations, 
it is difficult to detect significant trends  in the  indices,  although  the 
least erratic series  (for Ta)  does  show  a  definite upward  movement 
suggesting  that  the  smaller  companies  such as  Aberthaw,  Ketton  and 
Ribblesdale have  been  increasing their  shares  of  industry profit. 
Conclusions 
The  trends  in concentration of  the variables analysed  can be 
summarised  in the  following  way: 
Turnover  - relatively little change  over  the period. 
Capital  employed  - a  sharp rise between  1968-71  and  then  (a)  a 
tendency  to fall for measures  based  on  the unadjusted 
data,  and  (b)  little trend in the indices calculated 
from aggregated market  shares. 
Numbers  employed  - downward  trends  in all the  indices. 
Wages  and  salaries  - particularly strong downward  trends  1n all the 
indices. 
Net profit - unclear results because of  the  sharp year-to-year 
variations  in the variable. 
4.  A further  note  on  ownership  considerations 
It was  stressed earlier that  the concentration indices  should be 
interpreted in the light of  the various  ownership  and  control  links between 
the firms  in the industry.  To  make  this easier concentration measures  were 
calculated for differing levels of  consolidation of  the market  share data  and, 
in particular,  in the cases  indexed by  the superscript c  the statistics were 
based upon  an aggregation of  the relevant variables for  APCM  and  Aberthaw  and 
for Tunnel,  Ketton and  Ribblesdale.  Now  while  the three latter companies  have 
76 had  links  throughout  the period  (Ribblesdale being jointly owned  by  Ketton 
and  Tunnel)  it is only  since  1973  that Thos.  W.  Ward  has  had  a  major  stake 
in all  three  companies.  Before  1973  the block of  shares  in Tunnel  which 
T.W.  Ward  later acquired was  held by  F.L.  Smidth and  Co.  It might  be 
therefore argued  that,  from  the point of  view  of  ultimate  control,  there 
were  four  major  interests in the  UK  cement  industry prior  to  1973,  and  not 
three  as  assumed  in the earlier analysis.  It would  clearly be  straightforward, 
though  tedious,  to  calculate  the  values  of  the various  concentration indices 
for  this fourth  (and  any  other)  possible  consolidation of  the data.  However, 
the principal  implication of  this alternative view of  the problem are fairly 
obvious  and  can be  illustrated via a  single  example. 
Thus,  the  table below  shows  market  shares  for Portland Cement  output 
when  Tunnel  and  50%  of Ribblesdale are  assigned  to  F.L.  Smidth prior  to 
1973  and  to  T.W.  Ward  from  1973  onwards. 
Table 34  ..-------------- ---- -·-···-·-··  --·-··- -- - -·  ---------· ----------------.---· ---- ----
Ye"tr  APCM  Rugby  T.W.  Ward  F.L.Smidth  Hd 
--- -·  -- ------~- ----·~------- -- --------~--- ---- -- ---- -·· ----- ·--·- ---~  -· ---------- --- ---------- ---· -------·-··----- --· U•----··---·-
1968  66.0  13.0  5.50  15.50  0.480 
1969  65.5  13.()  5.75  15.75  0.474 
1970  65.0  13.0  6.25  15.75  0.468 
1971  63.5  14.5  6.25  15.75  0.453 
1972  65.0  14.0  6.00  15.00  0.468 
1973  66.0  14.5  19.50  0  0.495 
1974  66.0  14.5  19.50  0  0.495 
1975  66.0  14.5  19.50  0  0.495 
1976  65.0  15.0  20.00  0  0.485 
1977  64.0  15.5  20.50  0  0.476 
The  final  column  of  the  table  shows  the values  of  the Herfindahl  index for 
the data in the  table.  The  index is also plotted  ~n the  accompanying  graph. 
Comparing  the results with  those obtained earlier it can be  seen that  the 
77 major effect of  the change  in aggregation  LS  to produce  a  much  greater 
increase in concentration between  1972  and  1973  as  a  consequence of  the 
extension of Ward's  interest in the  industry in  the latter year.  Similar 
results would  also clearly follow for other concentration ratios and  other 
variables,  tending  to  attenuate or  reverse downward  trends  where  they appear 
in the series and  to  strengthen upward  trends. 
78 FIGURE  14  ADJUSTED  OUTPUT,  1968-1977 
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79 Table  35  Herfindahl  Indices  for  Turnover 
f 
Ye'"tr  Ha  He 
~-----------· 
1968  0.416  0.489 
1969  0.412  0.488 
1970  0.399  0.481 
1971  0.382  0.466 
1972  0.399  0.482 
1973  0.410  0.493 
1974  0.410  0.492 
1975  0.418  0.502 
1976  0.406  0.492 
""- ---~---~~--l------~-~----~--------... 
Table  36  Hall-Tideman  Indices  for Turnover 
----------- _,-
Year  Ta  Tc 
~--- .... - .. --. 
1968  0.366  0.509 
1969  0.361  0.510 
1970  0.351  0.504 
1971  0.342  0.491 
1972  0.356  0.503 
1973  0.360  0.506 
1974  0.359  0.505 
1975  0.361  0.512 
1976  0.357  0.504 
80 Table  37  Herfindahl  Indices  for caeital Employed 
Year  Ha  He 
1968  0.352  0.432 
1969  0.393  0.460 
1970  0.430  0.492 
1971  0.439  0.501 
1972  0.420  0.494 
1973  0.418  0.493 
1974  0.416  0.498 
1975  0.418  0.504 
1976  0.398  0.483 
81 Table  39  Herfindahl  Indices  for Numbers  Employed 
Year  Ha  He  1 
1968  0.421  0.489 
1969  0.423  0.491 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973  0.403  0.478 
1974  0.391  0.469 
1975  0.393  0.472 
1976  0.389  0.488 
1977  0.373  0.460 
j  -
Table  40  Hall~Tideman Indices for Numbers  Employed 
-----·---·  - -
Year  Ta  Tc 
1968  0.377  0.503 
1969  0.379  0.504 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973  0.364  0,496 
1974  0.357  0.489 
1975  0.358  0.489 
1976  0.347  0.490 
1977  0.343  0.473 
--------------------------- ---
82 Table  41  Herfindahl  Indices  for Wages  arid  Salaries 
Year  Ha  He 
1968  0.449  0.530 
1969  0.440  0.523 
1970  0.400  0.503 
1971  0.392  0.484 
1972  0.390  0.489 
1973  0.406  0.500 
1974  0.381  0.479 
1975  0.391  0.491 
1976  0.381  0.482 
Table  42  Hall-Tideman  Indices  for Wages  and  Salaries 
-----
Year  Ta  Tc 
1968  0.388  0.539 
1969  0.383  0.534 
1970  0.366  0.518 
1971  0.352  0.502 
1972  0.350  0.507 
1973  0.359  0.514 
I 974  0.345  0.505 
1975  0.343  0. 5 I I 
1976  0.340  0,500 
-~-~---·-··  --
83 Table  43  Herfindahl  Indices  for Net  Profit 
--------·-·  ----
Year  Ha  He 
-~···----
1968  0.422  0.502 
1969  0.447  0.598 
1970  0.493  0.597 
1971  0.442  0.503 
1972  0.452  0.524 
1973  0.512  0.576 
1974  0.385  0.425 
1975  0.492  0.569 
1976  0.493  0.555 
Table  44  Hall-Tideman  Indices  for Net Profit 
--r------------
Year  Ta  Tc 
~--------------·--
1968  0.363  0.518 
1969  0.429  0.629 
1970  0.413  0.598 
1971  0.402  0.510 
1972  0.415  0.532 
1973  0.461  0.571 
1974  0.404  0.603 
1975  0.447  0.559 
1976  0.476  0.685 
84 FIGURE  15  HERFINDAHL  AND  HALL-TIDEMAN  INDICES  FOR  TURNOVER,  1968--1976 
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FIGURE  17:  HERFINDAHL  AND  HALL-TIDEMAN  INDICES  FOR  NUMBERS  EMPLOYED, 
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FIGURE  18:  HERFINDAHL  ANC  HALL-TIDEM...AN  INDICES  FOR  WAGES  AND  SALARIES, 
1968-1976 
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FIGURE  19:  HERFINDAHL  AND  HALL-TIDE~AN INDICES 
FOR  NET  PROFIT,  1968-1976 
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89 Chapter  6  THE  COMMON  PRICE  AND  MARKETING  AGREEMENT 
I.  The  Cement  Makers'  Federation and  its Arrangements 
The  six companies  which  both manufacture  and market Portland  cement 
are members  of  the  Cement  Makers'  Federation  (CMF).  ICI,  which markets  its 
cement  through  APCM,  is not  a  member  of  CMF.  The  CMF  was  formed  in  1918 
but  assumed  its control over  the price of  cement manufactured  in the United 
Kingdom  in  1934. 
The  explicit objectives  of  the  CMF  include  the arranging of  reasonable 
prices  and  terms  for  the sale of  cement manufactured by members.  In this 
regard,  the  CMF  acts  by  resolution of its members,  whose  voting power  ~s 
calculated upon  a  system based  on,  but not directly proportionate  to,  their 
annual  deliveries  in the United  Kingdom.  The  voting rights are adjusted  to 
reduce  the voting power  of APCM  and  other restrictions ensure  that  APCM, 
despite its preponderant position in the  industry,  cannot  control  the policy 
of  the  CMF.  The  CMF  passed resolutions establishing  common  price and 
marketing agreements  in  1934,  and  these,  with minor  adjustments,  remain 
operative at the preset  time.  They  constitute a  voluntary agreement  and, 
although  they are expressed as  continuing for  an  indefinite period,  members 
are at liberty to withdraw at any  time  by  giving notice  to  the  CMF.  The 
arrangements  impose  no  legal obligations  and  carry no  penalites  for  failure 
to  comply with any  of  them. 
The  current arrangements  are  contained in a  volume  known  as  the  'White 
Book',  the latest of which  is dated  4  May  1976,  and  applies  only  to  grey 
Portland  cements  manufactured  to British Standard  specification's numbers 
12,  146  and  1370,  namely  Portland cement  (ordinary and  rapid hardening), 
Portland blast-furnace  cement  and  low heat Portland cement  respectively. 
The  main restriction is in the following  terms: 
91 "Each member  of  the Federation will  individually specify as  the 
current prices for  its cement  the prices  contained  in the current 
price schedules  issued by  the Federation,  allowing  the margins 
provided by  these arrangements  to  those  buyers  of  cement who 
become  entitled to  them  in accordance with  the conditions  upon 
which  such margins  are  declared  to  be  payable.  In respect of 
cement  supplied for re-sale,  each member  will ensure as  a 
condition of  sale  that  such  cement  shall not  be re-sold at prices 
greater  than  those operating on  the date of  despatch  to  the  custorrler 
and will individually enforce  such condition by  means  of  any  lawful 
remedy  available  to it either under  Section  25  of  the Restrictive 
Practices Act  1956  or otherwise." 
Subsequent provisions of  the White  Book  specify: 
(a)  the special  terms  for particular categories of users,  at this  stage 
restricted  to  cement  asbestos manufacturers; 
(b)  details of merchants'  margins  and  the basis  for  defining recognisedl 
builders'  merchants; 
(c)  standard  terms  of  quotations  and  contracts which provide  that 
deliveries  should be made  at the price current on  the actual  date 
of  delivery  and quality shall be  to  the current British Standard 
specifications; 
(d)  haulage  contractors  nominated by  cement  buyers will not  be  employed; 
(e)  merchants'  or users'  lorries may  be hired when  no  other haulage is 
available but haulage  charges  ~n excess of rates current  in the 
district will not be  paid; 
(f)  depots will not  be  established on users'  premises  or  for  the  purpose 
of  supplying  cement  to  individual contracts; 
(g)  members'  depots will not  be  established in merchants',  haulage  contractors' 
or  concrete product makers'  premises;  and 
(h)  rent will not be  paid  to  users  or merchants  for  signs,  display materials 
or advertising on  their premises  and  agents'  or  commission agents  ~Till 
not be  appointed. 
In  1947,  the Fforde Committee,  which had  been appointed  by  the Minister 
of Works  to  examine  the price  structure of  the  industry,  reported  that in  their 
view  the prices  fixed  up  to  that date had  not been unreasonable,  but  recommended 
improvements  in the method  of  fixing prices.  In consequence,  the  CMF  appointed 
an  independent  costs  committee  consisting of  the  then  independent  chairman of 
the  CMF  and  the  independent  accountant.  This  committee  worked with a 
representative of  the Minister of Works  until  government  control was  withdrawn 
92 1n  1951.  Since  that date,  Sir William Slimmings  has  acted  continuously as 
Independent Accountant.  Currently,  the  second member  of  the  committee is 
also  Chairman of  the Cement  and  Concrete Association.  The  independent 
costs  committee  inherited,  and has  continued  to  approve,  a  price structure 
built up  on  'Basing Points'  and  distance  zones.  It keeps  under  regular 
review the costs  and profits of  the industry,  receiving each quarter  from 
each member  the particulars of  that member's  production,  despatches  and 
deliveries,  net proceeds  of  sale,  and his costs of manufacture  and  delivery, 
analysed under  a  number  of  headings. 
From  these returns,  each  individual member's  performance is analysed 
on a  per  tonne basis,  before  the  c0mmittee decides whether  the costs 
properly can be  averaged  to  form  an  estimate  for  the industry as  a  whole. 
The  committee  is empowered  to  exclude  from  the weighted  average such 
returns  as  they  regard  to  be untypical.  This  power  is rarely exercised  1n 
practice.  The  weighted  average  costs  and  results  for  the whole  industry 
for  the quarter  and  for  the preceding  12  months  then are circulated  to all 
members.  If  the  committee  or any  member  of  the  CMF  considers  that a  change 
in prices is necessary  to maintain the overall profits of  the  industry at 
a  reasonable  level,  a  meeting is held of  the council  of  the  CMF  under  the 
chairmanship of  the  independent  chairman and  attended by  the  independent 
accountant.  The  two  latter have  no  vote  upon  any  resolution as  to  prices, 
but  indicate  their views  as  to present  and  future  trends  of  costs  and  of 
demands. 
In addition  to  the quarterly reviews,  the  independent  costs  committee 
is  involved  in the setting of  a  'base price'  and  'distance  zones'  for all 
new  works  which  come  into operation.  In general,  an attempt  is made  to 
fix  a  base price which will  induce  a  reasonable  rate of  return on  capital, 
bearing in mind  market  conditions.  The  'base price'  of  a  new  works  must 
not  exceed  the current price,  based  on  a  'distance  zone'  from  some  existing 
93 works,  at the  location of  the new  works.  Finally,  the  committee 
periodically initiates, at its own  discretion,  a  general  review of 
base prices  and  distance  zone  increments  throughout  the country. 
2.  Pricing Policy and  the Price  Structure 
There  ~s no  written document  which defines  the basis  on which priees 
are  set by  the  CMF  but  there  ~s ample  documentation of  the pricing 
procedures  adopted  in practice  since  1934.  The  CMF  fixes  both  ex-works 
prices for  supplies  collected by  customers  and  delivered prices  for 
ordinary,  coarse  ground  and  rapid hardening Portland  cements.  The  priee 
structure is built up  on  'basing point prices'  at works  and  increments 
for deliveries  to  locations within distance rings of works  in England, 
Wales  and  Northern Ireland and  road mileages  of  works  and coastal  depots 
in Scotland.  All  prices are outlined in a  volume  entitled  'Price 
Schedules'  distributed by  the  CMF  and  detailing  the delivered price, 
exclusive of VAT,  for  10  tonne  loads of ordinary Portland  cement  supplied 
in bulk by  road  in pressure vehicles  for  each administrative area  in 
England,  place in Scotland,  community  in Wales  and ward  in Northern 
Ireland. 
Currently,  the  CMF  has  43  designated  'basing points'  in the UK.  But 
9  are situated at closed works.  In March  1978  the  location of  the points, 
together with  the price  ranges  for ordinary Portland  cement within each 
area were  as outlined in Table  45: 
Table  45  Basing Points  and Price Ranges  in the  UK 
--·  -- ·-- Area  Number  of Basing Points  Basing Point Price Eer  tonne 
England  and Wales  33  £22.51  - £24.61 
Northern Ireland  2  £23  - £39 
Scotland  8  £24.56  - £26.90  --
43 
~ 
(Source:  The  Price Commission,  op.cit.) 
94 Of  the 33  points in England  and  Wales,  20  had  a  common  price of 
£22.51,  2  a  price of  £23.12  and  the rest ranged  up  to  £24.61.  In 
Scotland,  the  lowest  basing point price was  at  the only Scottish clinker 
making  works  (Dunbar)  and  the highest  is at a  depot  (Inverness). 
Ordinary Portland cement  and  coarse  ground Portland cement  are sold 
at  the  same  price.  Rapid  hardening Portland cement  is sold at a  standard 
premium  (currently of  £1.33  per  tonne)  above  the ordinary Portland  cement 
price.  The  selling prices of masonry  cement  and  sulphate resisting Portland 
cement  are not  controlled by  the  CMF.  In practice,  however,  the  cement 
manufacturers  systematically relate prices for  these products  to  that of 
ordinary Portland cement.  Masonry  cement  is sold at  the  same  price  (except 
for Northern Ireland where it is sold at a  premium,  currently of  £1.17  per 
tonne)  and  sulphate resisting Portland  cement  is  sold at a  premium 
(currently of  £3.50  per  tonne).  Only  APCM  produces white  cement,  although 
Tunnel  used  to  do  so. 
The  second part of  the pricing structure  LS  the  zone  or distance  ring 
increment.  In England  and  Wales,  the  zones  consist generally of radial 
distances  from  'basing points'  0f  5  miles.  There  are exceptions.  Zones  in 
Northern Ireland consist of radial distances  of  4  miles.  In  Scotland,  incre-
ments  are based  on  direct road mileages  from  'basing points'.  Table  46 
outlines  the  zone  price  increments  over  'basing point'  prices  and  indicates 
the degree  of  taper for  long  distances  as at March  1978. 
Customers  are  allowed  to collect cement  from works  or depots. 
Between  1973  and  1977,  about  6  per cent of sales were  collected by  customers. 
For  collection from works,  an allowance  (in March  1978  of  74p  per  tonne)  is 
given if a  10  tonne  load is taken in bulk.  For collection from  depots,  an 
allowance is given only if the  depot  is designated as  a  'basing point'.  The 
collection allowance  is reduced  (currently  to  40p  per  tonne)  for bagged 
cement  in  10  tonne  lots.  Other variations  to  schedule prices reflect a 
95 . Table  46  Zone  Price  Increments  and  Distance Taper 
Distance  from Basing Point 
England  and  vJales 
Up  to  4.99  miles 
5  to  19.99 miles 
20  to  34.99 miles 
35  miles  and  over 
Northern  Ireland 
Up  to  3.99 miles 
4  to  11.99 miles 
12  to  19.99 miles 
20  miles  and  over 
Price  Increment  over  B.P.  Price 
per  zone  in pence  per  tonne 
Nil 
20.7p  for  each of  the  3  zones 
18.1p  for  each of  the  3  zones 
12.9p 
Nil 
25.7p  for  each of  the  3  zones 
20.6p  for  each of  the  3  zones 
12.9p 
···----·---------------..:..------------------
Scotland 
Haulage  rates determined  by  the  CMF  on  a  mileage basis. 
(Source:  The  Price Commission,  op.cit.) 
range  of  factors,  such  as  whether  pressure  or  non-pressure  vehicles 
are used  for bulk deliveries or whether  delivery is made  by rail.  All  such 
variations are determined  by  the  CMF  and  are  governed  by  the  common  agreement. 
Two  discounts  are offered.  The  first is for merchants  and varies 
according  to product,  delivery point  and method.  The  second discount  (of 
2!  per cent)  is for  customers  who  settle their accounts within one  month  of 
the  end  of  the month  in which delivery is made.  There  are no  discounts 
related  to  size of  order or annual  off-take either  to  customers or users. 
Approximately  95  per cent of all orders are placed  through builders' 
merchants,  even  though  delivery may  be made  direct  to  the user.  The 
position of builders'  merchants  is regulated by  the  CMF  White  Book  which 
96 outlines  the  basic  trading relationships between  suppliers,  customers  and 
users.  An  approved  merchant  has  a  yard,  carries appropriate  stocks  of 
building materials,  handles  cement  at  a  minimum  rate of  500  tonnes  per 
annum,  of which  300  tonnes  passes  through his yard,  but  does  not  engage 
~n building or  contracting operations,  and  is not  a  user  of  cement. 
One  feature  of  the pricing  structure operated by  the  CMF  is  that 
the  extra prices  charged  for  delivery in the distance  zones  are not 
designed necessarily  to  recover  the full  costs  incurred.  The  zone  price 
system  (as  indeed many  other price  systems  operated in the  absence  of 
cartelisation)  may  well  give rise  to  cross-subsidisation in distribution 
and  transportation.  Evidence  of  such cross-subsidisation in  the  case  of 
APCM  was  compiled  by The  Price Commission  in its  1978  investigation.  It 
is reproduced  here  as  Table  47: 
Table  47  Zone  Prices  and  Cross-Subsidisation 
·----··  --
1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
£m  £m  £m  £m  £m 
Total  cost of distribution  18.9  20.5  24.4  27.9  30.5 
Cost  recovered  in pricing structure  6.4  6.4  8.8  9.8  10.5 
Net  subsidy  12.5  14. I  16.6  18. I  20.0 
Net  subsidy as  % of:-
- distribution cost  66  69  65  65  66 
- sales revenue  l I  13  II  I I  I I 
Net  subsidy in:-
- £'s per  tonne  I.  02  1.30  I.  6I  I.  94  2.36 
- index  (£  per  tonne)  100  127  I 58  I90  23I 
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Restrictive  agreements  such  as  those  operated by  the  CMF  became 
susceptible  to  investigation by  The  Monopolies  Commission  under  The 
Monopolies  and  Restrictive Practices Act  (1948)  following  a  reference 
from  the Government.  In fact,  no  such reference was  made  in the  case 
of  the  supply of  cement  products.  In  1956,  British antitrust policy 
was  tightened,  in the light of  the early reports  of  the Monopolies 
Commission,  and  the burden of proof was  shifted against  those who 
maintained restrictive agreements  in the  supply of goods.  To  this 
end,  The  Restrictive Practices Act  (1956)  established a  Restrictive 
Practices Court  and  a  Registrar of Restrictive Practices who  was 
empowered  to refer restrictive agreements  in the  supply of  goods  for 
the adjudication of  the Court.  Since  the  CMF  agreement  was  referred  to 
the Court  in  1957,  and  a  Judgment  was  delivered  in  1961,  it is necessary 
to outline briefly the  essence of  the  1956  Act  before  reviewing  the 
Judgment  of  the Court. 
The  Court  was  required  to  decide whether restrictive agreements 
referred to it by  The  Registrar  should  be  allowed  to  continue.  There 
is a  presumption in the Act  that  such agreements  are contrary  to  the 
public interest and  should not be allowed  to continue.  But  the Court  has 
power  under  Section  21  of  the Act  to grant what  is in effect a  licence 
where  an agreement  can be  shown  to satisfy  two  conditions:  first,  that it 
serves  the public interest in certain specific ways,  and  second  that its 
merits  in this respect outweigh any  detriments which flow  from  the agreement. 
(a)  The  Gateway  Provisions 
Section 21(1)  of the  1956  Act  (subsequently  extended  and  consolidatE!d 
as  Section  19(1)  of The Restrictive Trade Practices Act  (1976))  specified 
that restrictive agreements  should  be  deemed  to  be  contrary to  the public 
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following  circumstances  -
(a)  that  the restriction is reasonably necessary,  having regard  to  the 
character of  the goods  to which it applied,  to protect  the public 
against  injury  (whether  to persons or  to premises)  in connection 
with  the consumption,  installation or use of  those  goods; 
(b)  that  the removal  of  the restriction would  deny  to  the public as 
purchasers,  consumers  or users of any  goods  other specific and 
substantial benefits or advantages  enjoyed or likely to be  enjoyed 
by  them  as  such,  whether  by virtue of  the restriction itself or of 
any  arrangements  or operations resulting  therefrom; 
(c)  that  the restriction is reasonably necessary  to  counteract measures 
taken by  any  one  person not party  to  the agreement with a  view  to 
preventing or restricting competition in or in relation to  the 
trade or business  in which  the persons party  thereto are engaged; 
(d)  that  the restriction is reasonably necessary  to  enable  the persons 
party  to  the agreement  to negotiate fair  terms  for  the  supply of 
goods  to,  or  the acquisition of goods  from  any  person not party 
thereto who  controls  a  preponderant part of  the  trade or business 
of  acquiring or  supplying  such  goods,  or  for  the  supply of goods 
to  any person not party to  the agreement  and  not  carrying on  such 
a  trade or business who,  either alone or in combination with any 
other  such person,  controls'  a  preponderant part of  the market for 
such goods; 
(e)  that,  having  regard  to  the conditions  actually obtaining or reasonably 
foreseen at the  time  of  the application,  the removal  of  the restriction 
would  be  likely  to  have  a  serious  and persistent adverse effect on  the 
general  level of unemployment  in an area,  or in areas  taken  together 
in which  a  substantial proportion of  the  trade or industry  to which 
the agreement  relates is situated; 
(f)  that,  having regard  to  the conditions actually obtaining or reasonably 
foreseen at  the  time of  the application,  the removal  of  the restriction 
would  be  likely to  cause  a  reduction in the volume  or earnings  of  the 
export business which  is substantial either in relation to  the whole 
export  business  of  the United  Kingdom  or in relation to  the whole 
business  (including export business)  of  the said  trade or industry; 
(g)  that  the restriction is reasonably required for purposes  connected 
with the maintenance  of  any  other restriction accepted by  the parties, 
whether  under  the  same  agreement  or under  any  other  agreement  between 
them,  being a  restriction which  is  found  by  the Court  not  to  be 
contrary  to  the public interest upon  grounds  other  than  those 
specified in this paragraph,  or has  been  so  found  in previous 
proceedings before  the Court, 
and  is further  satisfied  (in any  such case)  that  the restriction is not 
unreasonable  having  regard  to  the balance between  those  circumstances  and 
any detriment  to  the public or  to  persons  not parties  to  the  agreement 
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parties,  or persons  engaged  or  seeking to become  engaged  in the trade 
or business of selling such goods  or of producing similar  goods) 
resulting or  likely to results from  the  operation of  the restriction. 
(b)  The  Case  for  the  CMF 
The  CMF,  in presenting its case for  the retention of its 
restrictive agreements,  relied upon  paragraph (b)  of  Section  21(1)  of 
the Act,  claiming  that,  in the  absence  of  the agreements,  the public 
would  be  denied  specific and  substantial benefits of which  the most 
important was  the benefit of  lower prices.  The  CMF  argued  that  seven 
benefits had  been conferred  upon  the public  as  a  direct consequence  of 
its restrictive agreements. 
Firstly,  the  common  price arrangements  had  been  so  operated·,  via 
the  independent  costs  committee,  as  to hold prices below  the level  that 
would  have  obtained  under  conditions of unregulated competition.  In 
support  of  this proposition,  the  CMF  presented evidence  that  the  range 
of costs as  between individual manufacturers  was  small,  with a  3  per 
cent difference between  the highest  and  lowest  average  costs of  the 
six  largest makers,  and with  the highest cost manufacturers  varying 
from year  to year.  (The  CMF  rejected  the notion that plant cost 
variations were  relevant on  the ground  that plant cost variations  gave 
little indication of efficiency differentials given  that  there  is an 
inevitably a  diversity of plant vintages at any point in time).  In 
addition,  the  CMF  presented  evidence  to  the effect  that productivity, 
measured  in  terms  of output per  membe~ was  better  than  in all European 
countries  and  that output  per  employee  was  greater  than  in  the  USA. 
In general,  therefore,  the  CMF  claimed  that its price agreement  operated 
from  a  basis of  technical  and  cost efficiency.  The  CMF  presented profit 
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and depreciation at rates allowed by  the  Inland Revenue  for  tax purposes 
at one  end  to  depreciated replacement value of assets at the other  end  of 
the accounting  spectrum.  On  whatever basis,  the evidence  showed  that 
rates of  return on capital in cement  were  reasonable  and  compared  favourably 
with rates of return elsewhere.  Specifically,  over  a  period of  8  years 
prior to  the  case members  of  the  CMF  had  achieved rates of  return on 
capital,  on a replacement  basis, of  less  than  10  per  cent.  Expert witnesses 
testified that,  in the absence  of  the security provided  by  the price agree-
ment,  a  return of  between  IS  and  20  per cent on capital  employed  would  have 
become  necessary at that  time  to attract investment finance  into  the  cement 
industry.  Such  a  rate of return was  available at that  time. 
Secondly,  the  CMF  contended  that its common  price agreement  avoided 
the wasteful  use  of  transport.  The  cost of transport comprised  a  high 
proportion of  the total cost of  cement  and  the  agreement  was  designed  to 
avoid cross-freighting and,  thereby,  to  economise  on  transport costs.  The 
effect of  the delivered pr1ce  system was  to offer a  maker  a  proportionately 
more  attractive price if he  sold  cement within  the area covered by  circles 
radiating from his works.  Even within  these areas,  the effect of  'freight 
averaging'  was  that it was  cheaper  to  sell to  customers  nearest  to  a  maker's 
works.  Before  the  scheme  had  been initiated in 1934,  there  had  been consid-
erable cross-freighting.  Cement  sold  in London  had  been  supplied  from 
works  in South Wales  and  cement  sold  in South Wales  had  been  supplied  from 
works  near  London.  The  CMF  presented  evidence  that,  apart  from  the works 
near London  and  The  Home  Counties  (which had  capacity in excess  of  the 
local market,  the output of  the various works  was  sold  in the  parts of 
the country where  the works  were  situated.  The  works  in The  Home  Counties 
also supplied  the export  trade.  The  CMF's  evidence  demonstrated  that  in 
relation to  the general  level of costs,  the cost of  transport  had  been 
falling substantially  throughout  the operation of  the  agreement. 
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price,  the  avoidance of  the cost  to  users  of  'shopping  around'  in order 
to obtain the cheapest available  cement.  This weak  claim was  advanced, 
no  doubt,  because it had  succeeded  in convincing  the Court in a  previous 
case  involving  the Black Bolt and Nut  Association's restrictive price 
agreement. 
Fourthly,  the  CMF  claimed  that its arrangements  avoided  a  possible 
abuse of its position by  the largest maker,  APCM,  which  then  supplied 
two-thirds  of all cement  delivered  to  U.K.  markets.  Under  the arrangements, 
the voting power  of  APCM  had  been reduced  to  36  per cent,  and  no  resolution 
could be  passed unless  four members  (out of  the eight  then  in existence) 
voted  1n favour.  These voting rules,  in conjunction with the existence of 
the  independent  costs  committee,  adequately controlled  the power  of  the 
APCM.  In the absence  of  the arrangement,  the only control  over  APCM  would 
be  its susceptibility to  a  Monopolies  Commission  reference. 
Fifthly,  the  CMF  claimed,  as  a  benefit from its agreements,  the work 
of  the  Cement  and  Concrete Association,  which  devoted  itself to research 
development  and  training.  Members  financed  the Association entirely by 
subscriptions  (9n  1964  amounting  to  £430,000).  The  Association made 
available  the benefits  of its services  to all purchasers  of  cement.  The 
CMF  argued  that any  termination of  its agreements  must  jeopardise  the 
existence of  the Association. 
Sixthly,  the  CMF  claimed  the  arrangement  had  enabled  the  cement 
industry  to  expand  capacity  to meet  rising  demand  without  creating excess 
capacity and without  excessive reliance upon  imports  even  in  1952  and 
1953  when  temporary  shortages occurred as  a  consequence  of  sharp  increases 
1n  demand  from  the housing  and  the  defence  markets. 
Seventhly,  the  CMF  claimed  that its arrangement  assured  the provision 
of  cement  at places  far  removed  from  supply centres.  The  supply of  cement 
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averaging'  customers  far distant from  cement  plants  did not  bear  the full 
cost of  transport.  Under  competition,  prices  to  the very distant 
customers  would  rise considerably,  and  in some  cases,  the  increase might 
be  such  that cement  would  no  longer  be  demanded.  Under  the  common  price 
arrangement,  no  such  customer had  experienced  a  shortage of  cement  supplies. 
(c)  The  Registrar's Criticisms 
The  Registrar of Restrictive Practices,  in his reply  to  the  CMF, 
denied  that any  of  the seven arguments  were valid and  requested  that  the 
arrangement  should  be  terminated.  Firstly,  the Registrar  claimed  that  the 
common  price agreement distorted  the price structure for  cement  which 
would  emerge  in a  free market.  Under  the scheme,  the customers  nearest 
to  the  cement  works  paid more  than would  be  the  case under  competition and 
customers  far distant from  the works  paid less.  In this respect,  the 
scheme  was  'arbitrary'  and  'artificial'.  The  Registrar acknowledged  that 
freight  averaging might  occur  under pricecompetitionbut denied  that it 
would  offer a  systematic  subsidy  to  customers  far distant  from  cement  works. 
An  arbitrary price structure which  gave rise only  to  reasonable profits 
could not be  designated  'reasonable'. 
Secondly,  whilst  conceding  that  the rate of return on capital in 
cement manufacture was  reasonable by  reference  to other industries,  on 
the bases provided by  the CMF,  the Registrar argued  that  such comparisons 
were  unjustified  in this case in view of  the  large accumulation of  cash 
and  depreciation reserves  by  cement  companies.  The  Registrar urged  a 
comparison of  the returns  on risk capital,  which would  be  less favourable 
to  the  CMF  given that a  large proportion of capital in cement  manufacture 
consisted of debenture  issues.  Furthermore,  if the Registrar's own  analysis 
of rates of return were  accepted,  profitability varied markedly from firm to 
firm.  In  such circumstances,  a  low average for  the industry as  a  whole  was 
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Thirdly,  the Registrar attacked  the CMF's  reliance upon  a  compar~son 
of  cement  costs on  a  manufacturer basis,  claiming  that  the divergence of 
individual works  costs was  wide.  The  averaging of  the costs of makers 
with multiple works  masked  the  inefficiency of  high cost works  in a  way 
which  would  not  occur  under price competition. 
Fourthly,  the Registrar queried  the degree  of  control  exercised by 
the  independent costs  committee  over  the makers,  claiming  that influences 
other  than  the  scheme  had  restrained  the  CMF  from  setting high prices. 
Notably,  in the early postwar  period,  the threat of nationalisation had 
moderated  cement  price-fixing, whilst  the later postwar period had  been 
influenced by  the  1956  Act itself and  then by  the reference of  the  CMF's 
agreements  to  The  Restrictive Practices Court. 
Fifthly,  whilst conceding  that  the  CMF' s  arrangements  had 'tended  to 
promote  sales near  the works  and  to  lower  transport  costs,  the Registrar 
claimed  that  the benefits  therefrom were wholly outweighed  by  other factors. 
Notably,  the nearest customers  paid more  for  their cement  than would  be  the 
case under  competition,  the  scheme  discouraged  low  cost works  from 
absorbing freight  costs  and  invading  the markets  of  their rivals,  whils.t 
the subsidy  to  far distant customers  discouraged  the building of  new 
capacity in areas without  existing works.  Specifically,  the  scheme,  as 
operated,  had  the effect of retaining the Medway  works  in use,  although 
they were  high cost works.  If the  scheme  were  ended,  makers  would  expand 
in areas  such as Lancashire  to  the detriment of  the longhauls  from  the 
Thames-Medway  works. 
Sixthly,  the Registrar rejected the notion that  the continued 
existence of  the Cement  and Concrete Association depended  upon  the 
maintenance of  the CMF's  agreements  and  the view  that  the  scheme  had 
enabled members  to  plan expansion of  capacity effectively.  Indeed,  the 
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line with the  increase in demand  with a  view  to perpetuating a  seller's 
market. 
Seventhly,  the Registrar noted  that,  if the  scheme  were  to  be 
continued,  there was  no  inherent  safeguard in it against unjustifiable 
price increases  in the future.  Even if the  independent  costs  committee 
possessed very great influence,  in the  absence of  a  legal basis,  the 
success  of its works  would  depend  to  a  large extent on  the character of 
those who  happened  to  be  members  at any point in time,  which must  be  a 
matter of  speculation.  In this regard,  the Registrar urged  that it was 
the agreement,  and  not  the manner  in which  that agreement  had  been operated, 
that was  relevant in considering  the application of paragraph  (b)  of 
Section  21(1)  of  the  1956  Act. 
(d)  The  Judgment  of  the Court 
The  Court,  in its judgment,  formed  a  view on  a  number  of  issues  over 
which  the  CMF  and  the Registrar  had  been in dispute,  prior  to  assessing 
the CMF's  case  by  reference  to  gateway  (b)  of  the Act. 
Firstly,  the  Court  concluded,  following  a  survey of  the  evidence, 
that  the CMF's  price structure  indeed had  been  successful  in general  in 
making it unattractive  to  a  cement manufacturer  to  deliver  cement  beyond 
the area in which  the distance  zones  were  based  on  the works  from which 
delivery was  made.  The  Court  accepted  ~n general  that  the overall cost 
of delivering  cement  to  zones  based  on  inland works  had  been kept  to  a 
minimum  and  that cross-haulage virtually had  been eliminated. 
Secondly,  the Court  concluded  that  the evidence  strongly  indicated 
that,  over  the previous  eight years,  the CMF's  price policy had  produced 
rates of  return on  capital appreciably below  those achieved by manufacturing 
industries  in general  in the  United Kingdom.  During  the period under  consider-
ation  the market  for  cement  had been  a  seller's market. 
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evidence  did not  support  the Registrar  in his criticism that  the  cement 
industry had  failed  to  expand  the overall capacity of  the  industry 1n 
proper relationship  to demand.  Indeed,  a  faster rate of  expansion might 
well  have  raised production costs.  The  Court also  concluded  that 
expansion appeared  to have  taken place  economically  from  the viewpoint 
of  geographical  location. 
Fourthly,  the Court  concluded  on  the basis of  the evidence  that, 
taken as  a  whole,  the industry had  operated with a  high  degree  of  efficiency 
insofar  as  costs of production were  concerned.  The  Court  accepted  the CMF's 
view that considerable variation in the costs of  individual works  was 
inevitable in a  manufacturing process  in which physical  and  geographical 
factors  exercised such  a  substantial influence on costs.  The  Court  expressed 
itself  to be satisfied that,  under  the CMF's  agreements,  the  cement  industry 
as  a  whole  had operated efficiently with respect both to  production and  to 
delivery costs and  that prices,  overall,  had  been reasonable. 
Fifthly,  the Court  expressed itself to  be  satisfied with the perfortnance 
of  the  independent  costs  comtllittee,  which  had  performed its functions 
"independently,  carefully and  fairly",  and  concluded  that it had  been 
effective ''in exercising a  wise  control over prices''.  Particular criticisms 
were  directed at  information deficiencies,  natllely  (i)  that  the  comtllittee  ~~as 
not  supplied with  the costs of  individual works  operated by multiple plant 
companies,  (ii)  that  the bases  of depreciation adopted  by  the various 
companies  were  not disclosed  to  the colllmittee,  (iii)  that  the  comtllittee 
had  not  made,  prior  to  the case,  any  investigation into  the capital 
employed  in the industry and  (iv)  that  the  consideration of  returns  by 
the  committee  had  always  been confined  to  those relating  to  home  trade 
in ordinary and  in rapid hardening Portland  cement,  thereby omitting  the 
export  trade  and  the performance of  special  cements.  However,  the Court 
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these deficiencies been  eliminated. 
On  the basis of  these conclusions,  the Court  evaluated  the  CMF's 
agreement  by  reference  to  'gateway'  (b),  centring attention upon  the  CMF's 
suggestion that  the overall price of cement  delivered in the U.K.  would  be 
lower  if the  agreement  continued  than if it were  to  be abrogated.  The 
Court  accepted  as  correct  three propositions,  namely  (i)  that in an 
expanding  industry,  in the  long  term,  the competitive  pr~ce level would 
provide  a  sufficient return on  cement  produced at new  works  to attract the 
investment  of capital,  (ii)  that  in the future,  supply would match  demand 
except  for  short periods at particular  times  and places  and  (iii)  that  the 
minimum  return which will attract investment  in a  new  works  would  be higher 
under  free  competition than  under  the  common  price agreement,  because  the 
risk would  be  greater.  The  Court  then addressed attention to  two  crucial 
issues,  namely  (i)  whether  the  CMF  would  in fact fix prices at a  level 
lower  than  that required  to attract investment  capital under  free  competition 
and  (ii) whether  the difference  in price level would  be  sufficient  to 
constitute a  "substantial" benefit  to  the public  as  purchasers  of  cement. 
The  Court  accepted  the  unanimous  view of  the expert witnesses  called 
to  give  evidence  that  the  return required  upon  new  capital  invested in the 
cement  industry under  free  competition would  be  in the range of  15  to  20 
per cent.  Following  a  detailed assessment  of  the price level  implications 
of a  shift from  less  than  10  per  cent  to  the free  competition requirements, 
the Court  concluded  that  the latter could be  achieved only by  an  increase 
in the price of  cement  which  should be  described  as  'substantial'.  Further-
more,  on  the basis of all available evidence,  and  on  the  assumption  that 
the  information deficiencies previously outlined were  to  be rectified,  the 
Court accepted  that  the  CMF  would  continue  to  operate  the price  agreement 
with  the  same  sense of  responsibility and restraint as  they had  shown  to 
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costs  committee  had  been alleged,  to  the  satisfaction of  the Court,  by 
the CMF's  assurance  that  information relative  to  pr~ces and  costs would 
be  supplied  to  the Registrar at  the latter's request for  the purpose  of 
his deciding whether  he  should make  application under  section 22  of  the 
Act  on  the ground  that  there had  been  a  material  change  in the relevant 
circumstances. 
The  Court  therefore  concluded  that  the CMF's  ma~n price agreements 
had  successfully negotiated  'gateway'  (b)  and,  ~n the absence  of offsetting 
detriments,  the agreements  were  declared  to  be  not  contrary  to  the public 
interest.  A number  of relatively minor  restrictions,  providing for  general 
rebates  to  large users  and  large merchants,  and  prohibiting quotations  and 
contracts for  the supply of  cement  for  periods  exceeding  12  months,  were 
found  to  be contrary  to  the public interest and,  accordingly,  vo{d. 
4.  The  Restrictive Practices Court  and  the  Cement  Agreements  (1973-1974) 
In  1973,  some  12  years after  the favourable  decision on  the  CMF's 
common  price agreements,  the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements, 
in his last act before his Office was  merged  in that of  the Director-
General  of  Fair Trading,  applied  to The Restrictive Practices  Court  under 
section 22  of  the  1956  Act  for  leave  to  apply  to  the Court  for  the Court 
to reconsider its previous  decision on  the ground  that  there  had been a 
material  change  in the relevant  circumstances.  This  was  only  the  second 
occasion upon which  the jurisdiction of  the Court  had  been invoked under 
that  section of  the Act. 
The  Registrar  claimed  that:-
(i)  The  cement  industry is not at present,  and has  not been for  a  number 
of years,  an expanding  industry working  to  full capacity. 
108 (ii)  Prices  are  no  longer  fixed  under  the  •••  agreement  at a  level  lower 
than that which would  be  required under  free  competition  to  attract 
investment of capital  in new  works. 
(iii) Accordingly,  the reasoning  by which  the court concluded  that  the 
agreement  is so operated as  to keep  down  the overall price of  cement 
to  a  level  substantially lower  than it would have  been under  free 
competition is no  longer applicable. 
(iv3  Since  1961  there have  been  important  improvements  in the methods  of 
distribution of  cement,  but  the  agreement  is not  so  operated as  to 
take  any  or  any  substantial account  of  them;  in particular,  purchasers, 
consumers  and  users  of  cement who  require  cement  at places near  to 
bulk depots  are  deprived of  the opportunity  to  purchase  cement  at 
prices which  take  into account  the  savings  in costs resulting from 
the delivery of  cement  from  low  cost works  to  such depots  in bulk 
and  by modern means  of  transport. 
(v)  There  have  been  no  significant changes  in base prices  and  distance 
circles  since  1961  except where  necessitated by  the opening of  new 
works  and  the closures  of old ones;  base prices at new  works  have 
in most  cases  been  fixed  substantially above  normal  and  have  not 
been reduced  to  take account of efficient and  low-cost  production 
of  such works;  and  in the result purchasers,  consumers  and  users 
of  cement  who  require  cement  at places  supplied  from  a  works  for 
which  the base price is fixed  substantially above  the  normal  are 
deprived  of  the opportunity  to  purchase  cement  at  a  price which 
takes  due  account  of  the costs of  production at  those works. 
(vi)  It is no  longer correct that in view of  the  infrequency  and  small 
scale of  changes  in the price of  cement  the  terms  of  the  agreement, 
preventing members  of  the  Cement  Hakers'  Federation  ••.  from 
quoting  a  fixed  price for  c8ment  delivered  throughout  the period 
of  a  long  term contract  do  not result in any  serious  financial 
disadvantage  to  purchasers  of  cement. 
(vii)  The  federation has  in making  the price increase which  came  into 
operation on  May  10,  1971,  departed  from  the principles  on which 
prices  have  been fixed  in the past,  and  that  increase was, 
accordingly,  substantially greater. 
The  Court  proceeded  to  consider  evidence with  a  v~ew to  assessing 
whether it amounted  to  prima  facie  evidence of  a  change  ~n an essential 
part of  the  reasoning  by  which  the court arrived at its previous  conclusion. 
Of  the grounds  relied upon  by  the Registrar,  the first  three were  seen  to 
be  the most  important. 
The  Court  considered  a  range  of evidence  concerning whether  or  not 
the  cement  industry  remained  an  expanding  industry.  The  Registrar  demon-
strated that  the total production of  common  price cements  was  the  same  in 
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production of  cement  for all purposes  was  16.78 million tonnes  in  1964 
and  18.23  in  1971.  Furthermore,  capacity had  increased from  13.75 million 
tonnes  in 1960  to  19.58 in  1972.  Overall,  the Court  considered that  the 
cement  industry had  expanded  since  1961  in line with its forecasts at that 
time. 
Following a  detailed analysis of  the rates  of  return on capital earned 
by  the  six new  works,  the Court felt unable  to  support  the Registrar's 
viewpoint.  Taking  the return on capital for all six works  together,  the 
highest  return for  any  year  sLnce  1962  had  been  8.97  per cent and  for  1972 
the figure was  6.82 per cent,  all on depreciated replacement values.  The 
Court  expressed itself to  be  impressed by  the  low  returns  on capital 
employed  in the  cement  industry as  compared with the average  returns  for 
other  industries. 
Having rejected the Registrar's  submissions  under  ground  (i)  and  (ii) 
above,  the Court was  clearly unable  to  accept  that  a  prima facie  case had 
been made  for  ground  (iii). 
The  fourth  ground  relied upon  by The Registrar  concerned  a  new 
detriment  since  the use of depots was  not referred to  in the  1961  Judgment. 
The  use of  depots  had  greatly increased  (52  in  1972  as  compared with  23  in 
1961)  and  such  depots  for  the most  part were  fed  by  special  trains  consisting 
of  100  ton  cement  wagons  in which  the  cement  was  carried under 
pressure  so  that it could  be  blown  out  on  discharge.  The  Registrar 
suggested  that cost  savings  from  the  establishment of  bulk depots  had  not 
been  accommodated  into  the  common  price agreements.  Evidence  analysed  by 
the Court  in fact  showed  no  general  reduction in delivery costs in favour 
of  depots.  The  Court  therefore  dismissed  ground  (iv)  of  the Registrar's 
submission. 
The  Court also dismissed  the Registrar's  argument  under  ground  (v), 
pointing out  that price adjustments  since  1964  had  been  influenced  to  a 
llO marked  degree  by  Prices  and  Incomes  legislation and  by voluntary price 
freezes.  Given  the Court's  v~ew that  cement  price levels  had been 
substantially lower  as  a  consequence  of  the price agreements,  the Registrar 
had  failed  to  produce  evidence  supporting  the submission  that  there was 
substance  in ground  (v)  of his application. 
The  Court also dismissed  ground  (vi)  of  the Registrar's application, 
pointing out  that  the  inability of  customers  to obtain long-term fixed 
price contracts for  the supply of  cement  was  a  detriment  of  a  very  limited 
nature.  The  biggest increase in cement prices- 17  per  cent  in May  1971 
resulted  ~n an overall  increase of  0.51  per  cent of  a  building or civil 
engineering contract.  For  cement  constitutes only  about  3  per  cent of  the 
total value of  such contracts.  There  had  not been  a  suggestion of  a  material 
change  in the circumstances relative  to  this restriction. 
Finally,  the Registrar  introduced no  evidence in support of  ground 
(vii)  of his  application which  related  to a  price increase in May  1971 
which was  designed  to  achieve  an overall return on capital  employed  of  10 
per  cent for  the whole  of  1971  (i.e. which  contained an  element  of  retros-
pection).  The  Court rejected  the Registrar's plea. 
For  these  reasons,  the Court  concluded  that prima facie  evidence  had 
not  been adduced  of a  material  change  in the relevant  circumstances.  The 
leave  sought  by  the Registrar was  refused  and  CMF's  common  price agreement 
remained operative. 
5.  The  'Critique'  by  The  Price Commission  (1978) 
In its recent Report entitled  'The Associated Portland Cement 
Manufacturers Limited  - Increase in Cement  Prices'  the Price Commission 
commented  upon  the CMF's  common  price agreements  in adverse fashion  and 
interfered with  the price structure by  the specific nature of its price 
increase resolutions.  Although  the Commission's  critique almost entirely 
111 was  gratuitous,  given  the decision of  the Court,  its price decisions 
clearly affecc  the price structure for  cement.  For  this reason,  a 
brief  (and  not uncritical)  resume  of its v~ews has  been  incorporated 
into  this chapter.  It is clear from  the Report  that  the Price Commission 
failed fully  to  comprehend  the specific nature of  Section 21(1)(b)  of  the: 
1956  Act  and  the requirement  only  to  demonstrate  the  existence of  a 
'specific  and  substantial'  benefit,  rather  than  to establish a  general 
case for  the retention of  a  restrictive agreement. 
There is a  marked  similarity in the  v~ews of  the Price Commission 
and  those of  the Registrar  as  advanced  in  1961.  Once  again,  the criticism 
was  advanced  that  the way  in which  production costs were  averaged  by  the 
CMF  avoided  any  penalty for  persistent low efficiency.  The  Price Commission 
calculated cost  indices for each of  the eight  cement  plants of  APCM  in  1973, 
demonstrating  that five plants had  lower manufacturing costs per  tonne  of 
cement  than  the largest plant.  Yet  three  such plants  sold at the  same 
'basing point price'  as  the largest plant and  two  such plants actually 
sold at higher basing point prices!  Furthermore,  both in  1973  and  ~n 
1977,  the cost per  tonne  in the  dry  and  semi-dry process  plants had  been 
lower  than for  the wet  process,  with the unweighted  average  difference 
widening  from  15  per  cent in  1973  to  22  per cent  in  1977.  This  difference 
was  not reflected  in base  prices which,  on average,  were  higher at  the  dry 
and  semi-dry works;  nor was  the widening  cost differential between  1973 
and  1977  reflected in price movements,  which were  uniform for all plants. 
This criticism in fact was  acknowledged by The Restrictive Practices 
Court  both in  1961  and  1974,  but dismissed  as  of  insufficient significance 
to counteract  the  'substantial and  specific'  benefit  to  users  arising from 
overall  low  cement  prices.  The  Price Commission  failed  to make  this 
important  comparison in its  1978  Report. 
However,  the Price Commission further  argued  that  the failure of  the 
common  price agreement  to reflect high plant costs in high basing point 
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is ambiguous,  for it  ~s clearly possible that  the  combination of  high 
production costs  and  low  prices might  induce  cement manufacturers  either  to 
shut down  high cost plant or  to  improve  efficiency as  a  means  of  raising 
the return on capital  to  the company  as  a  whole.  Certainly,  the competitive 
model  does  not predict high basing point prices for  high cost works  in a 
market as  homogeneous  as  that for  cement. 
The  Price Commission was  also critical of  the cross-subsidisation 
which  resulted  from failure  to  recover  the full cost of deliveries  to  the 
distance  zones.  Table  48  outlines  the extent of cross-subsidisation in the 
case of  APCM  products over  the period  1973  to  1977: 
Table  48  Cross-subsidisation of  APCM  Cement  Deliveries 
1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
£m  £m  £m  £m  £m 
Total  cost of distribution  18.9  20.5  25.4  27.9  30.5 
Cost  recovered  in pricing structure  6.4  6.4  8.8  9.8  10.5 
Net  subsidy  12.5  14. 1  16.6  18. 1  20.0 
Net  subsidy  as  % of:-
- distribution cost  66%  69%  65%  65%  66% 
- net  sales  revenue  II%  13%  II%  II%  II% 
Net  subsid;: 
- in £'s per  tonne  1.02  1.30  1.61  1.94  2.36 
- index  (£  per  tonne)  100  127  158  190  231 
(Source:  Price  Commission,  op.cit,) 
The  Price Commission  claimed  that  the  'basing point  system'  operated 
by  the  CMF  had  a  number  of effects which  ran counter  to its own  objectives 
as  defined  under  section 2  of  the Price  Commission  Act.  Firstly,  the existence 
ll3 of cross-subsidisation strengthened other aspects of  the  common  price 
agreement which permitted inefficiency and high costs.  In particular, 
the pattern of  demand  was  distorted significantly in  the case of  cement 
where  transport costs are almost  20  per cent of sales  revenue  and  where 
cross-subsidisation is significant. 
Secondly,  such  a  disparity between costs  and  transport  charges 
discouraged  customers  from collecting or  arranging their own  transport. 
The  Commission  argued  that this  had  created a  substantial distortion in 
the market  for  transport  services,  with  the  zone  system operating as  a 
barrier to  the growth  of an  independent  transport network. 
Thirdly,  the method whereby  the  transport subsidy was  recovered 
offered no  obvious  inducement  to APCM  to  increase  the efficiency of its 
transport fleet.  The  ability to  recover  a  transport  subsidy  through higher 
'basing point prices'  obscured  the  true  costs  involved and weakened  the 
incentive  to  seek  even greater efficiency. 
Fourthly,  the Price Commission  complained  that  thedistributionsystem 
offered an  inadequate  incentive  to  collect by  customers  in the form of  the 
small  collection allowances  for bulk and  bagged  cement.  The  fact  that only 
6  per cent of  sales were  collected indicated that customers  had not  found 
it worthwhile.  Closely allied  to  this was  the issue of merchants.  Although 
there was  no  agreement  amongst  CMF  members  to  deal  only  through merchants, 
the fact  that  95  per  cent of all sales were  handled  through  them meant  (to 
the Price Commission)  that for all practical purposes  a  sustem of  exclusive 
dealing existed.  It was  likely,  therefore,  that users  paid, throughdiscounts 
given  to  merchants,  for  services  that were  not required,  or  that  they could 
perform  themselves,  possibly at  lower  cost.  This  was  especially likely in 
the  case of  the largest  users  of  cement. 
Finally,  the  Commission was  critical of  the  subsidy  provided  to 
customers  for  cement  supplied  in bags.  For  10  tonne  loads  delivered  the 
114 user was  charged  an additional  £0.93 per  tonne,  whereas  the extra costs 
incurred were  estimated  to  be  £1.70  per  tonne.  Such deliveries  amounted 
to  25  per  cent  of APCM's  total sales.  The  Commission  argued  that higher 
charges  might  induce  customers  to  economise  by  purchasing  Ln  bulk. 
In recommending  that certain price  Lncreases  should  be  permitted in 
the case of APCM,  the Price Commission made  use of its authority  to 
influence  the composition of  the  'basing point pricing'  scheme,  as  the 
following  observation from its  1978  Report  clearly indicates: 
"We  would  expect  the  company  to  apply  the  increases  in the prices 
of ordinary,  rapid hardening  and  coarse ground Portland  cements 
permitted by our  Recommendations  in the main  to make  proportionate 
increases  in prices,  other  than  'Basing Point Prices',  so  as  to 
reduce,  so  far  as  possible,  the element of  cross-subsidisation 
in present distribution and  transport arrangements.  We  would 
also expect  the  company  to make  further progress  towards  further 
reducing  such cross-subsidisation in any  future ratifications 
for price increases''  (pp.  60-61). 
Conclusions 
In outlining  the nature of  the  common  price and marketing arrangements 
of  the  CMF  and depicting  the history of  investigations into its much-reviewed 
arrangements,  we  have  not attempted  to  evaluate its welfare  implications. 
Others  have  been less  than reticent in this regard.  It must  be  apparent, 
however,  from  a  reading of  this chapter  that  a  government  which legislates 
for  investigating bodies  so differently defined and with over-lapping 
jurisdictions contributes substantially to  the complexity of  devising 
acceptable arrangements  of  industrial organisation. 
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117 Chapter  7  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE 
International  trade  in cement  products  is relatively unimportant, 
largely as  a  consequence  of freight  costs which are high relative  to  the 
delivered price of  the products.  For  this reason,  countries with an 
adequate manufacturing capacity relative to  domestic  demand  largely are 
protected from  import penetration.  This  explains,  for  example,  the total 
absence  of  UK  cement  exports  to Europe  and  the absence of European  cement 
exports  to  the  UK  save  for  the  trade between Eire and Northern Ireland, 
where  distances are not great. 
As  Table  49  outlines,  imports  have  comprised  a  declining percentage 
of total  cement  deliveries  to  U.K.  markets  over  the period  1967-77,  and 
now  are of trivial importance.  By  contrast,  exports  have  formed  a  rising 
percentage of  UK  cement  production,  for  the most  part responding  to  cement 
shortages  in the developing world.  Increasingly,  however,  UK  cement 
manufacturers  are  avoiding  the heavy  freight costs  involved by  establishing 
interests in new  cement  capacity located  in developing world  countries. 
When  domestic  capacity is adequate  by  reference  to  domestic  demand  in such 
countries,  UK  exports  may  be  expected  to decline  to  insignificant levels. 
The  European  cement  industries  have  a  history of restricted competition. 
Before  the  Second  World  War,  there were  cartels in most  countries,  and  the 
more  important producers  co-operated  in the International Cement  Export 
Conference.  In addition,  there existed a  Five Nation  Ag~eement between  the 
Netherlands,  Germany,  France,  Belgium and  the United Kingdom  which  controlled 
cement  supplies  to  the Dutch market. 
The  postwar  situation,  however,  has  been radically different,  reflecting 
a  greater hostility towards  the cartelisation process.  Immediately after  the 
war,  cartels  in the  USA  and  French  zones  of  Germany  were  prohibited,  and  in 
the British zone  also by  1948.  The  introduction of  competition legislation 
in all the EEC  countries  and,  subsequently,  the growing  scope.  of Artie  les 85 
119 Table  49  Imports  and Exports  as  a  % of  UK  Cement  Deliveries 
Year  Imports  % of  Exports  % of 
(mill. tonnes)  UK  Deliveries  (mill. tonnes)  UK  Deliveries 
1967  o. 17  1.0  0.31  2.0 
1968  0. 15  1.0  0.22  1.2 
1969  0.06  0.3  0.28  1.6 
1970  0.03  0.2  0.71  4.2 
1971  0.07  0.4  0.67  3.8 
1972  0.08  0.4  0.80  4.5 
1973  0. 10  0.5  1.55  7.8 
1974  0. 1  1  0.6  1.02  5.9 
1975  0.08  0.5  0.99  5.9 
1976  0.05  0.3  0.99  6.4 
1977  0.02  0. 1  1.69  11.7 
·-~----·---------
(Source:  Cement  Makers'  Federation) 
and  86  of  the Treaty of  Rome  has  created a  very different legal  and 
economic  climate.  Except  for  the  UK  (as  outlined in Chapter  6)  formal 
cement  cartels have  disappeared within EEC,  although  'crisis' cartels are 
permitted,  under  special circumstances,  in  the Federal  Republic of  Germany. 
The  development  and  application of  EEC  competition policy has  invoked 
considerable  changes  in behaviour  during  the  1970's.  The  Noordwijk  Cement 
Accord,  signed between  Dutch,  West  German  and  Belgian producers  in  1956,  as 
a  successor  to earlier arrangements  outlined  above,  together with its 
subsequent  amendments,  have  been altered significantly following  EEC 
120 proceedings.  In addition,  the European  Commission  in  1972  found  an 
internal Belgian cement  cartel  to  be  contrary  to Article  85.  The 
precedents  established by  such  decisions  inevitably influence  the state 
of  competition in cement  products  throughout  EEC. 
There  is no  evidence whatsoever,  however,  that  the  UK  cement 
manufacturers  operate  arrangements  which  influence  the pattern of  inter-
national  trade  in cement  products within or without  Europe.  Some  such 
evidence,  if available,  would  have  been  located during  one  or more  of  the 
several  investigations of  the  UK  Cement  Makers'  Federation by  The  Restrictive 
Practices Court,  the National  Board  for Prices  and  Incomes  and  The  Price 
Commission  during  the past  seventeen years. 
Rather,  the evidence  suggests  that  UK  cement  companies  are anxious  to 
penetrate export markets  wherever  profitable opportunities exist and  indeed 
to  develop  financial  interests  in overseas  cement  making  capacity in markets 
where  cement  consumption continues  to  increase.  During periods  of  sustained 
excess  capacity 1n  the  domestic market,  as  at present,  there  is little 
likelihood  that  UK  producers will refrain from exporting  to profitable 
markets. 
121 CHAPTER  8  RECENT  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  THE  U.K.  CEMENT  INDUSTRY 
In  this chapter,  a  number  of recent  developments  in the  cement  industry 
which  have  not  been  accounted  for  in other chapters  - are briefly outlined. 
I.  The  World  Cement  Scene 
The  period  1953  to  1973  was  characterised by  continuous  growth  in the 
world  cement markets,  with world  cement  consumption  increasing four-fold 
to  a  total of nearly  700  million  tons.  Over  the  same  period,  cement 
consumption  in the non-Communist  European countries  increased  three-fold, 
whilst  that of  the United  Kingdom  only doubled  and  that of  the  USA  only 
grew  by  75  per cent.  Clearly,  therefore,  growth  in U.K.  cement  consumption 
lagged  significantly behind  that  in the rest of  the world.  By  1973,  the 
USSR  was  the  largest cement  consumer  and  Japanese  cement  production equalled 
that of  the  USA. 
Since  1973,  however,  the  effects of  the  rise 1n oil prices  and  the 
subsequent acceleration in the rates of  inflation have  lowered  cement 
consumption in Western  countries  as  governments  have  lowered  public 
expenditure  and  as  the private  sectors  have  experienced recessions.  Table  50 
outlines  the extent of  the  recession in a  number  of  leading Western countries 
in the  immediate  post  1973  situation: 
T  bl  50  C  a  e  ement  consu~Jt1on 1n E urope  an  d  h  USA  (000'  t  e  s  tonnes  )  1973  an  d  1975 
1973  1975  1975  as  % of  1973 
USA  78,250  60,805  77.7 
Italy  35,688  34,070  95.5 
Fest Germany  39, 711  31,450  79.2 
France  29,892  28,635  95.8 
Spain  21,592  20,700  95.9 
U.K.  20,019  16,830  84.1 
(Source:  APCM  Report  and Accounts  1975  p.23) 
123 As  is clear from Table  50  the initial impact  on  cement  consumption 
of  the world  recess~on was  more  serious  ~n the UK,  the  USA  and  in West 
Germany  than in other  leading European countries.  In  such  circumstances, 
it is not  surprising that  some  European manufacturers  have  directed  export 
attention to  the developing markets  which,  as  Table  51  indicates,  were 
largely unaffected  by  the recession in Europe  and  the USA. 
_Q~men  !_  Consu~)t  ion  -~E..__:] evel  o  .E.~n;.::  Cou_l!-trier:  ( 000' s  tormes) 
1973  2nd  1974  ~ 
'- ------.. 
1973  1974  1974  as  % 1973 
Algeria  2,227  2,948  132 
Libya  I,  871  2,580  138 
Israel  I,  577  I,  867  118 
Saudi Arabia  I,  364  I,  800  132 
Arabian Gulf  States  I ,500  2,200  147 
Iran  4,020  5,239  130 
Pakistan  2,396  3,150  131 
Indonesia  2,056  2,522  123 
(Source:  APCM  Report  and Accounts  1975,  p.23) 
The major  cement  producers  have  looked  therefore  to  exports  as  a 
solution to over-capacity,  but with varying degrees  of  success.  Other 
factors  than  the availability of  supplies  influences  exports,  notably 
proximity  to markets,  rates  of freight,  shipping opportunities and 
profitability.  There  was  also  a  radical  change  after  1973  im  the direction 
of exports.  In  1973,  the USA  was  the largest importer,  taking over  6 
million  tons  or one-sixth of  the world  cement  trade.  The  halving of  this 
figure  by  1975  contributed substantially to European excess capacity. 
The  largest export markets  are  now  in North  and  West  Africa,  and  in Iran 
and  the Arabian gulf,  the former  of which are most  economically  supplied 
by  the Mediterranean European producers  and  the latter by  Japan  and  other 
Asian producers. 
124 Cement  is a  bulky  and  expens1ve  cargo  to  send  by  sea  and,  although 
Western c0untries largely have  turned  tc bulk delivery  systems  in their 
domestic markets,  the developing countries  typically purchase  cement  in 
bags.  Their ports  do  not  have  the  facilities for  accepting bulk cement 
nor,  if it could be  landed  - at a  much  faster rate  than bagged  cement  -
have  they  the means  of  transporting it or  storing it. 
An  inevitable  consequence  of  excess  capacity and  increasing 
competition in export markets  is  that much  export  trade  is unattractive, 
effected at prices  below  the full  cost of production as  a  means  of making 
some  contribution to overheads.  Many  Western manufacturers  finding  export 
trade  in such circumstances  to  be  unacceptably unattractive have  closed 
down  kilns or  even complete works,  temporarily in the case of modern plant 
but permanently for  old equipment.  Increasingly,  European manufacturers 
have  turned  to  the activity of selling their expertise  to  developing 
countries desirous  of  producing  their  own  cement.  In  the U.K.  APCM's 
Consulting  Service has  been prominent  in this exercise.  Furthermore, 
several European  cement  manufactu~ers, in particu~ar those of  Switzerland, 
France  and  Belgium,  and  APCM  for  the U.K.,  have  taken a  financial  interest 
in companies  in the developing countries  or have  set up  subsidiary or 
associated  companies  in those  countries. 
The  most  widely  spread overseas  interests are  those of  APCM  and most 
of  these are in countries,  outlined in Table 52  where  cement  consumption 
has  continued  to  grow. 
Table 52  c  emen t  consump t'  1on 1n  (000'  t  s  onnes  )  - APCM  overseas  1n  t eres  t 
1973  1974  1974  as  % of  1973 
Canada  9,051  9,656  106.7 
Mexico  9,567  10,285  107.5 
Brazil  13,510  15,037  1  11 . 3 
Kenya  431  398  92.3 
South Africa  6,841  7,275  106.3 
Nigeria  1 '923  2,222  115,5 
Singapore  1 '126  1 '132  100.5 
Malaysia  1, 455  1, 644  113.0 
Australia  5,287  5,071  95.9 
New  Zealand  1, 046  1 '098  105.0 
·-·---~, 
(Source:  APCM  Reports  and  Accounts  1975,  p.23) 
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The  manufacture of  cement  has  always  required  a  large  input of 
energy and  energy costs  account  typically for  40  per cent of  the  total 
manufacturing cost of  cement.  Of  the energy  consumed,  90  per  cent is 
used  in the firing of  the rotary kilns  and  - by way  of  contrast - less 
than  1 per  cent is used  on  the distribution of  the product.  Any  signif-
icant  savings  in energy,  therefore,  must  be  achieved at  the point of 
manufacture. 
Kilns  are fired  by natural gas,  oil or coal,  the choice  being 
determined,  in the main,  by  cost.  As  we  outlined in Chapter  2,  approx-
imately 84  per cent  of existing kiln capacity in the  UK  is coal-fired, 
approximately  11  per cent is gas-fired and  5  per cent is oil-fired. 
Although  coal  price  rises  to date have  not  matched  the dramatic  increases 
experienced in the price of oil, nevertheless  they  have  made  a  substantial 
contribution to  the rising price of  cement. 
Between  1965  and  1976,  the amount  of  fuel  used  in the U.K.  to  produc:e 
a  ton of  cement  has  fallen by  some  25  per  cent  due  to  improvements  in 
existing plant and  to  the building,  wherever  possible,  of  new  dry process 
or semi-dry process  cement  works.  Even with new  plant,  economies  are still 
possible and,  in  1975,  there was  a  3  per  cent fall per  tonne  in fuel 
consumption in modern  plants. 
The  most dramatic energy  saving decision would  be  to  convert all 
existing wet  process plants  to  the  more  energy efficient dry process  - a 
conversion of over  70  per  cent of  the  UK  productive capacity.  But  such  a 
decision is uneconomic.  In  the past,  factors  other  than  energy costs have 
dominated  in the  choice of  cement  manufacturing processes.  The  nature  and: 
location of  the  raw materials often made  it impracticable  to  utilise  the 
dry process  (as  for  example was  the  case with APCM's  North fleet Works). 
126 The  manufacture of  cement  is highly capital-intensive and  during periods 
of recession it is not  thought  to  be  economically worthwhile  to  convert 
existing,  non-absolute wet  process plants  to  dry.  Energy  saving only, 
in such circumstances,  will not  support  the required  investments. 
The  APCM's  worldwide  consultancy organisation has built up  a 
considerable amount  of  energy experience which is supplied  on  a  commercial 
basis  to other  cement  producers  throughout  the world  - not least to  the 
USA  - where  the energy input can be  as much  as  40  per cent higher  per 
tonne of  cement  than in the  UK. 
3.  APCM' s  Contributions  to Research and  Development 
As  the largest cement  producer in the  UK,  APCM  devotes  considerable 
attention to research and  development.  In  I977,  APCM  expanded  a  total of 
£3  million  (or  I! per cent of its sales)  in this  exercise.  For many  years, 
the company  has  led  the  cement  industry  throughout  the world  in specialised 
research  into certain techniques of cement  production.  It remains  a  leader 
in developing  new  technology. 
Much  of  the  company's  success  in energy  conservation has  been based 
upon  detailed studies of kiln chain operation and  by  developing methods  of 
reducing moisture  levels in feed slurries,  and  thereby  in reducing fuel 
consumption per  tonne  of  cement  in the wet  process  by  19  per cent  between 
I967  and  I976. 
Since  1973,  the  company  the APCM  has  been  testing methods  of  reducing 
fueld  costs.  All oil fired kilns  have  been or are being converted  into 
coal  fired.  Following trials,  carried out  in  1975,  which  demonstrated 
that  the  combustible  content of  council  refuse collection,  after  treatment, 
could  be  used  to  reduce  coal  consumption without  loss of  cement  quality, 
APCM  installed at its Westbury works  a  plant for  the handling of  refuse. 
Approximately  5  tonnes  of  combustible refuse is required  to  replace  I  tonne 
127 of  coal;  but  the refuse has  to  be  used  in balanced proportions with coal 
fuel.  There  is now  substantial  evidence  that provided  the rate of 
addition of refuse is kept  below  12  per  cent  and  confined  to  suitable 
plants,  with robust  crushing machinery  the clinker quality is unaffected. 
APCM  additionally  supports research into product  innovation and  has 
developed  a  considerable variety of  cement  products  for  special applications. 
Indeed,  APCM  is  the only  UK  cement manufacturer  to carry out  any  significant 
amount  of product  development.  The  largest volume  cement  product  launched 
by  APCM  in recent  years  has  been oil well  cements.  APCM  is  the only maker 
of  these  in the UK. 
Although much  of  the work  of  APCM's  research division is concerned 
with developments  within  the  company,  it also acts  in association with 
external research  groups  involved in studies  into production  and  uses  of 
cement.  There is,  for  example,  extensive  involvement with  the British 
and European  Standards  committees  on behalf  of  the  cement  industry. 
Research into  the properties  and  uses  of  cement  is  supported additionally 
by  the APCM  as  the largest subscriber  to  the  Cement  and  Concrete Association, 
which is financed  by  UK  cement manufacturers  and  which  complements  APCM's 
extensive  testing to  improve  product  standards  and  to  ensure  that  customers' 
requirements  are satisfied. 
Finally,  APCM  provides  a  wide  range  of  technical  consulting services 
overseas,  which it has  developed via its role as  provider of  technical 
services  to its associate  companies.  This  APCM  service  covers  not merely 
technical management  but also general management  and  is provided against 
technical  services agreements,  for which  a  service  fee  is paid.  In its 
capacity as  consultant,  APCM  thus  provides  a  service extending over  the 
whole  course of  a  project from financial  appraisal  to project completion. 
The  services now  provided fall  into  three main categories: 
(i)  the design,  construction and  commissioning of  new  or  replacement 
manufacturing capacity; 
128 (ii)  the appraisal of  the efficiency of existing plant and  the  implementations 
of  innovations  and  improvements;  this  service is provided  largely for 
companies  outside  the group; 
(iii)  the  provision of  a  complete management  serv~ce for  the operation of 
new  plants,  whether built by  the group  or not,  in the developing world. 
These  overseas  consulting services,  apart  from  their financial  contribu-
tion to APCM's  operations,  have  enabled  APCM  to maintain a  high standard of 
technical  knowledge  during  a  long  period in which  no  major  new  capacity has 
been built in the  UK. 
4.  Cement  and  the Environment 
As  with any  industry handling  and  producing materials  in fine  powder 
form,  the manufacture  of  cement  generates  quantities of  dust which  must  be 
controlled if high environmental  standards are  to  be maintained.  Indeed, 
dust represents  a  loss of material  to  the manufacturing process,  and  to 
that extent it is in the economic  interest of  the manufacturer  to  ensure 
that as  much  as  possible is recovered  and  returned  to  the process. 
Dust  can arise at virtually every  stage of  the manufacturing process, 
from  the handling of  raw materials  through  to  the despatch of finished 
cement  in bulk or  ~n bags.  The  kiln process  is a  major  source  of  dust  in 
which fine particles in the materials being fired  are picked  up  by  the 
blast of hot gases  through  the kiln.  Suppression and  recovery of kiln 
dust is of major  importance.  Otherwise,  excessive dust  in the  exhaust 
gases  would  be  dispersed widely  from  the kiln chimneys.  The  dry process 
tends  to produce  more  kiln dust  than other processes,  since  the kiln is 
fed with dry  raw meal which  itself is dusty.  In  the wet  process,  dust 
picked up  by  gases  in the calcining and drying  zones  of  the kiln is 
partially suppressed by  contact with  the wet  slurry in the upper  end  of 
the kiln,  particularly in the  system of  slurry-coated drying chains.  All 
129 processes,  however,  produce  a  considerable amount  of  dust  which must  be 
removed  before  the exhaust  gases  are discharged  into  the atmosphere. 
A further  source of dust  in the exhaust is  the hot air or exhaust 
gas  used  to dry  raw materials for  the dry  and  semi-dry processes.  Dust 
in the hot  exhaust  gases  from  the kiln and  associated processes  is removed 
by  passage  through banks  of electrostaticprecipitator&  These  are arrange-
ments  of electrodes  and  earthed plates,  between which all exhaust  gases 
must  pass.  The  electrodes are  charged with electricity at 50,000  to  70,000 
volts,  creating a  corona discharge which  ionises  the surrounding gases.  Dust 
particles carried with the gases  become  electrostatically charged  and  are 
attracted  to  the earthed plates or  tubes.  The  earthed plates are  jagged 
mechanically,  shaking  the collected dust  down  into hoppers at the bottom 
of  the precipitator unit  from which it is returned  to  the kiln. 
Elsewhere  in cement manufacture  dust is generated by  the disturbance 
of fine materials  - raw materials,  clinker and  finished  cement  - and  in 
the process of grinding clinker.  To  counter  such dust pollution,  conveyors 
and  other equipment  are fitted with dust-proof  enclosures,  which,  however, 
are not  completely effective.  Transfer points,  where material passes  from 
one  piece of  equipment  to another,  are particular sources  of  dust.  These 
are hooded  and  fitted with extraction fans  which  reduce  the air pressure 
within the enclosure  and  prevent  dust  from escaping.  The  air stream 
usually is cleaned by fabric filters,  which periodically are  scavenged  to 
recover  the  trapped materials. 
In a  typical  cement works,  equipment  for  dust  control  and  recovery 
accounts  for many  hundreds  of  thousands  of  pounds  in capital  equipment. 
There  is close co-operation between  the  cement  manufacturers  and  the 
Government's Alkali  Inspectorate,  whose  responsibility it is  to  supervise 
and  enforce  legislation on  dust  emission. 
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International  comparisons  are easier to make  in the  case of  cement 
than in the case of most  other commodities.  For  the  industry possesses 
a  common  technology  and makes,  for  the most part,  the  same  finished 
products,  although  the  raw materials may  differ.  In this chapter,  we 
have  been able  to  draw  inter alia upon  information recently analysed  and 
reported on  by The  Price Commission  (UK)  in its  1978  study of  a  price 
increase  request  on  the part of APCM  (Associated Portland Cement  Manufact-
urers).  The  Price Commission made  extensive use  of information provided 
by  Cembureau,  by  the  US  Bureau of Mines,  the Federal  Trade  Commission  and 
the Council  on Wage  and Price Stability,  supplemented  by  staff visits  to 
leading European  cement  producers. 
I.  Output 
Even  by  European  standards,  and more  markedly by world  standards, 
the  UK  cement  industry is relatively insignificant as  Table  ~3outlines. 
As  is evident  from Table  53  the  UK  cement  industry accounts  only for  some 
13  per cent of  EEC  cement  production,  and  a  mere  2  per  cent  of  total world 
cement  production.  The  latter figure  is likely to  decline as  the developing 
world install and  extend  their own  cement  capacity. 
2.  Consumption 
To  a  very  considerable extent,  given freight  costs,  the production 
performance of a  national  cement  industry is controlled by  the demand  for 
cement  within the country in question.  Table 54  indicates  that  cement 
consumption  per capita currently is  lower  in  the  UK  than in any  other  EEC 
country and  below  that  also of  the  USA.  In large part,  this is explained 
131 Table  53  Production of  Cement  by  Countries  1974  and  1975 
I  l  Country  Cement  Production  mill. tonnes 
1974  1975  i 
E.E.C.  (9  countries)  138.4  128.8  1 
1.  West  Germany  35.8  33.5 
2.  France  32.5  29.7 
3.  Italy  36.3  34.2 
4.  Netherlands  4. I  3.7 
5.  Belgium  7.5  6.9 
6.  Luxembourg  0.4  0.3 
7.  United Kingdom  17.8  16.9 
8.  Ireland  1.5  1.4 
9.  Denmark  2.5  2.2 
I 0.  Greece  7.0  7.9 
II. Turkey  8.9  10.2 
12.  Norway  2.7  2.8 
13.  Sweden  3.3  3.3 
14.  Switzerland  5.3  3.8 
15.  Austria  6.4  5.6 
16.  Portugal  3. I  3.4 
17.  Finland  2.2  n.a. 
18.  Spain  23.7  23.9 
19.  USSR  115.0  122.1 
20.  USA  68. I  62.6 
21.  Canada  11.7  9.7 
22.  Japan  73.1  65.5 
WORLD  698  702 
(Source:  Eurostat:  Basic Statistics of  the Community  1975/76  and  1977) 
132 by  differing construction methods  and  in particular by  the abundant  supplies 
Ln  the  UK  of  clay suitable for brick-making: 
Table  5Lf  Cement  Consumption Per Capita  (Kg's) 
in EEC  and  the  USA  1976 
Country  Cement 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
Irish Republic 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
United  States of  America 
(Sources:  Cembureau;  U.S.  Bureau of Mines 
The  Price Commission  supra p.44) 
Consumption 
(kg's) 
620 
431 
542 
528 
493 
634 
775 
406 
278 
293 
per Capita 
As  Table 55  outlines,  many  of  the market characteristics in the  UK 
are reflected in other EEC  countries  and  in the  USA.  In particular,  sales 
of  cement  in bulk in all countries  now  greatly exceed  sales  in bags,  largely 
as  a  response  to  relatively lower distribution costs  in the former  process. 
Sales  in bulk and  sales  to  the readymix and precast concrete users clearly 
are directly associated,  and  the growing  importance  of  these latter markets 
has  clearly stimulated the  switch from bag  to bulk deliveries.  The  UK  and 
Denmark  are distinctive in the significant use made  of intermediaries in 
the selling of  cement  products. 
133 Table  55  The Market Profile of  Cement  Consumption  (1976) 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Fed.Rep.of  Germany 
Irish Republic 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
United  States of 
America 
Proportions  (kgs)  sold  to 
main market  segments 
Readymix 
concrete 
% 
33 
32 
26 
45 
24 
26 
22 
40 
40 
66 
Precast 
concrete 
% 
23 
42 
1  7 
27 
30 
13 
n.a. 
34 
28 
14 
Proportion 
sold in 
bulk 
% 
71 
74 
63 
78 
58 
56 
61 
80 
73 
92 
Proportion 
sold 
through  , 
inter:;]nediaries( 
lo 
33 
76 
6 ,-
.) 
n.a. 
39 
n.a. 
I) 
46 
n.a. 
(Sources:  Cembureau  and  U.S.  Bureau of Mines  The  Price Commission  supra p.44) 
3.  Qualities and  Grades  of  Cement 
The  range  of  cement  qualities 1s  somewhat  wider  in Continental Europe 
than  in  the UK,  principally because European  cement  makers  utilise,  in 
addition to  pure Portland cement,  a  blend  containing between  5  per  cent  and 
65  per  cent of blast furnace  slag  - a  by-product of  steel manufacture ·with 
a  very  similar chemical  composition  to  cement  clinker.  A principal disad-
vantage of  the  blend is that,  when  made  up  into  concrete,  its compressive 
strength up  to  28  days  from mixing  is up  to  30 per  cent  lower  than  that 
based  on  pure Portland  cement.  However,  s1nce  the blend  costs  less  to 
134 manufacture  than cement  clinker,  its use offers  the cement  maker  a  relatively 
cheap method  of  extending capacity.  Many  clinker grinding plants  in Europe 
are  located at steel works. 
Table  56  outlines  the variations in 1976  within EEC  and  the  USA  in the 
reliance of  cement  makers  upon  blended  cement: 
Table  56  The  Product Profile of Cement  in  1976 
Country  Pure  cement  Blended  cement 
%  % 
Belgium  70  30 
Denmark  100  0 
France  31  62 
w.  Germany  73  27 
Irish Republic  100  0 
Italy  58  41 
Luxembourg  4  96 
Netherlands  41  59 
United Kingdom  97  3 
USA  97  3 
(Source:  Cembureau;  U.S.  Bureau of Mines  The  Price Commission  supra p.43) 
Inevitably,  with  such variations  in product  profile between  countries, 
the  strength characteristics of  the various  national outputs  of  cement  differ. 
In  1975,  for  example,  over  70  per cent of  cement  output both  ~n France  and  in 
Germany  was  in the normal  grade,  much  of it slag cement.  By  contrast,  in the 
UK  in  the  same  year,  only 0.13 per  cent  was  'normal',  all of it slag cement, 
the  remainder being  'high grade'  85  per cent,  'very high grade'  5  per cent, 
and  other  special  categories,  just under  10  per  cent.  None  of  these higher 
grades  in the  UK  utilised slag in a  blend. 
135 The Price Commission,  in its  1978  Report,  suggested  that  a  gap  existed 
on  the  UK  market  for  a  blended  cement  of  'normal'  strength.  Whilst  not 
denying  that the availability of  raw materials  might  be  an  important reason 
for  the differing outputs  in the  UK  and  the  rest of Europe,  and whilst 
recognising  the relative absence  of pressure  from  the  steel industry  1n  ~he 
UK,  the Commission  concluded,  nevertheless,  that  cement  consumers  in contin-
ental Europe  had  a  greater choice  than in the  UK  both with respect  to  cement 
grades  and  to  cement  prices.  If relative continental European  costs were 
any  guide,  the Commission  considered  that it should be possible  to  sell a 
blended  cement  1n the  UK  at  lower  prices  than pure Portland  cement,  thus 
providing a  means  of  extending  cement  production capacity relatively cheaply 
whilst also  conserving energy resources,  the latter estimated at 22.5  per 
cent in total  energy  savings  per  tonne  of  cement. 
It is not  our  task,  in this  study,  to enter  into policy discussions 
of  this kind.  But it is perhaps  noteworthy  that  the  large  cost savings 
attributed  to blended  cements  have  not  enabled European  cement manufacturers 
to  gain even  a  foothold  in the  UK  cement market,  let alone  to make  a  major 
penetration.  Consumer  preferences  in favour  of  pure Portland cement  may  be 
more  pronounced  in the  UK  than  1n other European  countries. 
4.  Alternative  Cement  Naking  Processes 
Relative  to most  other countries  1n  the EEC,  and  to  the USA,  the  UK 
cement  industry is distinctive by its low utilisation of  less fuel-intensive 
and  cheaper dry and  or  semi-dry production processes.  Table 57  outlines  the 
1976  position. 
Moreover,  the rate at which  dry  and  semi-dry process  capacity has  been 
substituted for wet  process  capacity following  the  substantial 1ncrease 1n 
energy  costs  1n  1973,  is also  somewhat  lower  in the  UK  than  in other  cement 
producing  countries  as  Table  57  Jutlines. 
136 Table 57  The  Proportion of Dry  and  Semi-Dry  Capacity  in Cement  Manufacture  1976 
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Belgium  n.a. 
Denmark  0 
France  72 
Germany  89 
Irish Republic  24 
Italy  87 
Luxembourg  100 
Netherlands  44 
United Kingdom  36 
USA  47  .----------------------'--------------------------------
(Sources:  Cerembureau;  US  Bureau of  Mines;  The  Price Commission  supra p.43) 
Table  58  Rates  of Substitution of Dry  and  Semi-Dry  for  Wet  Capacity  1971-78 
:Country  Percentage of Capacity in Dry/Semi-Dry  Change  1971-78 
Processes  % Points 
19 71  1976  1978 
%  %  % 
Fed.Rep.of  Germany  63  82  94  +31 
France  51  69  71  +20 
USA  40  48  48  +  8 
UK  31  36  36*  +  5 
*  1977  statistic 
(Source:  Cembureau:  The  Price Commission  supra p.39) 
137 The  Price Commission  estimated  that,  by  the end of  1978,  the Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  would  have  converted  almost  entirely to  the  cheaper 
processes,  that France would  have  converted  three-quarters of  its capacity 
and  that the  USA  nearly one-half,  whereas  the  UK  would still produce  the 
greater proportion of  its cement  via high cost processes.  Although  no 
explicit criticism of  UK  performance in this respect was  enunciated  Ln 
its Report,  the implicit criticism clearly is apparent. 
However,  as  the Commission  itself noted,  continental Europe  had 
experienced an  impetus  towards  converting kilns  to  the  cheaper process, 
via rising cement  demand  and  rising fuel  prices  Ln  the late  1960's  and 
early  1970's,  which was  not  available to  UK  cement  producers  owing  to 
economic  stagnation and  subsidised fuel policies.  Since  1973,  the  recess,2d 
conditions  in the  cement  market  have made  it extremely difficult for  UK 
producers  to  contemplate major  investments.  Indeed,  it would be unprofitable 
to  engage  Ln  such exercises unless  the average variable costs  of  the existing 
plant  exceeded  the average  total costs of  the new  under  short-run conditions. 
Finally,  as  we  emphasised  in Chapter  2,  the availability of  raw materials is 
an  important  influence  on  the choice of  production process.  The  relative 
prevalance  of  suitable materials  (limestone  and  shale)  in contental Europ12 
further  explains  the relative  speed of  adjustment  of  cement  makers  in those 
countries  to  the dry  and  semi-dry processes. 
5.  Plant Size  and  Scale Economies 
The  high rate of  investment  in cement  capacity  Ln  continental Europe 
in recent  years,  stimulated by pressures  to  convert  to  dry  and  semi-dry 
processes,  has  enabled producers  Ln  those  countries  to  take advantage  of 
scale  economies  which arise from  recent  technical  progress.  Although  the 
average  annual kiln capacity of  dry kilns  (Germany  and  the  USA  excepted) 
is larger for  the dry  than for  the wet kilns,  equivalent  scale  economies 
138 appear  to be available for wet kilns of  comparable  sizes.  The  difference 
in average  capacity reflects essentially the differing age  structures of 
dry  and wet plants.  Table  59  outlines  the situation in  1976: 
Table' 59  The  Number  of Kilns  and Capacity of Average Kiln  1976 
Country  Number  of Kilns  Capacity of Average  Kiln 
Dry  Wet  Ver  Dry  Wet 
'000  tonnes  per  annum 
Belgium  5  13  3  n.a.  n.a. 
Denmark  0  10  0  0  26 
France  60  35  26  400  210 
Germany  98  1  1  36  423  385 
Irish Republic  1  8  0  400  158 
Italy  136  27  16  306  179 
Luxembourg  I  0  0  I75  0 
Netherlands  I  3  0  750  3I5 
United Kingdom  18  64  0  383  188 
USA  176  211  0  224  200 
- - ------ ------ -- -----·-- ·-~--------------------------~------____  ____. 
(Sources:  Cembureau;  U.S.  Bureau  of Mines.  The  Price Commission  supra p.43) 
It is evident  from  this Table  that  the  UK  cement  makers,  on  the  average, 
do  not  reap  the  scale economies  available  to  their major  EEC  counterparts. 
Once  again,  however,  it is noteworthy  that  any  cost advantages  accruing fail 
to offset  the freight costs  that would  be  incurred by  EEC  manufacturers  if 
they  attempted  to  penetrate  the United  Kingdom  cement  market. 
6.  Labour Productivity 
Cross-country  comparisons  of  labour productivity,  utilising crude 
information as  to  numbers  employed  are notoriously misleading and  we  outline 
139 1n Table 60  the  comparative figures  for  the  UK,  continental Europe  and  the 
USA  principally to  emphasise  their inadequacy  as  any  measure  of  economic 
performance: 
______  6_0_  Average  Output  per Employee  1n Cement  Production  (1976) 
Country  Average  output per  employee 
'000  tonnes  per  annum 
Belgium  2.24 
Denmark  I.  18 
France  2.89 
Germany  2.73 
Irish Republic  1.55 
Italy  2.49 
Luxembourg  I.  91 
Netherlands  3.08 
United Kingdom  I.  36 
USA  n.a. 
-----------------------------------~----------------------------------------------------
(Sources:  Cembureau  and  US  Bureau of Mines:  The  Price Commission  supra p.43) 
The Price Commission,  in analysing  the apparently poor  performanee of 
UK  cement  producers,  as  depicted 1n this Table,  noted  that  the difference 
in kiln size and  the higher rate of  investment  1n more  efficient plants 
were  factors with a  strong influence on  labour productivity.  Another  v1as 
the relative  importance  of blended  cement.  Another  factor explaining  some 
part of  the difference in labour productivity in France  and  Germany  as 
compared with the  UK  might  be differing proportions of plant operatives  to 
total  employees,  and  the inclusion of  transport staff in the  totals. 
Notwithstanding  these reservations,  the Price Commission's  treatment 
of  labour  productivity as  any  measure  of  performance is naive  and  unsatisfactory 
140 To  analyse  cross-country productivity performance  in any meaningful  sense 
requires  a  total factor productivity approach  - with output  simultaneously 
related  to  inputs of  labour,  capital  employed  and  energy as  well  as 
var1ous  raw materials,  each  suitably weighted  with all  information defined 
in comparable  form.  Such  an  exercise itself 1s beyond  the  scope  of  this 
study  (and  presumably also  that of The  Price Commission).  Even  such  a 
measure  is useless,  if employed  in countries with  a  varying  degree of 
recession,  as  was  the  case in  1976.  For  in such  circumstances,  all that 
might  be meausred  1s  the ability of  companies  to  lay off various  inputs. 
Ideally,  a  suitably formulated  total factor productivity  index,  measured 
at a  simultaneous  cycle  peak  across  countries would  offer  some  insights 
into  comparative productivities.  No  such  set of  indices is available at 
the present  time  for  cement  production. 
7.  Prices 
Comparisons  of  commodity  prices  in different countries  are almost 
impossible  to make  because of variations in product  specification,  differences 
in market  conditions,  varying degrees  of  government  price control,  and 
volatile movements  in the rates  of  currency exchange.  For  these reasons, 
we  have  attempted no  such  comparison.  Despite its limited meaning,  however, 
we  reproduce here  a  set of price movements  in selected countries over  the 
period  1973-77,  outlined in the  1978  report of  The  Price Commission. 
Table 61  outlines  the situation. 
It is clear from Table 61  with all its deficiencies  that  the  internal 
rate of inflation and  the rate of increase of  cement  pr1ces are related and 
that,  with  the exception of  the Netherlands,  cement  prices  rose more  quickly 
between  1973  and  1976  than consumer  prices  in general.  The  latter phenomenon 
must  be  largely explained by  the dramatic  increase in energy prices over  that 
period. 
141 Table  61 
--~ 
Country 
UK.l 
France  2 
USA3 
Netherlands  4 
West  Germany 
(Sources: 
Price Movements  of  Cement  in Selected Countries  1973  - 77 
(19 73  =  1  00) 
. -·----------- ---·--- -----·----··-----
1974  1975  1976  1977  1976  relative to  19736 
Consumer  Wages  and 
prices  salaries 
114  160  197  235  167  183 
138  150  164  174  139  161 
118  141  156  166  132  1277 
107  123  128  129  132  146 
5  116  124  123  119  :129  n.a. 
---·-·  --··· -· ···-·-······- .. --···- ·-------------1----------~--- -~ 
- ____ .. ____ ,._ 
1.  Business  Statistics Office 
2.  Average  for  I  company 
3.  Council  on  Wage  and  Price Stability Study  of  Cement  Prices 
4.  Central  Bureau of  Statistics 
5.  Bundesverband  der  Deutschen Zementindiztrie 
6.  OECD  Main  Economic  Indicators 
7.  Gross  earnings of production workers 
The  Price Commission  supra at p.40) 
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(i)  Associated Portland Cement  Manufacturers  (APCM) 
APCM  is the largest of  the  UK  cement manufacturers,  having approximately 
60%  of  the domestic market.  It is the parent  company  of  the Blue Circle 
Group,  an international group  of  companies  principally concerned with  the 
manufacture  of  cement  and allied products,  the extraction of  gravel  and 
other minerals,  paint manufacture  and  the merchanting  of building materials. 
A wide  range  of APCM's  products,  including cement,  are marketed  under  the 
"Blue Circle" brand  label. 
In  1977,  APCM's  total  turnover was  £370.8 million.  Approximately  25% 
of  sales  and  50%  of pre-tax profits were  contributed by  overseas  companies. 
Sales  revenue  from  UK  cement  operations was  £206.8 million. 
Since  the beginning of  1977,  APCM  has  been split into four  independent 
operating units,  co-ordinated by corporate headquarters.  The  units  and 
their functions  are  as  follows: 
(a)  Blue Circle Cement  UK  (BCC) 
Production,  sales  and distribution of basic  cement  products  from  UK 
plants  (including exports).  Also  produces  and  sells on  behalf  of  BCE  (see 
below)  some  non-cement  products.  About  97%  of  BCC  sales  and  profits are 
due  to  cement  products. 
(b)  Blue  Circle Enterprises  (BCE) 
Production and  marketing of  non-cement  products  (e.g.  plaster,  flints, 
bricks,  industrial minerals,  etc.),  land  and  property development,  invest-
ments  in aggregate  production and  builders merchants. 
(c)  Blue  Circle Technical  (BCT) 
Research  and  development,  engineering  serv~ces,  geological  services,  etc. 
143 (d)  Blue Circle Overseas  (BCO) 
Manages  the company's  overseas  investments  and  operations  and  its 
overseas  consultancy operations. 
Finance 
Blue  Circle 
Cement  UK 
APCM  Organisation 
Board  of 
Directors 
Managing 
Director 
Headquarters  Staff 
Personnel  Legal  Public Relations 
Blue  Circle 
Enterprises 
Blue  Circle 
International 
the operating units 
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Blue  Circle 
Technical In  1977  the breakdown of  sales and profits between  the  four  operating 
units was  as  follows: 
Table  62 
I  Group  sales  Profit before interest  Unit  (including share of associated 
1  and  tax  companies)  ··---·----·--- -·· 
£m  £m  as  % of  sales 
BCC  230.5  29 .I  12.6 
BCE  48.4  2.3  4.8 
BCT  - (3. 6)  -
Total  UK  units  278.9  27.8  10.0 
BCO  167.3  23.4  14.0 
Total  446.2  51.2  11.5 
!  -- --
The  figures  suggest  that margins  are higher  abroad  than  in the  UK,  and 
this conclusion is  supported  by  statistics  taken  from  the  company  reports 
for earlier years  which  show  the following: 
Table  63  Trading profit as  a  % of  turnover 
Year  Parent company  and  Overseas 
home  subsidiaries  subsidiaries 
1973  12.4  17.0 
1974  5.2  1  7. 1 
1975  1 I.  1  10.7 
1976  8.6  9. 1 
Average  '73  - '76  9.3  13.5 
The  number  of  UK  cement  producing works  operated by  APCM  in  1978  was  16. 
This represents  a  substantial reduction over  the last ten years,  the  company 
having  produced  cement at 33  works  in  1968.  Since  the beginning of  the 
145 decline  in  the  UK  n1arket  in  1973  four  works  have  been closed,  one  Ln  1975 
and  three  in  1976.  In addition kilns  having  a  total capacity of 0.5 million 
tonnes  per  annum  have  been  taken out  of  action.  Ten  of  the sixteen works 
operate  on  the basis of  the wet-process  and  six utilise dry  or  semi-dry 
techniques.  At  the  time  of writing  the annual  capacity of  the wet-process 
plants is estimated at  7.5 million  tonnes,  which  includes  the giant Northfleet 
works.  The  latter is the  largest  cement  plant in the  UK  with  an annual 
capacity of  some  3.9 million  tonnes,  approximately  32%  of  APCM's  total 
capacity.  Dry  process  works  have  been  introduced by  the  company  s1nce  1965. 
In  1978  APCM's  dry  and  semi-dry works  had  a  capacity of  around  5.0 million 
tonnes  per  annum. 
APCM  is the only  UK  cement  company  to  provide  coverage  of  the full 
national market,  although its market  share varies  from  region  to  region. 
For example,  it dominates  in Northern  Scotland  (100%),  Northern Ireland 
(100%)  and  much  of  the West  Country  (90+%),  whereas  in South Wales  and 
Northamptonshire it holds  less  than  20%  of  the market.  Substantial  shift:3 
in APCM's  market  shares  in  the various  subregions  have  occurred over  the 
past  ten years,  although its overall position in the national market  has 
remained  relatively stable. 
Aspects  of  the  recent performance of  APCM  are  shown  in  tables 64  and  65 
In interpreting  the figures  for profits and  capital employed,  the  followi1~g 
statements  regarding  accounting policies  taken  from  the  1976  company  report 
and  accounts are particularly important. 
"Valuation of Fixed Assets.  The  accounts  of  the  UK  companies  are 
prepared on  a  depreciated  replacement basis,  the  fixed  assets of 
the  companies  being revalued at regular intervals.  The  cost of 
plant  dS  new  is assessed at  the date of  valuation and  that cost 
is reduced in respect  of  the expired life of  the plant.  The 
life expectancy of  the plant is reviewed at each valuation date 
and  assets disposed of  are  also valued prior  to  their sale. 
Surpluses  and deficits arising at  the  time  of valuation are 
transferred  to  fixed  assets  replacement  reserve,  except  that 
any  loss on  disposal against written down  original cost is 
charged  to profit and  loss  account." 
146 Table  64 ·  Recent Performance  of  the  APCM  Group 
Profit before  tax  and  interest  Exports  as  Average 
as  a  % of  a  % of  remuneration 
Year  turnover  per  UK 
Capital  employed  Turnover  employee 
1965  11.0  12.2  n.a.  n.a. 
1966  13.6  17.2  n.a.  n.a. 
1967  14.0  17.5  2.7  1240 
1968  11.6  15.4  2.4  1320 
1969  8.7  12.9  2.5  1395 
1970  9.0  14.3  3.6  1588 
1971  12.0  17.4  3.4  1819 
1972  11.9  17.6  4.0  2087 
1973  13. 1  18.0  5.8  2324 
1974  7.4  13.7  6.2  2758 
1975  11.8  17.2  5.4  3588 
1976  10.7  14.5  6.5  4033 
' 
147 Table  65  APCM  sales  and  profits  from  UK  cement  production 
UK:  Ordinary Portland  GK:  Special  and  Exports  Total  Year  cements  other cements 
Sales  (Em) 
1973  99.1  11.7  8.5  119.3 
1974  100.0  11.3  8.5  11 9. 8 
1975  135.2  15.6  8.3  159. 1 
1976  150.6  1  7. 1  12.9  180.6 
1977  161 • 9  18.9  26.0  206.8 
----~-·-·· 
--------------~-~~-- ~· ---- ~- -__,.,-~~~-~ 
Profit before interest and  tax  (Em) 
1973  14. 1  -0. 1  0.3  14.3 
1974  5.5  -0.9  0.7  5.3 
1975  17.7  0.0  0.4  18. 1 
1976  18. I  -1.0  0.6  17.7 
1977  17.6  -1.5  1.5  17.6 
-··--·· ··-----------------------------·- ····-··-··-· -·-~·  ---~------·----------
Profit before  interest  and  tax as  a  % of sales 
1973  J!L2  -0.9  4. 1  12.0 
1974  5.6  -8.4  7,7  4.4 
1975  I 3. I  0.2  4.4  11.4 
1976  12.0  -5.8  5.0  9.8 
1977  10.8  -7  .. 8  5.8  8.5 
148 "Depreciation.  Depreciation is charged  from  the date of original 
use  or  subsequent valuation by  equal  annual  amounts  over  the 
estimated  annual  lives of  the assets,  except  that,  where 
applicable,  it is provided  on  the basis of  tonnage  extracted 
from freehold  and  leasehold  land. 
In  the  company,  its subsidiaries and  principal associates, 
an  additional  depreciation charge  is made  in the profit and 
loss  account  and  transferred  to  fixed  assets  replacement  reserve. 
This additional  charge  represents  the  increase  in fixed  assets 
replacement  costs  from  the date  of  the last valuation or 
acquisition,  as  appropriate,  to  the mid-point of  the year. 
There  has  been  a  change  in policy in so  far  as  in previous 
years  no  additional  depreciation was  provided  in subsidiaries 
and  associates." 
The  major  revaluations  of  assets  during  the period  of interest 
occurred at  1st January  1969  and  1st January  1974. 
It should also be  noted  that  the capital  employed  figures  used  1n  table 65 
have  been  calculated by  adding back bank  loans  and  overdrafts  to  the net  assets/ 
capital employed  figures  shown  in the statutory accounts.  This  has  been done 
to yield  an adjusted figure more  appropriate  for use  in assessing  company 
performance. 
It appears  from  the first  two  columns  of  table 65  that profitability 
has  held  up  relatively well  in the last few  years  with  the exception of  1974. 
The  fall  1n that year  of  the profit:sales margin was  largely due  to  the  steep 
fall in UK  cement  demand.  Note  that  the profit:capital ratio falls more 
dramatically  than  the margin on  sales  due  to  the asset revaluation mentioned 
above  (a  similar point holds  for  the  1969  figures).  However,  these aggregate 
statistics mask  some  important features  of  the  company's  performance. 
Comparing  tables 64  and  65  it can be  seen  that APCM's  margins  on  UK  cement 
products  have  been significantly lower  than  those  on its other products. 
Figures  prepared  by  the  company  for  the Price Commission  showing  the return 
on capital  employed  in APCM's  UK  cement  making activities confirm that  the 
profitability of  these operations has  been relatively low  1n recent years. 
The  relevant  table is: 
149 Table  66 
~---------------~~~of  it befo-r--e-~-·  n_t_e_r_e_s  ___ t:  -=~~ -~a~- : s-: -~-· ~f  cap  i::~  .  ~~~-;~)~;d  __ 
I  Year  With  fixed  assets- ~-~-sho-~~ 
in  the statutory accounts 
1973  9.5 
1974  2.5 
1975  8.5 
1976  8.3 
1977  7.7 
With  fixed  assets at 
replacement  cost 
7.0 
2.0 
5.9 
5. I 
4.6 
Thus  from  1973-77  the  company's  average  cement  return in the  UK  averaged 
about  7%  on  the statutory accounts basis,  about  a  third  less  than  for  the 
Group  as  a  whole.  With  fixed  assets valued at replacement  cost,  however, 
the average  rate of  return was  only 4.9%. 
Turning  to  exports,  APCM's  performance  ~n highly  competitive markets 
has  been  good  ~n the  recent past.  Exports  of  cement  stood at approximately 
1.0 million tonnes  in  1976  and  reached  1.75 million  tonnes  in  1977  (16.8% 
of  total  sales  from  the  company's  UK  plants). 
Finally,  it may  be  noted  that  the  average  remuneration of APCM's  UK 
employees  in  1976  was  the highest of  the major  companies,  although  the 
differences are not very great. 
(ii)  Rugby  Portland Cement  Company  Ltd 
The  Rugby  Portland Cement  Company  is the  second  largest supplier of 
cement  in the UK,  with about  15%  of  the total market.  In the  UK  its cements 
are  sold under  the "Crown"  brand  label,  and  overseas under  the "Bulldog"  label. 
Its market  share has  risen steadily over  the past  ten years,  climbing  fron1 
13%  of  the  supply of Portland  cement  (the principal product)  to  15.5%  in  :1977. 
150 With  two  exceptions,  Rugby  Portland's operating subsidiaries are 
engaged  1n activities ancilliary to  the manufacture  and  distribution of 
cement.  The  exceptions  are  (a)  Mill Properties Pty.  Ltd.  which  owns  and 
operates  a  hotel in Western Australia,  and  (b)  The  Rom  River  Company  Ltd. 
which designs,  fabricates  and  fixes  steel reinforcement.  The  relative 
importance  of  these secondary activities is  shown  in the following  table 
which  provides  a  breakdown of  turnover and profit in  1976  (figures  1n 
thousands). 
Table  67 
Group  Turnover 
Group  pre-tax 
UK&  exports  Overseas  Total  profit 
Cement  & lime  42703  15485  58188  (75%)  10369  (90%) 
Reinforcement  16659  - 16659  (21.5%)  1190  (10.3%) 
Hotel  - 2715  2715  (3. 5%)  -32  (-0.3%) 
59362  18200  77562  (100%)  11527  (100%) 
The  Rom  River  Company  was  acquired  in  1968  and  Rugby  Portland have  been 
involved in no  major  take-overs  since  then.  At  the  time  the  Chairman was 
anxious  to  point out  that  the acquisition did  not mark  the beginning of  a 
period of diversification or  forward vertical  integration: 
"I do  not  want  to  g1ve  the  impression  that  this acquisition marks 
the start of  a  period of diversification.  We  do  not  believe in 
diversification for  the  sake  of diversification,  neither do  we 
share  the view of  so  many  politicians of all parties  that  size 
is a  guarantee of  economy  and  efficiency.  All  too  often it 
produces  neither. 
Steel  reinforcement  is  so  closely allied  to  cement  in its 
use  in constructional work  that  the extension of  our activities 
into this  field  can scarcely be  called diversification.  Further, 
we  have  always  turned  our  face  against  competing with our  own 
customers,  a  policy which we  believe  has  certainly been appreciated 
by at least the  larger  users  of  our  cement.  This  does  not arise in 
the case of  Rom  River."  (from  the Chairman's  speech,  AGM,  1969). 
In  1976  overseas  operations  accounted  for  23.5%  of  the  total  turnover 
of  the Rugby  Portland  Group,  but  their contribution to  pre-tax profits was 
151 was  not  revealed in the annual  report.  However,  figures  given  in earlier 
years  suggest  that profit margins  have  been significantly higher  than in 
the  UK  (see  table  67).  For  example,  in  1973-75  overseas  turnover 
averaged  about  24%  of  the group  total whereas  the overseas  contribution 
to pre-tax profits averaged approximately  36%.  The  principal overseas 
subsidiary is Cockburn  Cement  Ltd.  which  is located in Western Australia 
and  in which  the parent  company  has  a  85%  stake.  Until  1976  Rugby  also 
operated  in Trinidad  through Trinidad  Cement  Ltd.,  but  this latter company 
was  nationalized in August  that year. 
In the  UK  Rugby  produces  cement  in seven plants at  the  following 
locations: 
Barrington,  Cambridgeshire 
Chinnor,  Oxfordshire 
Lewes,  Sussex 
Rochester,  Kent 
Rugby,  Warwickshire 
Southam,  Warwickshire 
South Ferriby,  Lincolnshire 
From  these plants  the  company  supplies  to  a  market  area covering 
Yorkshire,  Eastern England,  the Midlands  and  the  South of England.  In 
recent years  a  new  semi-wet  process kiln has  been built at  Rochester  and 
at  Southam  conversion from  a  wet  to  a  semi-wet  process  has  taken place. 
With  the  exception of  the  semi-dry plant at South Ferriby,  all  the  company's 
other kilns  use  the wet  process  of  cement  manufacture. 
Some  aspects  of  Rugby•s  performance  over  the last  twelve  years  are 
shown  in table  68.  In  interpreting  the profitability figures,  the  accounting 
conventions  used  by  the  company  should  be  born  in mind.  Fixed assets are 
valued at cost  (with  the exception of  relatively unimportant  revaluations 
of certain assets  in  1966  and  1973)  and  are  depreciated  on  a  straight  line 
152 Table  68  Rugby  Portland Cement  breakdown of  sales,  employment,  profits and margins,  1971  - 76 
i  I  l 
I  % of  turnover 
I 
% of  UK  employ- % of  turnover  % of pre-tax  Pre-tax profit as  a  %  ! 
Year  accounted  for  ment  accounted  from overseas  i  profits from  of  turnover  on: 
by  cement  and  for by  cement  &  operations 
r 
---
:  overseas 
I 
lime products  lime products  operations  cement  &  lime  reinforcement 
\  (approx.)  i 
i 
1971  73o7  74o9  22o5 
j 
24o6  9o3  '  noao 
1 
i 
1972  75o9  76o0  25o5 
i  noao  24o5  9o9  ' 
I 
i 
I 
' 
1973  70o3  73o5  25o4 
!  40  21.0  12o2 
' 
I 
I 
1974  61.5  73o0 
I 
22o7  39  17 0  9  8o8 
I 
1975  72o 1  76o9  I  24 o  I  28  l  17o7  7. I 
I 
' 
i 
l 
1976  75o0  n.a.  23o5  n.ao  17.8  7  0  1 
! 
i basis  over  their estimated useful  lives  (excepting unquarried  freehold  land  on 
which  no  depreciation is provided).  In  the  inflationary period  of  the nine-
teen seventies it is  therefore  likely that  the capital  employed  estimates 
are  seriously biased  downward,  so  the first  column  of  the  table  should  be 
treated with caution.  It is clear  from  the  second  column  that,  compan~d 
with  the other  eompanies,  Rugby  earns  a  relatively high margin  on  sales, 
though  this has  been  squeezed  in the last  few  years  by  the  downturn  in  the 
UK  demand  and  by  poorer  results  from  the Australian subsidy.  The  fact  that 
the  return on capital has  fallen  less  since  the early seventies  than  the 
margin  on  sales  is probably  due  to  the  increasing undervaluation of assets 
in the  accounts. 
The  profits  to  sales  figures  shown  ~n table 69  are  in fact  an under-
statement of  the profit margin  on  cement  products,  as  can  be  seen  from  the 
last  two  columns  of  table  68.  These  are  not  strictly comparable with  those 
in table  68  since interest payments  have  been deducted  from profit before 
the ratios are  calculated  (the accounts  and  company  reports  do  not  quote 
figures  for  the ratio of profit before  taxation and  interest  to  sales on 
cement  and  lime).  However,  it is clear  that  the margin on  cement  and  lime 
is considerably above  that obtained  from  the activities of  Rom  River. 
Allocating  the interest payments  of  the  company  between its activities  ~n 
proportion to  sales yields  a  ratio of profit before interest and  tax  to 
turnover of  19.8%  in  1976  for  cement  and  lime operations,  the highest of 
the major  companies. 
Exports  by  Rugby  are relatively modest,  averaging about  1%  of  turnover 
during  the  last  five years,  although  there has  been  a  significant increase 
since  1973  in line with  the growth of  the world  cement  export  trade in the 
mid-seventies. 
154 Table  69  Recent  Performance  of  Rugby  Portland Cement 
Profit before interest and  tax  Average 
Year  as  a  % of  Exports  as  a  remuneration 
Capital  employed  Turnover  % of  turnover  per  UK 
employee(£) 
1967  13.0  26.0  n.a.  n.a. 
1968  11.3  22.2  0.8  1350 
1969  12. I  21.6  1.0  1430 
1970  13.5  21.6  0.9  1576 
1971  16.9  24.0  0.8  1725 
1972  15.9  23.5  1.0  1912 
1973  15. 1  20.8  0.6  2187 
1974  15. 1  17.9  0.7  2587 
1975  14.9  17.7  1.2  3234 
1976  14.5  18. 1  I .4  I  3652  I 
I 
!  .  ' 
Note:  The  denominator  used  in the first column  was  calculated by 
adding back  bank overdrafts  to  the capital  employed  figures 
given in the statutory accounts. 
155 (iv)  Aberthaw  and Bristol Channel Portland Cement  Company  Ltd 
Aberthaw Cement  is one  of  the  three  smaller  UK  manufacturers, 
principally supplying  in the  South Wales  area where  its plants are  locat1~d. 
The  company's  share of national Portland  Cement  output  increased  from 
approximately  4%  in  1968  to  around  5%  in  1977.  One  significant  increase 
in the demand  for Aberthaw's  output occurred  ~n 1969  and  1970  following 
the  closure of  the works  at Penarth in Wales  by  APCM  and  an agreement  that 
the latter would,  over  a  long  term,  purchase its cement  requirements  in 
this area from Aberthaw. 
Aberthaw's  principal activities are  the manufacture  of  cement  and  the 
merchanting of builders materials.  It has  four  wholly  owned  subsidiary 
companies,  all  incorporated in the  U.K.  They  are: 
(a)  T.  Benyon  and  Company  Ltd 
Acquired  in  1976,  this  company  acts  (and  acted before  1976)  as Aberthaw's 
sole  sales  agent.  Prior  to acquisition it was  controlled by  the  joint 
managing directors of  Aberthaw. 
(b)  Davies  Brothers  (Deebee)  Ltd 
A firm of builders merchants,  acquired  in  1972,  operating in  the  South 
wales  area. 
(c)  W.B.  Harrison  and  Son  (Builders  Merchants)  Ltd  --------
A smaller  firm  of  builders merchants  acquired by  Davies  Brothers  in 
October  1973. 
A non-trading  company  supplying  raw materials  to  Aberthaw.  Prior  to 
1971  Aberthaw held  50%  of  the  issued capital  of Ruthin,  but  during  that year 
acquired  the  remaining  shares  thus  making it a  wholly  owned  subsidiary. 
156 In  1976  cement  manufacture  accounted for  about  85%  of  the  total  sales 
and  95%  of  the pre-tax profits of  Aberthaw.  Sales,  profits  and  margins  on 
sales for  the  two  principal activities of  the  company  are  shown  in table 70, 
Aberthaw procudes  cement  at  two  plants:  East Aberthaw,  Glamorgan 
and  Rhoose,  Glamorgan.  There  are  two  dry  process kilns at Aberthaw but 
the Rhoose  works,  with older  equipment,  consists  of wet  process kilns. 
The  first of  the  dry process kilns was  brought  into operation in  1967  and 
represented  a  considerable  gamble  for  the  company  due  (a)  to  the  newness 
of  the  technology,  and  (b)  to  the size of  the kiln which,  with an annual 
capacity of  350,000  tons,  could potentially handle  about  50%  of Aberthaw's 
output at  the  time.  After early  teething  troubles  following  installation, 
the fuel  savings  made  possible by  the  dry  process  have  obviously been 
increasingly valuable  as  fuel  costs have  risen.  Thus,  construction on  a 
second  dry process kiln was  started at Aberthaw  in  1973  and  the  new  plant 
came  fully  into operation in  1976. 
The  movement  of  the return on  capital and  the margin  on  turnover  for 
the  company  during  the past  ten y=ars  is shown  in table  71.  These  figures 
were  abstracted from  the  accounts  constructed by  the  company  on  a  "historic 
cost" basis.  That  is,  fixed assets are valued at cost  and  then depreciated 
according  to  the conventions  used  by  the company.  In  the  1976  company 
report  these were  stated as  follows: 
"Works,  including Buildings,  Roadways,  etc., Plant and Machinery  and 
Vehicles: 
These assets are being depreciated  on  a  straight line basis  over 
their estimated lives,  with  the  exception of assets  acquired prior 
to  30th June,  1948,  the book value of which at 31st December,  1976, 
was  £112,000.  The  Directors are of  the opinion that  these assets 
may  be  expected  to  contribute  to  the earnings  of  the Company  for 
many  years  and  no  prov1s1on for  depreciation is considered necessary 
at the present  time." 
"Freehold Land  and Buildings: 
Land  currently being quarried,  other  than  that wholly written off at 
1st January,  1976,  is being depreciated  according  to  the quantity of 
stone extracted,  The  remaining  land and buildings are not  being 
depreciated." 
157 Table  70  Aberthaw  cement  :  breakdown of  sales,  profits and  margins 
Cement  Manufacture  Builders Merchants  Total 
Sales  (£  thousands) 
7500  I 144  8644 
8077  1527  9604 
8070  1949  10018 
11310  2009  1.3319 
13235  2312  15547 
Profit before  tax  (£  thousands) 
1972  1154  69  1223 
1973  1057  92  1149 
1974  949  136  1085 
1975  1573  69  1642 
1976  1590  87  1677 
Pre-tax profit as  a  % of  sales 
1972  15.4  6.0  14. I 
1973  13. 1  6.0  12.0 
1974  11.8  7.0  10.8 
1975  13.9  3.4  12.3 
1976  12.0  3.8  10.8 
·------···----.. -- .. -·-~  -------·----··---~-------------~---·  -·----------------------~-- -' 
158 Table  71 
Year 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
I 
t 
!  1972 
i 
1973 
i 
I 
1974 
1975 
I 
i 
'  1976  I 
.l-----· 
Recent  Performance  of  Aberthaw Cement 
-
Profit before  tax and 
as  a  % of 
Capital  employed 
--·----
11.8 
13.3 
12.4 
18.4 
21.5 
20.4 
12.7 
10.2 
15.6 
16.1 
-----~--..... -~  ~- ___ .,. 
interest 
Turnover 
---
11.9 
14.6 
13.7 
16.2 
15.4 
14.9 
12.5 
11.5 
15.0 
14.2 
··--·-·~---~-- -·>-
---·-------r---------, 
Exports  as 
a  % of 
turnover 
Average 
remuneration 
per  employee 
(£) 
1322 
1451 
1552 
1833 
1981 
2145 
2340 
2806 
3645 
- l.  4018 
..  ---.------···-----··-- ··- ------~-------------
Note:  Bank  overdrafts  and  acceptance credits have  been  added  to  the 
capital employed  figures  given in the statutory accounts  to 
obtain the denominators  used  in column  I. 
159 The  table suggests  that  the profitability of Aberthaw's  operations 
has  held up  relatively well  during  the mid-seventies'  recess~on.  The 
major fall  in the rate of return on capital between  1972  and  1973  was 
largely due  to  a  substantial  rise in bank borrowing  connected with  the 
financing  of  the new  dry  process kiln,  the  construction of which  started 
in the latter year.  This rise in borrowing  inflated  the capital  employed 
figures  (while  the  new  plant did not start to  contribute significantly  to 
profits until  1976)  thus  leading  to  a  temporary fall  in  the  rate of  return. 
Since  1975  Aberthaw has,  in addition  to its "historic cost"  accounts, 
also published  a  series of fairly detailed accounts  in the annual  report 
constructed on  a  "current cost" bases.  It is therefore of  interest  to 
compare  the results  obtained  from  the  two  sets of  accounts  and  thereby gain 
some  insight into  the  likely consequences  of  inflation for  the  interpretation 
of  the "historic"  figures.  Unfortunately it is not  possible  to  calculate the 
level of profit before  taxation and  interest  from  the  current cost data,  so 
we  are restricted  to  considering  the ratios of pre-tax profit  to  capital 
employed  (unadjusted)  and  to  turnover.  The  statistics shown  below have  been 
calculated  from  the  information given  in  the  1976  company  report. 
Table  72  --
Pre-tax profit as  a  % of 
I 
i  Capital  employed  Turnover  Year 
i 
Historical basis  Current  Historical  Current  cost 
cost basis  basis  basis 
1975  I 4. 7  7.0  12.6  10.5 
1976  13.5  5.9  11.0  9.2 
The  dramatic  impact  of  the  accounting procedures  on  the  rate of  return 
figures  indicates  the unreliability of  the first  column  of  table 72  when  used 
160 as  a  measure  of  performance.  Thus,  despite  the reasonably high figures 
for  the "historic" rate of return on  capital  in  1975  and  1976,  it appears 
that when  some  allowance is made  for  the effects of  inflation Aberthaw 
turns out  to  be  operating at a  rather  low  level of profitability. 
For  the period covered  by  table  71  Aberthaw was  not  involved  ~n 
the  export  trade.  However,  with excess  capacity resulting  from  the 
recession,  an overseas  contract was  negotiated  in  1977  against  strong 
international competition and  during  the year  exports  reached  90,000 
tonnes,  well  in excess  of  10%  of  output. 
Finally,  although average wages  in the  UK  industry  tend  to be 
positively related  to  firm size,  it is worth  noting  that  the  remuneration 
of Aberthaw's  employees  compares  very  favourably with  that of workers  in 
the  larger companies. 
(iii)  Tunnel  Holdings  Ltd 
The  principal activities of  this group,  through its subsidiary 
companies  in the  UK  and  abroad,  are  the manufacture of  cement  and  allied 
products  for  the building industries.  Tunnel  is  the  third largest supplier 
of  cement  in the  UK  with around  10%  of  the Portland Cement  market.  The 
company  has  faced  serious operating difficulties during  the past  ten years 
and  has  seen its market  share drop  from  approximately  13!%  in  1968. 
Following  reorganisation in the mid-seventies  the parent  company  is 
now  essentially a  holding company  with a  large number  of  operating subsidi-
aries and  associates,  the latter being defined  as  firms  in which Tunnel  has 
a  minority stake of at least  20%.  A full list of Tunnel's major  subsidiaries, 
associates  and  trade  investments  as at  the middle  of  1977  is shown  in Table 
74.  Table  73,  which  shows  the percentage  of  turnover  and profits 
(before debenture interest,  tax and  exceptional  items)  accounted  for  by 
associated  companies,  trade  investments  and other net  lending,  illustrates 
the heavy  dependence of  the Group  on  these  investments: 
161 Table  73 
i  I 
I  ~ear 
Percentage 
of  turnover  Percentage of profit from  I 
Interest 
from  receivable 
associated  Associated  Other  invest-
i  less  Total 
companies  compan1es  ment  income  payable 
1972/3  21.4  20.0  2.6  4.5  27.0 
1973/4  33.4  24.9  4.8  22.1  51.7 
1974/5  40.4  35.6  3.6  15.9  55.1 
1975/6  35.3  26.7  3.0  II. 7  41.4 
1976/7  36.6  36.0  3.2  15.8  55 
Thus  it can be  seen  that  s1nce  1973  these "outside"  sources  of  income 
have  been contributing about  50%  of Tunnel's profits. 
Tunnel  produces  cement  in the  UK  at  three works  located at Pitstone 
(Bedfordshire),  Padeswood  (Flintshire)  and  Gartsherrie  (Lanarkshire).  The 
Gartsherrie plant is purely a  cement  grinding works  and  does  not produce 
clinker.  There  is one  dry process kiln at  each of Pitstone and  Pudeswood, 
together with older wet  process plant.  Due  to  low profitability the  company 
has,  since  1974,  closed  down  a  grinding works  at Clydebank  (Dunbartonshire) 
and  the  large West  Thurrock plant in Essex.  In addition,  as  part of  a  cost 
saving operation,  the company  shifted its central office in  1974  and  closed 
down  a  kiln at Pitstone.  The  fall in market  share  in  1973  (to  II!%  from 
13%  in the previous  year)  which occurred before  these  closures appears  to 
have  been partly due  to serious  labour  problems  which  the  company  then 
faced  (one  major  and  several minor  strikes in 1973). 
Performance  figures  for Tunnel  Holdings  from  March  1967  to  March  I977 
are  shown  in table  73.  The  relevant  accounting  conventions  (as at March  I977) 
are as  follows: 
Fixed Assets  Certain freehold buildings were valued at 2nd  April  1972  and 
subsequently  included at their revalued  amounts.  All other fixed assets are 
162 Table  74  Prinicpal Subsidiaries  and  Investments  of Tunnel  Holdings 
Country of 
Incorporation 
SUBSIDIARIES 
UK 
;Australia 
!cyprus 
!Jersey 
jSwi tzerland 
I 
Clyde  Cement  Ltd 
Compo-Cem  Ltd  (60%) 
Flintshire Quarries  Ltd 
Hundred  and  Five Piccadilly Ltd 
Stablex  (UK)  Ltd  (84%) 
Tunnel  Building Products  Ltd 
Tunnel  Cement  Ltd 
Tunnel  Cement  (North Western)  Ltd 
Tunnel  Cement  (Scotland)  Ltd 
Tunnel  Cement  (West  Thurrock)  Ltd 
Tunnel  Cement  Investments  Ltd 
Tunnel  Industrial  Services Ltd 
Tunnel  Trading Ltd 
Tunnel  Cement  Investments Pty.  Ltd. 
Cyprus  Trading Corporation Ltd(59.3%) 
Tunnel  Holdings  (Jersey)  Ltd 
Stablex A.G.  (84%) 
~SSOCIATED COMPANIES 
I 
I  pK 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Australia 
i 
;cyprus 
' 
Cyprus  Asbestos  Ltd  (25%) 
Go-Con  Concrete Ltd  (40.9%) 
Ribblesdale  Cement  Ltd  (50%) 
Stablex Ltd  (SO%) 
Metro  Industries Ltd  (37.2%) 
Cyprus  Asbestos  Mines  Ltd  (25%) 
OTHER  TRADE  INVESTMENTS  : 
Cement  - Roadstone  Holdings  Ltd  (3.6%) 
UK  Erith and  Company  Ltd  (10.32%) 
163 
Principal 
Activity 
Cement  sales 
Glass  reinforced  cement 
sheeting products 
Limestone  sales 
Property  investment 
Waste  management 
Asbestos  cement  products 
Cement  sales 
Cement  manufacture 
Cement  manufacture 
Cement  manufacture(part 
year) 
Property investment 
Site management  & services 
Mineral/oil  sales 
Investment holding  company 
Caterpillar tractor agency 
Investment  management 
Waste  management 
Asbestos  fibre  agency  sales 
Concrete machinery 
Cement  manufacture 
Waste  management 
Industrial holding  company 
Asbestos mines 
Industrial  Investment 
Holding  Company 
Builders merchants stated at cost,  less  government grants. 
Depreciation  Freehold  land  is not depreciated;  leasehold  land  and  buildings 
are written off over  the period of  the  lease.  Depreciation on  freehold 
buildings  and  all other fixed assets is provided on  a  straight-line basis 
at rates which will  completely write off  the cost or valuation of  the 
assets by  the  end  of  their estimated useful  lives. 
Investments  Investments  in associated companies  are  shown  Ln  the 
(consolidated)  balance sheets at cost less  amounts  written off plus  the 
Tunnel  Group's  interest in the associates'  post-acquisition retained 
earnings,  based  on  their latest available  accounts.  Quoted  investments 
are stated at cost. 
Because of Tunnel's  extensive  investments  the figures  are rather 
difficult to interpret,  although  the effects of  the downturn  Ln  cement 
demand  during  1974  on  profitability are fairly clear.  Given  the  company's 
operating difficulties over  the period it may  be  inferred  that  the  rates 
of  return and  profit margins  shown  in the  table overstate  the profitability 
of  its cement  activities.  Unfortunately,  it is not  possible  to  derive 
accurate  estimates of  the latter from  the published data,  although  a 
closer approximation can  be  obtained  by  calculating  the ratio of pre-tax 
profit  (excluding  investment  income  and  interest received,  interest payable, 
exceptional  items  and  profits of associated  companies)  to  group  turnover 
(not  including  the  share of  sales of  associated  companies).  The  results 
yielded  by  this exercise are  as  follows: 
1967/68  13.0%  1971/72  12.6%  1975/76  I I .2% 
1968/69  I I .0%  1972/73  16.0%  1976/77  8.5% 
1969/70  6.8%  1973/74  8,8% 
1970/71  8.0%  19 74/75  7.5% 
The  erratic nature of  the  returns  and  the  fall  in profitability in  1973  are 
clearly visible from  these  figures. 
164 Table  75  Recent  Performance  of  Tunnel  Holdings 
---·r  ~~-o~-i~~-·b:f:~:·· ~~~--and interest  ., 
..  ----T  ·- ·-. ··-···-·· 
Exports  as  a  % 
'Year 
:1967/68 
I 
:1968/69 
I 
1969/70 
!
1
1970/71 
I 
11971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
as  a  % of 
~-------- ··----~----·- ..... ----,  ---~·-······  ..... 
1  Capital  employed  Turnover 
I 
i 
l 
I 
I 
I 
11.6 
9. I 
7. I 
9.0 
14. I 
15.6 
13.8 
11.7 
16.9 
16. 1 
16.3 
14.0 
II.  I 
10.3 
15.6 
17.3 
13.5 
9.7 
12.6 
12.7 
of  turnover 
(including  share 
of  sales  of 
associated 
companies) 
1.0 
0.7 
1.4 
1.7 
0.7 
0.5 
2.6 
2.0 
5.5 
2.5 
Average 
remuneration· 
per  UK 
employee  (£) 
1259 
1313 
1388 
1626 
1867 
2157 
2322 
3036 
3698 
3950 
Notes  (i)  Tunnel's financial  year  ends  1n  the last week  of  March 
(ii)  Bank  overdrafts  and  advances  have  been added  back  to  the capital 
employed  figures  published in the statutory accounts  to obtain 
the denominators  used  in column  I. 
165 Like  the other  companies,  Tunnel  has  tended  to  increase its export 
level  in the last five  years,  stimulated  by both  the general  increase  in 
the export  trade  and  excess  capacity in the  UK.  According  to  the Chairman's 
review  1.n  1975  the contracts for clinker exports  1.n  1975  and  1976  were 
gained at very  low margins  and  were  accepted  simply  to  maintain production 
and  prevent more  severe  cutbacks. 
166 (v)  The  Ketton Portland Cement  Company  Ltd 
Since  1973  Ketton has  been  a  wholly owned  subsidiary of T.W.  Ward  Ltd 
and  therefore  the usual  type of company  report and  accounts  is not  now 
available  for  the  company.  Data available up  to  1972  indicates  a  relatively 
prosperous  company,  as  can be  seen  from  the ratio of net profits before 
interest and  tax  (excluding profit of  the Ribblesdale  subsidiary)  to  turnover:-
Table  76 
Year  ended  June  30  Profit/turnover 
1968  15. 1% 
1969  13.6% 
1970  17.7% 
1971  18.9% 
1972  21.2%  -
Ketton produces  cement  from  a  single plant  in Sheffield.  It has  expanded its 
market  share for Portland Cements  from  3!%  in  1968  to  5%  in  1977  and  has 
recently  (1978)  raised its capacity by  14%.  The  company  has  not diversified 
into non-cement  activities and  does  not  export. 
(vi)  Ribblesdale  Cement  Ltd 
The  company  is jointly owned  by  Tunnel  and  Ketton and  therefore  does 
not publish a  report  and  accounts.  It is concerned  solely with  cement 
manufacture  and  operates  from  a  single plant at Clitheroe,  Lancashire, 
chiefly supplying markets  in  the North of England.  Ribblesdale's  share of 
the  UK  Portland  Cement  market  has  risen from  4%  ~n  1968  to  5!%  in  1977  and, 
judging  by  the  references  to its performance  in  the  annual  reports  of Tunnel, 
it is a  relatively profitable  company.  Capacity at  the Clitheroe plant has 
expanded  from  800,000  tonnes  per  annum  in  1967  to  1,150,000  tonnes  in  1977. 
Ribblesdale  does  not  export  any  of its output. 
167 Appendix  1 .  Summary  of Data  from  Company  Reports  and  Accounts 
This  appendix contains data extracted from  company  reports and 
accounts  for  the following variables: 
Turnover  (including  share of associated companies  where  given) 
Capital  employed  (=  fixed assets  and  investments  and net current assets) 
Numbers  employed  in the UK 
Wages  and  salaries in the  UK 
Net profit  (i.e. profit before interest and  tax) 
Gross  cash flow  (=  net profit and  depreciation) 
Net  cash flow  (  = gross  cash flow  - taxation) 
In addition a  table is given  showing  the estimated  turnover  each 
company  derives  from its sales of  cement  to  the  UK  market.  The  figu~es have 
been obtained in the following  ways: 
Abert  haw 
Up  to  and  including  1971  the company  was  concerned entirely with  cement 
manufacture  and  therefore  total  turnover  is the  same  as  revenue  from  cement. 
After  1971  the  company  has  published its sales revenue  from  cement  in the 
annual  report.  Since  there were  no  exports  during  the period  these  figures 
measure  the  turnover  from  UK  cement  sales and  no  further  adjustments  to  the 
statistics are necessary. 
APCM 
Figures  for  APCM's  sales revenue  from  cements  supplied  to  the  UK  market 
since  1973  are  available  from  the Price Commission  Report.  Estimates prior  to 
1973  have  been derived  as  follows: 
Let  q
1  =  tonnes  of  cement  supplied  to  UK  market  by  APCM 
q2  tonnes  of  cement  supplied  to  UK  market  by  Aberthaw 
169 p
1  average  pr~ce per  tonne  of APCM's  UK  sales 
p2  average price per  tonne  of Aberthaw's  UK  sales 
s1  APCM's  turnover  on  sales  of  cement  in the UK=  p1q1 
s
2 
Aberthaw's  turnover  on  sales of  cement  in the UK=  p2q2 
Now 
and  since  figures  for  s1 and  s2  are available  from  1973,  the price ratio can 
be  estimated if q1/q2  is known.  But  q1/q2  can be  estimated  from  the market 
share data  for  cement  output  shown  in table 
1973,  1974,  1975  and  1976  can be  derived. 
.  Hence  estimates of p 1/pr,  in 
L. 
Let  p  be  the average  of  these  pr~ce 
ratios and  assume  that  the  true price ratio is approximately constant  through 
time.  Then p can be  used  as  an  approximation  to  p1/p2  in years  prior  to  1973. 
Substituting in  the equation above  yields 
Now  p  ~s known,  s2  is known  (Aberthaw's  turnover  from  cement  in the  UK)  and 
q1/q2  can be  estimated  from  the market  share  data  in table  for  any year 
before  1973.  Hence  estimates of  s1  can be  obtained for  the earlier years. 
Ketton 
Figures  for  total sales are available  from  the accounts  up  to  1971 
and  these have  been assumed  to  represent  proceeds  from  UK  cement  deliveries 
(the company  is not diversified and  does  not export).  For  the period after 
1971  estimates of  cement  turnover  have  been derived in a  similar fashion  to 
those for APCM,  except  that  the price ratio has  been estimated on  the basis 
of  the observations  for  1968-71.  Abert  haw's  cement  was  again  taken  to  b1~ 
the numeraire. 
Ribblesdale 
In  the absence  of  any  published  information on Ribblesdale's  turno\rer, 
170 it has  been assumed  that  the ratio of  the  average price of its cements  to 
the average  price of Aberthaw's  cements  was  constant  through  time  and  equal 
to  the estimated price ratio derived  for  Ketton  in  1968-71  (Ketton and 
Ribblesdale are of  similar s1ze,  are  linked  through ownership  and both 
operate on  single sites 1n  the North of England).  The  method  of  estimation 
used  for  APCM  then yields  the required  turnover  series. 
Rugby 
The  annual  reports  provide  figures  for  turnover  from  sales of  cement 
and  lime  produced  in  the  UK  since  1971.  Since both  lime  sales  and  exports 
appear  to  be  relatively  small  in magnitude  the  turnover  figures  are used  to 
approximate  sales  revenue  from  cement  in the  UK.  Prior  to  1970  the  required 
estimates are again generated  by  the method  used  in  the  APCM  case. 
Tunnel 
Since  no  figures  for  cement  sales are available in the annual  reports, 
it has  been assumed  that  the relative  (average)  price of Tunnel's  cements 
(with Aberthaw as  numeraire)  is constant  and  equal  to  the estimated price 
ratio derived for  Rugby  from  the  1971-76  data.  Rugby's  relative price is 
chosen because it is a  company  of  similar size.  Application of  the method 
used  1n previous  cases  then yields  the estimated  turnover series. 
Throughout  the appendix data which is not on  a  calendar year basis  has 
been adjusted  to  render it comparable with other  information.  For  example, 
Tunnel's  accounting year  ends  in late March,  so  the  figure  for  turnover  in 
(say)  1973  shown  in the tables will have  been calculated by  taking  the  sum 
of one-quarter of  turnover  in the accounting year  72/73  and  three-quarters 
of  turnover in the accounting year  73/74.  Similar procedures  have  been 
applied  to capital  employed  figures  and  the table in this case  shows  capital 
employed  at the  end  of  each calendar year. 
171 Table  77  Turnover  (£m) 
--...  ··-~---------·- ---·--·  ~ ~------~---·-· 
... _____ 
I 
1968  1969  1970  19 71  1972 
APCM  136.6  145.3  145.4  170.7  174.7 
T.W.  Ward  59.3  65.4  73.2  84.2  108.7 
Tunnel  18.8*  18. 7*  22.4*  26.8  29.9 
Rugby  26.4  31.7  37.8  43.9  46.0 
Aberthaw  3.8  ,  ... 0  5.0  6.5  8.5 
____ ..  ___  ------··  ··---. --.-------- ·····~---·---------·--····--····--
------------·------------ --·-------·-------·····  ••••n• ·- •• -- •  •  •••voY ••  -·•-·•-·----••-• 
1973  1974  1975  1976 
-----------------------------~--- ---------·-· 
APCM  209.0  213.3  286.1  360.0 
T.W.  Ward  134.4  169.0  211 . 1  232.8 
Tunnel  34.2  41.9  48.5  52.2 
Rugby  57.8  65.2  71.6  77.6 
Aberthaw  9.4  9.8  13.0  15.2 
Note  on  Tunnel  data 
Prior  to  the  accounting year  1970/71  the  share  of associated  companies 
was  not  consolidated  into  turnover  (whereas  capital,  profit,  etc.)  was 
consolidated,  leading  to non-comparabilities  in the data.  To  partially 
compensate  for  this,  an  estimate of half  the sales of  Ribblesdale  (attributable 
to Tunnel)  has  been added  back  to  the  turnover  data  shown  in  the accounts  for 
the years  1968-70.  The  figures  in the  table  for  these  years  are  therefr::>re 
estimates only,  but  comparisons  with later years  suggest  that  the errors 
involved are relatively  small. 
172 Table 78  Capital Employed  (£m) 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
~------- ---~-- --~-----------
APCM  173.8  212.6  227.5  233.1  246.7 
T. W.  Ward  34.6  37.8  40.6  43.6  49.6 
Tunnel  24.0  24.3  26.0  29.9  33. 1 
Rugby  49.7  52.6  55.4  57.7  64.2 
Aberthaw  3.4  3.5  3.8  4.5  5.6 
·--··  ··--~-~--- ------
1973  1974  1975  1976 
APCM  271.4  361.8  408.1  483.5 
T.W.  Ward  62.5  86.8  91.0  95.4 
Tunnel  34.5  36. l  37.3  40.4 
Rugby  73.7  74. l  81.2  90.4 
I 
Aberthaw  7.8  9.8  11.2  12.4 
------------------- ·----------- ·----- . - -- ..  ----------~--------.. ·------·····-· -- -----------------------4 
173 Table  79  Number  of  Ernplolees  in U.K. 
~--
·----~--------·  ---------------------------------- ----- -- -------· 
I 
I 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  l 
-·-------· ··- --- - -------------~~----·· 
APCM  14382  14413  13551  13304  13072 
T.W.  Ward  10985  10761  10817  10930  11069 
Tunnel  2351  2423  2518  2490  2429 
Rugby  3303  3351  3347  3388  3405 
I  Aberthaw  560 
'-·-·-·  . ···-·. 
561  572  611  735 
--------- r 
----~---------------------'" 
1973  1974  1975  1976 
-------------- ~ 
APCM  13053  13110  12597  12228 
T.W.  \vard  11069  10724  10218  9256 
Tunnel  2386  2267  2167  1878 
Rugby  3402  3328  3175  3135 
i 
l 
j__~~-e-=-~~~~--------·-------}_!__1  ----------~~~-------?~~-------~~~-----·----------
174 Table so  Wages  and  Salaries in  UK  (£m) 
-~--~----------------·-·· 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
I  -·-·-·-·--·-·-1 
APCM  18.98  20. II  21.52  24.21  27.29  I 
T.W.  Ward  10.99  11.70  12.90  14.53  16.09 
Tunnel  3.06  3.32  3.95  4.49  5.06 
Rugby  4.46  4.79  5.27  5.84  6.51 
Aberthaw  0.81  0.87  1.05  1.21  1.58 
•• '""'"""-- W•  o  •  o  ,,_  ... 
--~----·-------------------
1973  1974  1975  1976 
-.  ------------- ----· ----··  ------ ----------- - ·- -·-·--- ---------·------------- --------· 
APCM  30.34  36.16  45. 19  49.32 
T  .W.  Ward  17.48  21.02  25.22  26.09 
Tunnel  5.44  6.46  7.65  7.29. 
Rugby  7.44  8.61  10.27  II.  45 
Aberthaw  I.  78  2. 11  2.76  3.26 
··------------------------ - ------------------···--- ·-
175 Table  81  Net  12rofit  (Em) 
I968  I969  I970  I97I  I972 
APCM  20.99  I8.73  20.84  29.6I  30.7I 
T.W.  Ward  2.96  3.I9  4.25  5.44  6.9I 
Tunnel  2.67  2. I4  I.  76  2.69  4.60 
Rugby  5.88  6.86  8.I7  9.96  I0.80 
Abert  haw  0.56  0.5.5  0.81  1.00  1.27 
-~--~---.......  ~- ,,  "  . .  ~-· . 
---·-·-~--
1973  I974  I975  I976 
----- ----------·- --------····  ----~· 
APCH  37.50  29.15  49 .IO  52,30 
T.W.  Ward  8.67  II.  02  II. 70  I2.25 
Tunnel  5. 16  4.66  4.81  6.48 
Rugby  II.99  II.  66  I2.67  14.02 
I  Abert  haw  1.18  I. I3  I.  96  2.18 
!  ···-···-· ..  -·- ··------------ --·--- ---~----~----- ---·------------~ 
176 Table 82  Gross  Cash Flow  (£m) 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
- ---·-·-··----- ..  -~-------·-·--- -- -·  .  ------
APCM  29.78  30.78  31.66  41.01  41 .84 
T.W.  Ward  4.30  4.57  5.75  7.06  8.68 
Tunnel  3.87  3.38  3. 16  4.39  6.40 
Rugby  7.29  9.02  10.24  12.04  13.18 
Aberthaw  0.79  0. 77  1.04  I.  24  1.56 
- -- -- -~--
r---------------- -------------------- ----------
1973  1974  1975  1976 
-------------------
APCM  52.09  46.71  69.10  76.60 
T.W.  Ward  10.62  13.32  14. 18  14.88 
Tunnel  6.99  6.47  6.54  8.07 
Rugby  15.19  14.69  16.16  18.07 
Aberthaw  1.51  1.47  2.43  2.84 
177 Table  83  Net  Cash  Flow  (Em) 
--------- ----- "" -f 
! 
I 
1968  196.9  1970  1971  1972 
APCM  21.6 7  24.28  25.78  33.77  34.17 
T.W.  Ward  3.08  3.28  4.13  4.99  6.22 
Tunnel  2.82  2.53  2. 51  3.43  4.65 
I 
I 
I  L  __ Aberthaw 
Rugby  9.90 
1.04 
8.27  9.07  6. II  7.58 
0.58  0.56  0.74  0.86 
APCM  38.30  35.23  46.70  54.00 
T.W.  Ward  7.60  9.18  9.98  10.34 
i  Tunnel  5.00  4.26  4.28  4.99 
I 
I 
I  Rugby  II. 14  I0.69  II.  4 7  I2.73  l  Aberthaw  0.95  0.90  I.  IS  2.00 
-----·-~---·  ~------ -·--- .. 
178 Table  84  Estimated Turnover  from  Sales  of  Cement  in the  UK  (£m) 
Figures  in parentheses  show  estimated  UK  cement  turnover  as  a  percentage of· 
total  turnover.  Stars  denote  estimated magnitudes. 
------- ---------------- ---------:------------------------- ___ l  ________  -
Yc:;ar 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Abert  haw 
3.8  (100) 
4.0  (100) 
5.0  (100) 
6.5  (100) 
7.5  (88) 
8. I  (86) 
8.1  (83) 
11.3  (87) 
13.2  (87) 
APCM 
63.0,~  (46) 
65.8*  (45) 
71.9*  (49) 
91.2*  (53) 
96.3*  (46) 
110.8  (53) 
II I . 3  (52) 
150.8  (53) 
167.7  (47) 
I 
a  Ketton 
3.6  (100) 
3.9  (100) 
4.7  (100) 
5. 7  (I 00) 
6.4*  (100)* 
6.1*  (100)* 
7.7*  (100)* 
9.7*  (100)* 
I 2. 7*  (I  00) * 
~--··-----T  ;i~b  ~.~;.:.p....,g'-b__y...___ __  -t--·-T_u_n_ne_l_a  ________  ~·----------· 
1968  4.1*  (100)  13.5*  (51)*  14.1*  (75)* 
1969  4.8*  (100)* 
1970  5.3*  (100)* 
1971  6.9*  (100)* 
1972  6.4*  (100)* 
1973  7.8*  (100)* 
1974  8. 7*  (100)* 
1975  12.1  (100)* 
1976  14.1*  (100)* 
14.2*  (45)* 
15.8*  (42)* 
22.5  (51) 
23.7  (52) 
27.0  (47) 
26.9  (41) 
36.5  (51) 
42.7  (55) 
14.8*  (79)* 
16.4*  (73)* 
21 .4  (80)* 
21.4*  (72)* 
20.4*  (60)* 
21.7*  (52)* 
26.0*  (54)* 
30.4*  (58)* 
- ______________________  ,!,.._ ______  ...,L_ ____________  • 
179 Table  84  (cont) 
i 
Year  b  Ketton  Tunnel  b  T.W.Ward  I  F.L.Schmidth 
1968  5.6*  (I 00)*  16. I*  (86)*  4. 1*  (7)*  4.2*  (n.a.) 
1969  6.3*  (I 00)*  17.2*  (92)*  4.7*  (7)*  4.5*  (n.a.) 
I 
I 
1970  7.3*  ( 100)*  19.0*  (85)*  5.4*  (7)*  4.9*  (n.a.) 
1971  9. I*  (100)*  24.8*  (93)*  6.7*  (8)*  6.4*  (n.a.) 
1972  9.6*  (100)*  24. 6i•  (82)*  7. I*  (7)*  6.4*  (n. a.) 
1973  10.0*  (100)*  24.3*  ( 71) ,.,  10.3*  (8)*  4. 7*  (n.a.) 
1974  12.0*  (100)*  26.0*  (62)*  18. 0* (II)*  0*  (0)* 
1975  15.7*  ( 100)*  32.0*  (66)*  24. 0* (II)*  0*  (O)* 
1976  19.7*  (I  00)*  37.4*  (72)*  29.4*(13)*  0*  (0)* 
I 
Notes 
The  figures  for Kettona  and  Tunnela  do  not  include  the estimated sales 
of  their associated  company,  Ribblesdale. 
In the  columns  headed Kettonb  and  Tunnelb,  the appropriate  shares  (50%) 
of  Ribblesdale's  estimated  cement  sales have  been assigned  to  the  former 
companies.  The  figures  under  Tunnelb  are  therefore  the appropriate ones 
to  use  (in conjunction with  the firm's  other  accounting data)  when  assessing 
the relative  importance  of its total  cement  activities. 
The  Ward  figures  are  obtained by  assigning  the  company  the follo"'ing 
fractions  (based  on  percentages  of  equity  owned)  of other  firms'  sales: 
Until  end-June  1973  - 74%  of Ketton's  saLes  (b  column) 
After end-June  1973  - 100%  of Ketton's  sales  (b  column) 
After  end-September  1973- 26%  of  Tunnel's  sales  (b  column) 
The  Schmidth  sales are  calculated as  26%  of  Tunnelb  until end-September 
1973. 
180 Appendix  2:  Profit  and  Loss  Acc9unts 
Table 85  APCM  Group  Profit and Loss  Account,  year  ended 
31st December  1976 
TURNOVER 
Trading profit before depreciation 
less  Depreciation 
TRADING  PROFIT 
add  Share  of profits of  associates 
add  Investment  income 
less  Finance  charges 
PROFIT  BEFORE  TAXATION 
less  Taxation 
PROFIT  AFTER  TAXATION 
less  Interest of minority  shareholders 
GROUP  SHARE  OF  PROFIT  AFTER  TAXATION 
Dividends 
Retained profit 
Earnings  per  £1  ordinary  stock unit 
181 
f.m 
360.0 
55.9 
24.3 
31.6 
16.9 
3.8 
6.9 
45.4 
22.6 
22.8 
4.4 
18.4 
6.8 
II .6 
22.8  p Table 86  APCM  Company  and  Group  Balance  Sheets  31st December  1976 
~-~-~--
CAPITAL  EMPLOYED 
Ordinary  capital 
Reserves 
TOTAL  ORDINARY  STOCKHOLDERS  FUNDS 
Preference Capital 
Minority interests 
Investment  incentives equalisation 
Debentures  and  loans 
Total  Capital Employed 
NET  ASSETS  EMPLOYED 
CURRENT  ASSETS 
Stocks  and  work  in progress 
Debtors 
Deposits 
Bank  balances 
182 
81.0 
113.6 
194.6 
0.3 
24.6 
62."i 
282.0 
32.6 
43. I 
20.4 
0.2 
:31  • 0 
2:54.6 
335.6 
0.3 
<+2. 8 
30.1 
74.7 
4:33.5 
67.2 
68.6 
23.2 
2.4 
96.3  161.4 1able  87  APCM  Group  Source  and Application of  Funds,  year  ended 
31st  Dec0mber  1976 
,----------------------------------------------------~----------------~ 
I 
£  millions 
SOURCES 
Profit before  taxation  45.4 
Depreciation  24.3 
Profits retained in associates  -5.2 
Disposal  of  investments  0.5 
Disposal  of  fixed  assets  4.1 
New  loans  11.4 
TOTAL  80.5 
APPLICATIONS 
Dividends  paid  8.2 
Tax  paid  13.3 
Purchase of  fixed  assets  14.4 
Purchase of  investments  13.1 
Redemption  of  depentures  and  loans  3.2 
Increase in stocks  4.6 
Increase in debtors  8.2 
Increase in creditors  0. 1 
Increase in net  liquid  funds  15.4 
TOTAL  80.5 
183 Table  88  APCM  Group  Financial  Statement  1967  - 76  (all figures  l.n  £  million) 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
!cAPITAL  EMPLOYED 
Ordinary capital  54.0  54.0  54.0  54.0  54.0  81.0  81.0  81.0  81.0  81.0 
Reserves  53.1  57.6  80.2  87.7  93.9  68.9  86.6  171.3  195.6  254.6 
Total  ordinary  stockholders'  I 07. I  Ill • 6  134.2  141.7  147.8  149.8  167.6  252.2  276.6  335.6  funds 
Preference  capital  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Debenture  and  loans  24.2  35.6  51.7  58.9  56.7  58.2  56.5  51.2  72.3  74.7 
- Minority interests  13.8  20.3  21.3  18.6  19.9  16.5  19.6  30.2  28.8  42.8  =  ... 
Investment  incentives  equal- 4.0  6.0  5. I  8.0  8.4  21.9  27.4  27.8  30. I  30. 1  isation 
Total  capital employed  149.3  173.8  212.6  227.5  233.1  246.7  271 .4  361.8  408. I  483.5 
REPRESENTED  BY 
Fixed Assets  Ill .5  131.2  168.6  169.8  17 I.  8  184.7  195. I  281 .4  271.9  272.4 
Trade  Investments  10.2  10.9  13.2  23.9  25.5  32.7  38.8  48.9  76.8  133.3 
Net  current assets  27.6  31.7  30.8  33.7  35.7  29.3  37.4  31.5  59.4  77.8 
Total  149.3  173.8  212.6  227.5  233. I  246.7  271.4  361 .8  408. I  483.5 Table  89  Rugby  Portland Group  Profit and Loss  Account,  year  ended 
31st  December  1976 
£  thousands 
TURNOVER  77,562 
PROFIT  BEFORE  TAXATION  I2,49I 
less Taxation  5,333 
less Minority  interests  202 
add  Extraordinary  item  I ,845 
less Extraordinary  item to capital reserve  I ,845 
PROFIT  ATTRIBUTABLE  TO  THE  SHAREHOLDERS  6,956 
Dividends  3,053 
Retentions  3,903 
Earnings  per  25p  ordinary  share  8.2  p 
Earnings  per  5p  participating share  3.6  p 
Note:  The  extraordinary  item  in the  accounts  represents  the excess  of 
the sale proceeds  of Trinidad  Cement  Limited  over  the  consolidated 
assets at  the date of  sale,  31  July  1976. 
185 Table  89  (continued)  APCM  Group  Financial  Statement  1967  - 1976 
TURNOVER 
Rome  Companies 
Overseas  Companies 
Total 
PROFITS,  DIVIDENDS  AND 
RETENTIONS 
Depreciation 
Trading profit after depreciation 
Profit before  taxation 
Taxation 
Profit after  taxation 
Group  share  of  profit after 
taxation 
Ordinary dividends 
Retained profit 
I 
I  i  84.9 
I 37.6 
I 
1122.5 
8.8 
19.0 
18.9 
7.7 
11.2 
10.3 
6. 1 
4. 1 
1969  1970 
89.8  89.3  99.9 
46.8  56.0  45.6 
136.6  145.3  145.4 
9.3  12.2  11. 1 
18.7  15.8  16.8 
18.3  15.4  15.9 
8.1  6.9  5.9 
10.2  8.4  10.0 
8.8  6.5  8.7 
6. 1  4.6  6.2 
2.7  1.9  2.5 
1971 
119. 8 
50.9 
170.7 
12.4 
23.8 
23.0 
7.2 
15.7 
13.6 
7.6 
6.0 
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
129.6  150.5  153. 1  202.9  239.6 
45.1  58.4  60.2  83.2  120.4 
174.7  208.9  213.3  286. 1  360.0 
12.7  15.0  17.6  20.0  24.3 
23.4  28.6  18.0  31.5  31.6 
23.7  31.8  22.5  42.5  45.4 
7.7  13.8  11.5  22.4  22.6 
16.0  18.0  11.0  20. 1  22.8 
14. 1  15.5  8.2  16.6  18.4 
6.3  5.7  5.7  6.2  6.8 
7.8  9.8  2.5  10.4  11.6 
Note:  In  1976  a  Rhodesian  subsidiary company,  the Salisbury Portland Cement  Company  Limited,  ceased  to  be 
consolidated because of  the political situation in that  country.  In  1975  SPCC  appears  to  have  contributed 
£6.2m  to  turnover. Table 90  Rugby  Portland  Company  and  Group  Balance  Sheet~2-_2Ist  Dece~er ~976 
., 
£  thousands 
Company  Group 
--
CAPITAL  EMPLOYED 
Share  Capital  19220  19220 
Reserves  19928  48999 
Future  taxation  4590  7025 
Loan  stock  12500  12500 
Minority interests,  etc.  - 2662 
Total  capital  employed  56238  90406 
' 
NET  ASSETS  EMPLOYED 
CURRENT  ASSETS 
Stocks  7650  17094 
Debtors  6556  13078 
Bank  balances  7144  25953 
Total  21350  56125 
CURRENT  LIABILITIES 
Creditors  8860  18891 
Dividends  3053  3053 
Bank  overdrafts  2514  6101 
Total  14427  28135 
NET  CURRENT  ASSETS  6923  27990 
FIXED  ASSETS  24821  59712 
SUBSIDIARY  COMPANIES  24347  -
INVESTMENTS  147  2704 
Total  56238  90406 
187 Table  91  Rugby  Portland  Group  Source  and  Application of  Funds, 
year  ended  31st  December  1976 
SOURCES 
Profit after  taxation and  minority interests 
Depreciation 
Future  taxation 
Minority  interests 
Sale  proceeds  of  subsidiary 
Currency  changes 
Investments 
Total 
APPLICATIONS 
Fixed assets 
Dividends  paid 
Secured  loan repayment 
Increase in stocks 
Increase in debtors 
Increase  Ln  creditors 
Increase in bank balances 
Total 
£  thousands 
+-------------·~ 
6956 
4052 
2540 
87 
4400 
1265 
90 
19390 
6684 
2776 
41 
5216 
2746 
-1601 
3528 
19390 
·-----------------------------------·------~---------------· 
188 ~ .. , 
Table  92  Rugby  Portland  Group  Financial  Statement  1967  - 76  (all figures  l.n  £  million) 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  ., 
CAPITAL  EMPLOYED 
Share  and  loan capital  14.4  27.5  26.9  26.8  29.0  29 .o  32.5  32.5  32.5  32.2 
Reserves  16.7  20.4  23.4  25.8  26. I  32.2  35.7  36.9  42.0  49.0 
Future  taxation  0.6  1.0  1.4  1.8  1.5  1.6  3.0  3. 1  4.9  7.0 
Minority interests  0.7  0.7  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.4  2. I  2.0  2. I  2.2 
Inter-group balance  -0.3 
-
Total capital  employed  32. 1  49.7  52.6  55.4  57.7  64.2  73.2  74. I  81.2  90.4  =  I.Q 
REPRESENTED  BY 
Fixed assets  25.9  35.0  35.2  37.7  40.6  49.0  54.5  55.8  59.6  59.7 
Net  current assets  6. 1  14.7  17.4  1  7. 7  1  7. I  15.2  18.7  18.4  21.5  30.7 
Total  32. 1  49.7  52.6  55.4  57.7  64.2  73.2  7  4. 1  81.2  90.4  I Table  92  (continued)  Rugby  Portland  Group  Financial  Statement  1967  - 76 
--·-···  ----- ....  . 
I967  I968  I969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  I975  1976 
TURNOVER  I9.0  26.4  31.7  37.8  43.9  46.0  57.8  65.2  71.6  77.6 
I  PROFITS'  DIVIDENDS  AND 
RETENTIONS 
I 
Profit before taxation  4.6  5.2  5.9  7. I  9.0  9.9  I0.9  10.5  11.3  12.5 
Taxation  I.  I  1.2  1.4  2.0  3.0  3.3  4.1  4.0  4.7  5.3 
Minority interests  0.2  0. I  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.2  0. I  0.2 
...... 
I,Q  Profit after taxation  Q  3.3  3.8  4.3  4.9  5.8  6.4  6.6  6.3  6.5  7.0  and minority interests 
Dividends  1.6  1.8  2.2  2.4  3.2  2.7  2.4  2.6  2.8  3. I 
Retentions  1.7  2.0  2.0  2.5  2.6  3.7  4.2  3.7  3.7  3.9 Table  93  Tunnel  ~oldings Group  Profit and  Loss  Account,  year  ended 
27th March  1977 
TURNOVER 
Group  turnover,  excluding  intra-group  sales 
Share  of associated  companies 
TRADING  PROFIT 
add  Share  of profits of associated  compan~es 
add  Other  investment  income 
add  Interest  receivable  less payable 
less  Debenture  interest payable 
add  Exceptional  items 
PROFIT  BEFORE  TAXATION 
less Taxation 
PROFIT  AFTER  TAXATION 
add  Minority interests 
add  Extraordinary  items 
PROFIT  ATTRIBUTABLE  TO  THE  SHAREHOLDERS 
Dividends 
Retentions 
Earnings per  SOp  equity unit 
£  thousands 
NOTES  The  exceptional  items  resulted from profit on  the purchase  for 
cancellation of  5!%  debenture  stock  (£7000)  and  from  the  surplus 
on  the sale of  a  subsidiary's business  (£218000). 
The  extraordinary  items  were  realised profits on  the sales of 
investments. 
191 Table  94  Tunnel  Holdings  Parent  C~any and  Group  Balance  Sheets, 
27th March  1977 
CAPLTAL  EMPLOYED 
Ordinary  shares  and  stock 
Reserves 
Preference  Capital 
Debentures 
Deferred  taxation 
Minority interests 
Total  capital employed 
NET  ASSETS  EMPLOYED 
CURRENT  ASSETS 
Bank  balances  and  cash 
Short-term deposits 
Debtors 
Stocks,  machinery  spares,  etc. 
Total 
CURRENT  LIABILITIES 
Bank  overdrafts  and  advances 
Creditors 
Taxation 
Dividends 
Total 
NET  CURRENT  ASSETS 
ASSETS  HELD  FOR  DISPOSAL 
FIXED  ASSETS 
INVESTMENTS 
INTEREST  IN  SUBSIDIARIES 
Total 
192 
£  thousands 
Company 
5870 
20630 
1200 
2249 
17 
29966 
5 
6400 
806 
7211 
30 
1531 
59 I 
810 
2962 
4249 
2346 
854 
225I7 
29966 
Group 
5870 
26205 
1200 
2249 
5476 
298 
41298 
409 
9540 
7995 
8013 
25957 
466 
6715 
ISIS 
SIO 
9489 
I6468 
693 
I7451 
6686 
41298 
:: 
i 
'"i Table  95  Tunnel  Holdings  Group  Source  and Application of  Funds, 
Year  ending  27th March  1977 
SOURCES 
Profit before  tax and  extraordinary  items 
Extraordinary  items 
Depreciation 
Retained  in associated  companies 
Minority interests on  acquisition of  subsidiary 
Reserves  on  acquisition of  subsidiary 
Sale of fixed  assets  and  assets held for disposal 
Total 
~PPLICATIONS 
Dividends  paid  to  shareholders 
Dividends  paid  to minority  interests 
Taxation 
Purchase  of  investments 
Purchase of  fixed  assets 
Purchase of debentures  for  c,'lncellation 
Increase  1n stocks 
Increase 1n debtors 
Increase in creditors 
Increase in liquid funds 
Total 
193 
£  thousands 
6473 
307 
1589 
-1686 
173 
253 
870 
7979 
Ill  7 
6 
331 
960 
1592 
13 
-508 
-117 
3877 
708 
7979 Table  96  Tunnel  Holdings  Groups  Financial  Statement  1967-77  (all Figures  in £  millions). 
I 
il967 /8  1968/9  1969/70  1970/71  1971/72  1972/73  1973/74  1974/75  1975/76  1976/77~  J 
I 
CAPITAL  EMPLOYED  I 
!  i 
I 
1  Equity interests  I  18.2  18.2  20.5  23.7  26.9  27.6  28.6  29.4  32. 1  i 18.0 
Preference  capital  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2  1 • 2  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2 
Minority interests  I  0.1  0. I  0.2 
I 
Debentures 
I  3.0  2.9  2.8  2.8  2.7  2.6  2.5  2.4  2.3  2.2  I 
I 
I 
Deferred  taxation 
I 
1.6  1.8  2. 1  2.2  3.4  3. 1  3.4  4.3  4.5  5.5 
Total capital employed,24. 0  24.0  24.4  26.6  31.0  33.8  34.7  36.5  37.5  41.3 
I  -
I 
I 
\C  I 
~  REPRESENTED  BY  I 
I 
Fixed assets  16.5  19.7  21.0  20.5  21.4  20.4  20.3  19.0  19.0  18. 1 
Investments  2.7  2.7  2.7  3.5  2.6  4. 1  6.6  6.6  5.0  6.7 
Net  current assets  4.8  1.6  0.7  2.6  7.0  9.3  7.8  10.8  13.5  16.5 
Total  124.0  24.0  24.4  26.6  31.0  33.8  34.7  36.5  37.5  41.3 
'  ~--~---~  ~---~--~ Table  96  (continued)  Tunnel  Holdings  Group  Financial  Statement  1967  - 77 
_____  ,.,  ·~---·~--~---
I  11967/8  1968/9  I969/70  1970/1  1971/2  1972/3  I973/4  1974/5  I975/6  1976/7 
I 
I 
TURNOVER 
Group  turnover  1  7. I  16.8  16.6  19.4  23.5  24. I  23.5  26.3  32.3  33.6 
Share of associated  3.7  4.5  6.5  I1.8  17.8  17.6  I9.4  companies 
PROFIT,  DIVIDENDS 
and  RETENTIONS 
Depreciation  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.7  I • 6 
-
Trading profit  2. 1  1.7  0.8  1.1  2.8  3.9  2.9  2.5  4.2  3.7 
-.e 
<:.n 
Profit before  taxation  2.6  2. 1  1.5  2.3  4.2  5.0  4.6  4. I  6.3  6.5 
Taxation  1.1  0.9  0.6  0.9  1.7  1.9  2.3  2.0  3.0  3. I 
Profit after taxation  1.5  1.2  0.8  1.4  2.4  3.2  2.3  2. 1  3.3  3.4 
Profit attributable to  1.5  1.2  0.8  1.3  2.4  3. 1  2.3  2. 1  3.2  3.3  equity 
Ordinary  dividends  1.2  1.0  0.7  0.9  1.2  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.1 
Retentions  0.4  0.2  0. I  0.6  1.6  2.2  0.4  1.0  0.9  2.5 
L_  _______ Table  97  Aberthaw Cement  Group  Profit and Loss  Account,  year 
ended  31st December  1976 
£  thousands 
TURNOVER  15239 
PROFIT  BEFORE  TAXATION  1677 
less  Taxation  839 
PROFIT  ATTRIBUTABLE  TO  SHAREHOLDERS  838 
Dividends  248 
Retentions  590 
Earnings  per  25  p  ordinary share  21 . 23p 
196 Table  98  Aberthaw  Cement  Company  and  Group  (  consolidated) 
Balance  Sheets,  31st December  1976 
r-----------------------------------------------~---------------------------1 
CAPITAL  EMPLOYED 
Issued capital 
Reserves 
Loans 
Deferred grants 
Deferred  taxation 
Total capital  employed 
NET  ASSETS  EMPLOYED 
CURRENT  ASSETS 
Stocks 
Debtors  and  prepayments 
Regional  development  grant 
Investments 
Cash  and  bank  balances 
Total 
CURRENT  LIABILITIES 
Creditors  and  accrued  charges 
Taxation 
Bank  overdrafts 
Acceptance  credit 
Dividend  on  preference  stock 
Proposed dividend  on  ordinary  shares 
Total 
NET  CURRENT  ASSETS 
FIXED  ASSETS  AT  NET  BOOK  VALUE 
INVESTMENT  IN  SUBSIDIARIES 
EXCESS  OF  COST  OF  SHARES  IN  SUBSIDIARIES  OVER 
BOOK  VALUE  OF  NET  ASSETS  ACQUIRED 
Total 
197 
£  thousands 
Company  Group(consolidated) 
1221 
4147 
2750 
709 
3388 
12215 
2757 
1747 
25 
2 
4531 
1587 
137 
736 
100 
6 
235 
2801 
1730 
9778 
707 
12215 
1221 
4226 
2750 
709 
3524 
12430 
3244 
2162 
25 
13 
I I 
5455 
1776 
158 
985 
100 
6 
235 
3260 
2195 
9969 
266 
12430 
I 
i Table  99  Aberthaw Cement  Group  Source  and Application of  Funds, 
year  ended  31st December  1976 
·--------------' 
SOURCES 
Profit before  taxation 
Depreciation less grants  released 
Sale of  fixed  assets 
Grants  received 
Total 
APPLICATIONS 
Purchase of fixed  assets 
Dividends  paid 
Taxation 
Costs  re.lating  to  the acquisition of  a  subsidiary 
Repayment  of  loan 
Increase in stocks 
Increase in debtors 
Increase in creditors 
Increase  1n  investments 
Net  decrease in short  term borrowings 
Total 
198 
£  thousands 
1677 
566 
22 
191 
2446 
747 
227 
118 
19 
50 
800 
284 
-67 
13 
255 
2446 Table  100  Aberthaw Cement  Financial  Statement  1967-76  (all figures  1n  £  thousands) 
--~---------------··-
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
CAPITAL  EMPLOYED 
Share  capital and  reserves  2407  2432  2460  2707  3017  3928  4232  4356  4857  5447 
Loans  250  300  1300  2800  2800  2750 
Deferred grants  316  330  347  352  352  313  333  470  698  709 
Deferred  taxation  508  615  670  763  885  1097  1899  2207  2830  3524 
Total  capital employed  3231  3377  2477  3822  4504  5638  7764  9833  11185  12430  - '-=  '-= 
REPRESENTED  BY 
Fixed assets  3922  3771  3801  3708  3872  4996  7351  8840  9904  9969 
Net  current assets  -691  -394  -324  I 14  632  399  173  752  1040  2195 
Goodwill  243  240  241  241  266 
Total  3231  3377  3477  3822  4504  5638  7764  9833  11185  12430 
---------------TablelOO  (continued)  Aberthaw Cement  Financial  Statement  1967  - 76 
~ ------- ------ --- ---- --- ---· ----- --------~-
I 1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  I 
! 
TURNOVER  3768  3826  3995  4997  6508  8502  9412  9786  13049  15239 
PROFITS,  DIVIDENDS  and 
RETENTIONS 
Depreciations  260  230  225  228  239  292  336  351  477  663 
Profit before  taxation  410  481  473  744  953  1223  1149  1085  1642  1677 
Taxation  173  207  212  300  379  518  566  564  836  839 
Profit after taxation  237  274  261  444  574  705  583  521  806  838 
~  Extraordinary  items  72  189  78  =  =  Dividends  234  128  115  281  295  230  207  207  227  248 
Retentions  3  25  12  178  279  475  304  125  501  590 
NOTES 
From  1972  onwards  the figures  are  drawn  from  the consolidated accounts.  Prior  to  1972  consolidated 
accounts  for  the company  are not available. 
The  figures  for  extraordinary  items  are dominated  by  interest,  less  taxation relief on  a  bank  loan obtained 
for  the purpose of financing  a  new  kiln during its construction period. European Communities- Commission 
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